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Summary 
 
This research sets out to explore the interface between the new politics of localisation and the 
political process in India. Governments and donors have increasingly emphasised the locality as 
the primary unit of development and politics. This new trajectory has been manifest in the 
increase of community-based organisations and mechanisms of participatory governance at the 
local level. From the late 1990s, the south Indian state of Andhra Pradesh emerged as one of 
the most important examples of this new developmental politics and this research sets out to 
explore how local dynamics changed as a result. 
 
Political economy approaches tend to focus on state-periphery relations in terms of interest 
groups or vote banks. By contrast, this research found the village to be an enduring unit in the 
political system through which political identity manifests itself through three features. First, 
participation in local elections is driven by common forces of politics of parties, caste and 
corruption but its outcome is dependent on the specific context at the village level. Second, 
new participatory institutions created through state policy were found to merge with informal 
practices at the local level and produce a complex interplay between the new local and state 
identities. Third, analysis of leadership found evidence of a well-defined system of organisation 
within party groups at the village level, which were shaped not by party institutions but by the 
inner workings of village politics.  
 
These findings give cause to reassess the way in which we understand policy and political 
change. I do so by expanding on Skocpol's polity approach, which focused attention on the 
dynamic interplay of policy and social structure. Drawing on elements of the 'political 
development' theory, the concept of a ‘developing polity’ approach is elaborated on, to better 
explain the complex interplay between local and higher level politics. These findings have 
implications for understanding both political change in India and development strategy. The 
macro-perspective on the decay of political institutions is contrasted with a local perspective 
that finds evidence of the vitality of party politics at the village level. This has a number of 
important implications for development, both in terms of the way in which we analyse 
participation and the way in which participatory development can be translated into political 
change.   
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Chapter 1: The Politics of Development and the 
Development of Politics 
 
 
1. 1 Introduction 
 
This thesis emerges from a long-term fascination with village politics developed during 
countless hours of discussion in various parts of rural India. Villagers do not willingly 
engage in discussions of village politics with outsiders but once one starts asking the 
right questions, a complex world of intrigue opens up - one that is populated by events, 
issues and actors that have immense significance for rural denizens but have little 
impact outside their immediate localities. 
 
As Beteille (1965) observed, political processes at the village level have an informal 
character whose analysis requires tools of a different kind from those that are 
conventionally used by political scientists. In fact, it can be questioned whether the 
word ‘politics’ means the same at the level of the village and the state (ibid:141). Yet 
for the majority of the poor, the village is the first and most important arena for public 
participation; it conditions their participation and their outlook (Ruud 2000:1). As such, 
penetrating village politics is both a political as well as a developmental challenge. 
 
Rural India has undergone immense changes over the last three decades on account of 
successive waves of democratisation, as well as, economic and social mobilisation. 
These changes have served to undermine the conceptual clarity of the village as a unit 
of analysis for understanding rural poverty. At the same time, it has become 
increasingly apparent that the poor do not automatically benefit from democracy and 
economic growth. This realisation has led donors and governments across the world to 
adopt new approaches to development that have emphasised the need to develop the 
capacity of the poor through institution building at the community or local level 
(Manor 2003). 
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In 2000, when this research was originally framed, the tension between formal 
participatory governance reforms and community participation were starting to 
become apparent. Nowhere was this clearer than in the South Indian state of Andhra 
Pradesh where a new, dynamic Chief Minister was spearheading a high profile and 
controversial campaign that sought to mobilise community participation in local 
development that bypassed the constitutionally sanctioned system of democratic 
decentralisation.  Chandrababu Naidu was certainly not the only politician in India to 
support such programmes; what made him different was the scale and degree of 
political support that he gave this new trajectory in development.  
 
One important manifestation of this new development trajectory was an esoteric 
campaign style programme called ‘Janmabhoomi’ (which literally means land of one’s 
birth).Under this programme, the state administration, which included ministers and 
other local government officers,were mobilised to visit all villages in the state and hold 
open meetings with them to discuss development priorities and grant projects to the 
community. These projects were to be implemented bythe villages themselves or 
through the multiple user groups and committees that had been set up to manage 
aspects of village development.  
 
I first learnt of this initiative during a visit to the state.While travelling in villages, I 
observed wall paintings with the Janmabhoomi logo blazoned on walls and buses and 
came to know from the villagers that this was the initiative of the Chief Minister, 
Chandrababu Naidu and his political party.What struck me was the degree of 
penetration which is indeed rarely  found in such government programmes.This is what 
led me to find out more about the approach and the strategy that lay behind this 
unique programme.  
 
The significance of this new trajectory in development needs to be understood in the 
context of what Kohli refers to as the ‘crisis of governability’ (Kohli 1991) and the near 
systemic decay of political institutions in India (Kohli 2000, Manor 1983). Successive 
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waves of democratisation has brought the lower castes and other historically 
marginalised social groups within the ambit of electoral politics (Yadav 1999, 2000) but 
they have also eroded the influence of the local 'big men' who once held sway of local 
politics and formed the vital link to the higher levels of the political system (Kohli 
2000). The political functionality of this relationship has been intensively studied as a 
means to explain the success of the India National Congress Party (INC), which was 
India's main political institution until the 1970s (Weiner 1967, Kothari 1964). According 
to Weiner (1967), the success of democracy during this era was based on the existence 
of two political cultures - the modern culture of national politics and the vernacular 
culture of local politics, and the capacity of the party organisations to emerge as a 
mediator between them.  Successive waves of populist mobilisation undermined this 
distinction, resulting in a 'vacuum of authority' at the local level. Populist leaders have 
been largely unable to make their influence penetrate effectively to the local level and 
as result, India's polity has become more fluid and difficult to govern (Manor 1983).  
 
For most politicians in developing democracies, the local space is a terra incognita1 in 
which social structures and behaviours ‘function according to their own rules’ (Ruud 
2000:1) and hence cannot be understood without ‘travelling down the various levels of 
the political system’ (Kohli 2000:228). As Kohli argues, rather than assuming that social 
structures are given, it is important to recognise that social and political actors at the 
periphery are actively involved in shaping the use of authority and in the process, both 
the state and society are reformed from below (ibid). Fuller and Benei (2000) coined 
the phrase the ‘everyday state’ to highlight the distinction between politics in the local 
space in contrast to the ‘large scale structures and epochal events’ that characterise 
state or national level politics in India. Chatterjee coined the term ‘political society’ to 
focus attention on the ‘ability of particular population groups to mobilise support to 
influence the implementation of governmental policy in their favour’, with the result 
that therewas ‘no equal or uniform exercise of the rights or citizenship’ (Chatterjee 
2006:60). As Heller (2000) argues, successful decentralisation is contingent on the 
                                            
1
 I am grateful to James Manor for alerting me to this concept, and have borrowed the term from his 
writing (Manor 1983). 
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presence of a well-organised party and a well organised civil society which serves to 
make the critical connection between local politics and the state.  
 
This thesis sets out to contribute to this debate on the ‘new politics of localisation’ in 
the context of India. Using the case of Andhra Pradesh as an example, the study shows 
how the focus on the locality by state politicians can be a pragmatic response to the 
broader political and governance challenges in a highly politicised bi-polar polity. Yet, 
when one looks beyond the macro-political economy to the local level, a more complex 
picture of politics emerges, one in which the policy process is mediated by a newly 
invigorated village politics.  
 
As the remainder of this chapter sets out to show, the focus on the locality as a site for 
development (Harriss et al. 2004:1) evokes fundamental questions regarding the 
construction of the polity in developing societies. These questions have tended to be 
downplayed in favour of accounts of the dual process of ‘glocalisation’ or the meeting 
between policy approaches from international organisations and new possibilities of 
political action from the local level (ibid). As theorists of political development have 
long since argued, the relationship between local and national politics is the main force 
in the process of political change and underpins the central challenge of governance.  
The ‘developing polity approach’ set out below seeks to understand how the new 
politics of development is based on the search for the ‘institutional fit’ (Skocpol 1993, 
Houtzager 2003) between pragmatic electoral compulsions and the distinctive politics 
of rural localities.   
 
1.2 Theoretical Considerations – The New Politics of Localisation 
 
Donors and governments have increasingly focused their attention on the locality as 
the 'primary arena for development and politics' (Harriss et al 2004). The spread of 
democracy in the developing world has been accompanied by a growing sense of 
disquiet regarding the effectiveness of representative politics and centralised 
developmental states and an indiscriminate hostility towards large-scale political 
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organisations (Houtzager 2003) - especially political parties. What is needed, it is 
argued, is a new politics - one that promotes the empowerment and inclusion of the 
poor through 'local spaces and practices' (Harris et al. 2004, Mohan and Stokke 2008). 
 
The mainstreaming of the new politics of localisation into practice has been manifest in 
a significant increase in funding and institution building efforts that are directed at the 
community level, resulting in the establishment of an array of community based 
organisations (CBOs) and new mechanisms of participation in local governance. The 
2004 World Development Report was an important milestone in this regard, by framing 
discussions of voice and accountability towards the interactions between users and 
providers, rather than voters and the state (World Bank 2003). In many parts of the 
developing world, this new development trajectory has progressed in parallel to 
existing systems of the local government, leading one observer to label this the 'second 
wave of decentralisation' (Manor 2004). The effects of this second wave are contested. 
For some, it represented a potentially damaging force of polycentrism that undermines 
the long-term project of democratic reform (Manor 2004). Others see the creation of 
new political spaces as an important prospect for the deepening of democracy 
(Gaventa 2006, Cornwall and Coelho 2007). Donors have played an important role in 
promoting this new trajectory in development, leading some observers to argue that 
this represents a new politics in which the primacy of the state has been undermined 
(Harriss et al. 2004, Mohan and Stokke 2008).  
 
The remainder of this section starts by exploring three perspectives of the politics of 
localisation. The first sees the state as the driver of change, drawing largely on the 
experiences of experiments with formal decentralisation reforms starting from the 
1990s. The second prioritises the independent role of local or community level politics 
in shaping the process and reflects emergence of participatory development in the 
decade that followed. The third attempt,which is a more interactive analysis of state 
and society, draws on the polity approach (Skocpol 1993) with a more recent attempt 
to apply this to a developing country context (Houtzager 2003). The last section sets 
out to adapt this model with greater attention to the distinctive forms of politics in a 
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‘developing polity’;this marks the key departure of this research and serves to establish 
the detailed research question that guides the empirical analysis of local politics in the 
field research.  
 
1.2.1Politics of localisation 
 
Decentralisation has been attempted across the spectrum of political system, ranging 
from relatively stable multi-party democracies to authoritarian and 'fragile' states 
(Crook and Sverrisson 1999). The popularity of the approach focused attention on the 
need for a political economy of development. As Manor (1998) argues, administrative 
reforms need to be understood as a 'double-edged sword', one that was equally 
effective in promoting 'genuine empowerment' as it was in extending 'narrow or 
partisan advantage' (Manor 1999:33-36, also see Slater 1989) by directing resources 
and allocating authority to certain social groups. A more nuanced account, which has 
been explored by Manor in this analysis of the political economy of decentralisation 
(1999) and a less recognised analysis of democratisation (1998), shows how even the 
most committed reformers need to 'strike a balance' between what is desirable and 
what is doable. 
For over two decades, the technocratic thrust of decentralisation emanating from the 
World Bank, in particular, has been met with an increasingly vocal critique in favour of 
understanding institutional change as a political process (Slater 1989). This debate 
crystallised in the 1990s during the decade of decentralisation and sought to draw 
attention to the significance of decentralisation as an ordering political space (Mohan 
and Stokke 2000). The 'political approach' aimed to highlight the extent to which 
technical designs needed to be planned in a way that pays attention to political 
feasibility and administrative capacity (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Looking beyond technical design 
 
(Source: Pritchett et al 2006:9) 
 
 
The political approach sought to emphasise the dangers of “institutional mono-
cropping” (Evans 2002), or the transplanting of 'best practice' across different contexts. 
The political approach to decentralisation drew immense support from the intensive 
analysis of a handful of leading cases: namely, of decentralised planning in Kerala in 
India (Heller 2000) and participatory local budgeting in Porto Alegre in Brazil (Baiocchi 
2003). These cases highlighted the importance of context and the link to the political 
process and especially to the important role played by well-organised left-of-centre 
political parties (Heller 2000) and a strong and capable civil society. While on the one 
hand these 'successes' indicated the potential of what Fung and Wright (2000) termed 
'empowered deliberative democracy', on the other, they defined an entirely different 
analytical challenge, i.e., one of exploring the fit between policy and politics in a 
developing democracy. 
 
Arguably, the most important constraints to reform in a developing democracy are 
imposed by the compulsions of the electoral cycle. As Crook and Sverrisson (1999) 
argue, most decentralisation reforms take some time to get established and in reality, it 
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may take at least 10 to 15 years in a context of financial and political stability, for a 
system to show any results. This commonly overlooked reality has a number of 
important implications and not in the least in terms of focusing attention on tangible 
results in the short term, which often limits or affects the prospect for the type of long 
term transformation envisaged by theorists of empowerment.   
 
The recognition of the importance of understanding participation as a political process 
focused attention on identifying the structures of political support within the 
electorate. As Boone argued, ‘(g)overnments may have important stakes in established 
powerbrokers and in established local-level social and political hierarchies that can 
extend beyond the reach of the state’ (Boone 2003:25). It is, therefore, important to 
attempt to characterise both the way in which society is constituted at the periphery 
and the character and power bases of the national ruling elite which are embedded in 
particular kinds of alliances with local or regional elites and frequently reflect long 
histories of conflict and political bargaining (Crook and Sverrisson 1999:2). 
 
Boone (2003) proposes four models to describe the types of centre-local relations that 
are pertinent to participatory reforms. The first describes a scenario where the ruling 
elite seeks to build its powerbase through alliances with established local or regional 
elites who are both congenial to its interest and have some degree of autonomy. In the 
second scenario, the ruling elite sets out to circumvent locally powerful groups for a 
range of motives ranging from ethnic or ideological differences. The third scenario is 
associated with consolidation or renewal of an already powerful elite or the creation of 
a new set of elites who have been marginalised. The fourth strategy, termed as 'neglect 
isolation', is said to emerge in contexts where societies are not organised and where 
rural elites lack the necessary clout to challenge the centre.   
  
The political approach to decentralisation aims to look beyond the concept of 'political 
will' by emphasising the importance of the 'fit' between state and social structures. As 
Crook and Sverisson (1999) argue, there is sufficient evidence emerging from across 
the world of examples of each of these four models which have resulted from different 
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political conditions. However, this approach tells us less about the capacity of the 
states to control the flow of power and resources to the local level. 
 
1.2.2 Localisation of Politics 
 
Toward the end of the 1990s, the scaling up of participatory or community driven 
development programmes and the links to the state focus attention on the growing 
significance of local politics which illustrates the effect of local dynamics on 
development policies (Chhotray 2004, Veron et al 2003). Kaviraj (2001) states the key 
question eloquently, arguing that policies formulated at the national or state level are 
often distorted beyond recognition by the time they are implemented at the village 
level. While the effectiveness of the state was in question, it was becoming increasingly 
apparent that there were other forces that affected the implementation of the 
development policies.  
 
The concept of the ‘everyday state and political society’ sets out to highlight the 
significance of the gap between the locality and the broader polity. In his overview of 
this analytical approach, Harriss (in Fuller and Benei 2000) argues that the weakness of 
the state gives cause to focus attention on the extent to which the experience of 
citizens is shaped by the quotidian interactions with local bureaucrats and politicians 
(Ruud, in Fuller and Benei 2000, also see Corbridge et al. 2004) and confers salience on 
everyday forms of discourse and strategies played out at the local level. For Ruud, the 
state is mediated through gossip and folk forms, as well as, the narratives of corruption 
that people constructin their everyday lives. This gives cause to challenge the concept 
of an identifiable civil society or public sphere as western thinkers conceive it.  The 
importance of the approach proposed by these theorists lies in the extent to which 
these local patterns of interaction take on an aggregated significance as they are 
reproduced in various ways across a multiple of local spaces, affecting the lives of the 
rural poor. 
 
While the focus of these recent ethnographies of modern India has been on re-
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conceptualising the state, there are important implications for understanding the 
political process. As the previous sections have sought to show, analysis of 
participatory development involves a decision regarding the models adopted. There is 
a tendency to develop proxy categories like elite capture and informal institutions that 
are derived from analysis of the broader political context, yet there is a need to 
consider how successfully these translated into the local context. Conversely, 
developing analysis of participation with too narrow a lens that ignores broader 
patterns at the supra-local level gives rise to an artificial construct of the 
distinctiveness of the locality in relation to the broader polity. As theorists of the 
everyday state have argued, there is a need to focus greater attention on 
understanding the significance of distinction between local-level politics and the 
political system, based in a broader concept of political development. As the following 
section aims to show, local politics can be seen as counteractive to participatory 
development or enabling the deepening of democracy.  
 
 
Elite Capture 
 
The discussion of ‘elites’ has taken a different form as part of mainstream narratives on 
participatory development in the local space. Elite capture is widely cited as one of the 
main threats to successful community-based development. Just as the benefits of 
involving communities in poverty alleviation programmes are well acknowledged, so 
too is the fact that ‘endogenous community imperfections’ (Platteau 2002) undermine 
the pro-poor outcomes of these programmes. In response, policy actors and analysts 
have sought to overcome the problems of capture through two main routes. The first 
has been to improve project design so as to insulate projects from elite domination. 
The second has been to focus on empowerment of the poor as a means to develop 
their capacities vis a vis the elite.   
 
Evidence suggests that it is unrealistic to expect (external) development initiatives to 
equalise power relations or by-pass the so-called elite in the short or medium term. In 
22 
 
 
a recent review of World Bank projects, Mansuri and Rao surmise that ‘most 
(community development projects) are dominated by elites, and both targetting and 
project quality tend to be markedly worse in more unequal communities’ (2004:21). 
They go on to argue that a ‘distinction between potentially “benevolent” forms of elite 
domination and the more pernicious types of capture is likely to be important for 
understanding project dynamics and outcomes’ (Mansuri and Rao 2004: 30).   
 
The changing nature of elites in rural areas has been highlighted by recent research in 
local politics and participatory development in rural India. With a few exceptions (see 
Ananthapur 2007), there is a broad consensus about the decline of the traditional axis 
of rural authority along the lines of social status. As Krishna (2002)argues, the 
traditional elite have been replaced by a new set of political entrepreneurs or naya 
netas(new leaders) who are younger and more educated than their counterparts. 
Manor (2000) refers to these people as fixers (Reddy and Haragopal 1985) who have 
particular skills in mediating between villagers and higher-level bureaucrats and 
politicians. Importantly, the status of these elites is not conferred upon them 
exclusively by their caste or landownership but rather by their ability to adapt to the 
new compulsions of democracy and development in rural India.   
 
 The erosion of pre-existing structures of social2 and political organisation has not been 
a uniform process across Indian states3. Yet, there are clear indications of this trend 
from a range of different contexts. For example, in his study of Madhya Pradesh and 
Rajasthan, Krishna finds no evidence of a permanent grassroots-level political party 
                                            
2
The declining importance of caste in rural India is highly debatable, especially in light of the 
macroscopic picture of caste-based exclusion and differential development outcomes. However, there is 
emerging evidence that challenges this on the basis of micro-level ethnographies (Krishna 2003) and a 
broader literature on the decline of traditional models of the village social order, or the dominant caste 
model proposed by pioneers like Srinivas (1959). Clearly, this is an important issue that demands further 
research. 
 
3
These studies highlight the extent to which the transformation of the rural socio-political power 
structure varies across a state and even districts. In the latter half of his paper, Manor provides an 
interpretive account of inter-state variations in the stock of fixers and the use of this resource by party 
leaders (2000). There is a need for more detailed empirical research on these differences so that the 
implications for the design of community driven development and decentralisation projects become 
better understood. 
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structure. ‘Rather than aligning themselves with any particular political party, …, young, 
development-orientated leaders in villages usually drive hard bargains by playing off 
one political party against another’ (2002: 152-156). Even where well-organised party 
structures are found at the local level, namely in the period of Leftist dominance in 
West Bengal, recent ethnographies have shown that the controlling influence of the 
parties is far more limited than is often assumed (Veron et al 2003, Williams 2001)4. 
The implicit conclusion of these recent studies is that the quality of local leadership 
remains crucial in determining developmental outcomes at the local level.   
 
While the terminology differs, there is a broad recognition that this new breed of rural 
elites, brokers or fixers, genuinely serve the people whom they claim to represent and 
play a crucial role in driving and distorting the democracy and development in rural 
India (Manor 2000).   
 
‘Most fixers tend to be more concerned with their own interests and careers than 
with the welfare of the people whom they serve, but they are not strangers to 
altruism. Many take real pride in having helped to arrange benefits for grassroots 
groups. More crucially, nearly all fixers understand that villagers in most parts of India 
are now so politically aware and assertive that it is insufficient for them merely to 
avoid large-scale profiteering. Fixers must also deliver something tangible. Only then 
will they be able to generate the esteem at the local level on which their careers 
depend. So the distinction between their self-interest and their ability to assist rural 
dwellers is something of a false dichotomy.’ 
           (Manor 2000:822) 
 
The resilience of these codes of conduct that act to regulate or constrain the business 
of brokerage is likely to be an important determinant of the pro-poor outcomes of 
emerging forms of elite capture in rural India. Far from being homogenous groups who 
are aloof from ordinary villagers, the new elite provide services on which the poor rely 
and, as such, are assessed according to their performance and the fixing fees that they 
demand. Furthermore, a more fluid local society can potentially expand the pool of 
aspiring elites and increase competition between these local actors. 
                                            
4
The myth of the CPM as an enabling influence on decentralisation has rarely been questioned. The two 
accounts referred to here are some of the only empirical studies to have tested (and in the process, 
significantly challenged) the assumption of the party’s pro-poor organisational capacity.   
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InformalInstitutions 
 
The importance of institutions has defined the current wave of development theory 
and practice. It has also promoted the need for a better understanding about how 
institutions actually work in a developing society. One important aspect of this has 
been the perceived need to question the dualities between state and society, 
institutions and organisations, political and social arenas and to focus instead on the 
processes of interaction that give rise to institutional change (North 1996:15, IIPG 
2010). Equally, there is a growing sense of the need to reflect the fact that institutions 
are affected by context and take the form of ‘norm patterns’ which shape behaviours 
rather than externally defined principles (Lauth 2000:23). 
 
The concept of informal institutions has gained prominence as a means of explaining 
institutional outcomes (Helmke and Levitsky 2003), both in terms of the apparent 
success of formal institutions, as well as, their failure; but more importantly, the 
reasons why institutions do not work in the same ways in different contexts. The 
examples cited by Helmke and Levitsky highlight the broad canvas of issues that 
informal institutions can help explain, ranging from effective limits of presidential 
powers to the oil that makes the electoral system function. Indeed, ‘(t)he term informal 
institution has been applied to a dizzying array of phenomena, including personal 
networks, clientelism, corruption, clans and maﬁas, civil society, traditional culture and 
a variety of legislative, judicial, and bureaucratic norms (ibid: 726 - 7). In short, informal 
institutions tend to be used as a means of giving structure to outcomes that cannot be 
explained without reference to culture or social analysis. 
 
The concept of informal institutions is widely used in the context of local development 
projects, where the need for conceptual clarity is perhaps the greatest. As a recent 
evaluation report on World Bank community-driven development project concludes, 
bank projects have tended to focus on formal organisation and manifestations of 
collective action and that ‘customs and conventions that could be specific to a 
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particular community and are important in determining collective activities have 
received inadequate attention’  (2005:39). The report goes on to say that ‘little thought 
appears to have been given to how formal structures that are created under a bank 
intervention will affect the informal organisations, customs and conventions of a village 
society and how the interactions of the formal and informal rules could influence 
empowerment (World Bank 2005:40). Failure to assess informal institutions, the report 
concludes, is a major determinant in the lack of sustainability of CBOs. 
 
The use of the term informal institutions in the context of institutional change at the 
local level gives cause for greater conceptual clarity. Hans Lauth argues that ‘formal 
institutions are guaranteed by state agencies and their disapproval is sanctioned by the 
state, (whereas) informal institutions5 are based solely on their existence and their 
effectiveness’ (2000:24).  According to Lauth, informal institutions are dependent on 
formal institutions; ‘they live, as it were, at the expense of the (formal institutions), 
exploiting them for their own purpose, by either partially occupying or penetrating 
them’ (2004:26).  While they develop ‘indigenously’, they exist in relation to the formal 
system in ways that complement, substitute or conflict with formal institutions (2000). 
 
The concept of informal institutions has been used to describe dynamics that are 
manifest at different levels of society. Taking India as an example, caste is often cited as 
one of the most important informal institutions that shapes the political process and 
social interaction more generally. Yet, as Srinivas (1959) showed, by adapting this 
concept to the local level, caste patterns do not translate into events. In his analysis of 
the ‘dominant caste’, he shows how the question is not one of externally defined 
notions of primordial rank but rather one of local expressions, which can vary between 
localities. More recent analysis has supported the low level of correlation between 
caste (as well as wealth) and participation in local affairs and has posited the 
importance of new structuring variables, notably education and awareness (Alsop et al 
                                            
5
 
 
 Lauth focuses his discussion on Informal Institutions of Political Participation (IIPP) which come 
close to the commonly adopted notion of informal institutions used in the literature discussed here. 
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2000). Similar questions have been posed to reassess the role of political parities 
through studies that have highlighted the variations that are determined by local 
events, issues and actors rather than structures that emanate from outside the local 
space (Veron et al. 2004).  
 
Deepening Democracy 
 
One important contribution to this debate has been elucidated by Gaventa (2006) and 
the participation team at the Institute of Development Studies who have argued for 
the need to assess ‘local spaces’ and participation as a route to influencing higher-level 
politics and deepening democracy. The ‘PowerCube’6 highlights the important 
distinctions between ‘closed’, ‘invited’ and ‘claimed’ spaces, each of which can vary in 
terms of the degree of visibility of power, which is enacted within them. The concept of 
an invited space comes close to the type of externally created forums for participatory 
decision making, whereas closed spaces represent those in which ‘decisions are made 
behind closed doors’ (Gaventa 2006) which, together with ‘claimed spaces’, constitute 
the effective informal institutions that Lauth argues exist in dynamic dependence with 
formal institutions. Whereas Gaventa is concerned with the way in which citizens and 
social movements create effective space from below, the current trajectory of 
participatory development raises the question of how political and polity actors at the 
state level respond to the prevailing patterns in the social structure. 
 
The scaling up of participatory development has been closely linked to the deepening 
of democracy (Gaventa and Valderrama 1999, Gaventa 2006) and the demand for good 
governance. One important arena of interaction lies in the interface between 
community-driven development and the local governance structure, both of which 
form the centre of interactions between citizens and the ‘front line’ service providers 
and elected representatives. Another important set of interactions relate to the 
encounters with the state and the political system and hence, people’s participation 
                                            
6
 
 
www.powercube.net accessed 30
th
 October 2010 
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and perceptions of politics in general. This latter set of issues has tended to be 
downplayed in analysis of the politics of participation and demands a more prominent 
role in order to understand the type of initiatives discussed in this thesis. 
 
The need to refocus attention on participation in higher-level politics has been under-
explored by theorists who focus on the spaces and mechanisms of political 
participation (see Gaventa and Valderrama 1999). As a result, there is a tendency to 
overlook some of the lessons from the broader literature on political participation, 
which looks beyond the narrow definitions of influence in the selection of government 
personnel and the decisions that they make (Verba et al. 1978) to provide a more 
holisitic account that includes ‘elections campaigning, collective action around policy 
issues, contacting political representatives and direct action like protests and 
demonstration’ (Bratton 1999:552). 
 
Situating local political participation in the broader context of state politics demands a 
different framework of analysis. Political participation tends to follow a ‘cumulative 
structure’ where the various types of political activity are not comparable units but are 
instead, elements in a pattern of political behaviours (Krishna 2002). For instance, 
someone who attends party meetings, a relatively intensive activity, is also likely to be 
an active member of political parties and involved in a number of other activities such 
as campaigning, contacting public officials etc.. Indeed, it is unlikely that participation 
in more time-intensive activities will occur independently. This approach has a number 
of important implications for the way in which we understand the electorate and by 
extension, community members in a developing democracy. 
 
The model of political participation that is relevant for analysis is fundamentally 
dependent on the broader question of the relationship between state politics and 
local-level politics. As we see below, this poses the need for an analysis of the nature of 
the polity, and in particular, the penetration of national or state politics to the local 
level. However, before moving on to this discussion, it is important to note that even in 
contexts where these links are not explicit, there is cause to question the political 
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salience of local politics. 
 
 
1.2.3The polity approach 
 
Theda Skocpol first elaborated the polity approach in 1993 in her study of social 
policies in the United States (Skocpol 1993). The approach sets out to overcome the 
limitations of the state and society centric approaches to understanding the 
construction and outcomes of public policy. The approach views the polity as the 
primary locus of action, yet understands political activities as conditioned by the 
institutional configuration of the state and society and emphasises the dynamic 
process of interaction across the state - society divide. As others have recently argued 
(Houtzager 2003, Joshi 2008), this model is particularly relevant in seeking to 
understand contemporary development prescriptions and the political institution 
arrangements that underpin them.   
 
The polity approach explores the dynamic interface between state and society and 
emphasises the need to pay attention to the perspective of politicians - both in terms 
of the ways that policy processes are structured, enabled or constrained by the political 
organisation in which they operate. It also opens up the analysis to account for the 
broader pressures or concerns that politicians face, including international and 
domestic struggles, which contribute to what Skocpol refers to as 'state formation'. 
 
The social arena is not seen as an autonomous domain but rather one that is shaped by 
the relationship to the state.  Social structures are broadly defined to include cultural 
patterns and capacities, as well as, the extent to which 'politically active' groups are 
influenced by political structures and processes (1993:47). However, rather than 
substituting political determinism for social determinism, the social domain is 
understood as one in which 'social and political factors combine to affect the social 
identities and group capacities involved in (..) policymaking' (ibid). 
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Defining both state and society in terms of their interaction reflects the emerging view 
of the need to bring the state back into the analysis of politics and policy (Migdal 
1988), and explores the extent to which the state is embedded in society and vice 
versa. In exploring the other two principles of the polity approach, Skocpol takes this 
broad debate a step further by using it as a means to explore policy effectiveness; not 
in terms of technical design, but instead, in terms of the degree of 'fit' between 
political institutions and group capacities (Figure 2). 
 
Skocpol's analysis of institutional ‘fit’ understands policy as a key instrument that 
affects state society relations. Policy choices determine 'access and leverage to some 
groups and alliances, thus encouraging and rewarding their efforts to shape 
government policies, while simultaneously denying access and leverage to other 
groups and alliances operating in the same national polity' (1993:54). This 
interpretation of policy as an important part in the historically changing relationship 
between social groups and the state, as we see below, is of particular relevance when 
understanding participatory development. 
 
Policy choices are formed through an iterative process of 'policy feedbacks'. Just as 
polices can shape access to influence, they can 'affect social identities, goals and 
capacities of groups that subsequently support or ally in politics' (Skocpol 1993:58). 
Just as theorists of path dependence approaches have argued, policy making, 
therefore, needs to be understood as feeding into the long term process of social 
change, as well as, being affected by past performance and experience. 
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Figure 2: Polity approach 
 
(based on Skocpol 1993) 
While the polity approach marks an important departure from more static models of 
state-periphery relations implicit in the political approach to decentralisation (Blair 
2000), there is cause to question the extent to which the state and society can be 
treated as unified concepts in developing societies. The following section presents an 
important modification to the polity approach that aims to bring in the aspect of the 
distinctive politics in developing societies or political development. 
 
1.2.4 The developing polity approach 
 
The concept of political development emerged during the 1960s as a framework for 
comparative analysis of societies undergoing the transition towards modernity. The 
process of democratisation, as it has unfolded over the last three decades, has led 
most theorists to reject the fundamental axioms of the approach as part of a broader 
rejection of the concept of democratic transition, or what Carothers calls the 
‘sequencing fallacy’ (2007) and the need to focus instead on the ‘continuum from low 
to high quality democracy’ (Linz and Stephan 1996). Yet, as this section sets out to 
show, the concept of political development can be useful both in terms of exploring the 
dynamic process of political change and the potential interaction between different 
types of politics in a single polity. In particular, the approach focuses attention on the 
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distinctiveness of the local polity and the governance challenges this invokes. 
 
The contrast between the modern and post-modern views of the locality is evident 
when we consider Karl Deutsch’s description of social mobilisation. For Deutsch, this 
entailed an ‘overall process of change that happens to substantial parts of the 
population which are moving from traditional to modern ways of life’ (1961: 493). 
Critical to this process was the physical and psychological mobilisation away from the 
confines of the locality in ways that enabled citizens to forge new patterns of 
association, cognition and identification, which in turn, gave rise to new types of 
political behaviours associated with modern politics. For Deutsch, modern forms of 
democracy depended on the erosion of the locality in social, economic and political 
terms. 
 
Deutsch’s uncompromising definition of modernisation laid an important foundation 
for the seminal body of comparative political analysis, which came to be identified as 
political development. This school of thinkers, which included Lucian Pye, Samuel 
Huntington and Myron Weiner, made important contributions in terms of detailing the 
challenges that surround the core model of linear political change. The more nuanced 
account of political change set out by Huntington (2006) shows how this linear model 
of political development is not so much a prescriptive path, but rather a basis to 
understand the types of tensions and challenges that faced polities in transition and 
therefore, the governance challenges that politicians face in a developing polity.   
 
A key concept underpinning political development is the distinction between 
traditional and modern politics and the evolution of the relationship between local and 
national politics. In a conference on local-level politics held in 1966, Swartz and his 
peers converged around views that local politics was defined by multiplex relationships 
(Swartz 1969). The concept of multiplex relations refers to the clustering of economic, 
social and political authority in local leaders and hence, the blurring of boundaries 
between personalised or familial power, which others have termed traditional politics 
(Huntington 2006: Chapter 3). This is a view that has been explored in depth by 
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anthropological accounts of traditional political systems which have emphasised the 
gaps between the familiar social structure of rural man and the alien political system 
(Tinkler 1969). Yet Swartz and his colleagues emphasise the difference between local 
politics and local-level politics. While the former was constructed through multiplex 
relations, the latter was incomplete in the sense that it was affected by actors outside 
the immediate local context (Swartz 1969). 
 
This characterisation is important in that it creates a seamless field between tradition 
and modernity. Nonetheless, constructs that help to explain the distinctiveness of the 
local polity find a place in the narratives of Swartz’s contemporaries as useful analytical 
devices that provide a local expression to the kind of large-scale transformations 
proposed by Deutsch. One important example of this is provided by Huntington (2006), 
who describes the progression of party formation from local patronage to the 
emergence of a mass party organisation through the various stages of interaction with 
supra-local politics. Another is Scott’s analysis of the erosion of patron-client relations 
which is rooted in the rejection of clientelist ties to local powerbrokers (1972). These 
approaches share a common understanding: the distinctiveness of local level politics 
and the extent to which this is not simply eroded by the progression towards modern 
political systems (c.f. Deutsch 1963), but rather are changed through dialectic forces 
across the local-supra-local divide. 
 
The emergence of ‘simplex’ (as opposed to multiplex) political (Swartz 1969) relations 
that characterise the modern polity entails a fundamental change in the role of the 
locality, which ceases to be a formative unit of social and political organisation. Central 
to this is the concept that people move across localities or are able to consider local 
events and actors with a broader (comparative) perspective which is enabled through 
membership of new forms of identify based associations and exposure to information 
beyond the locality. Yet as Huntington (2006) argues, this process imposes new 
challenges in terms of maintenance of political order, where the challenges lie in 
creating new institutions to respond to changing demands.  
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For Huntington, the breakdown of local ties does not simply lead to the creation of 
new types of political institutions. Instead, it imposes new challenges for the political 
elite in terms of building new political institutions in their place. For Huntington, this 
process defined the critical governance challenge in a developing polity, which he 
understands as the maintenance of political order. La Palombara (1971) stated this 
challenge most clearly, labelling it the ‘crisis of penetration’. Large-scale social and 
political change imposes new challenges on state elites, not simply in terms of 
responding to the demands but in terms of making their influence penetrate to the 
local level. The crisis of penetration can occur for a number of reasons, including 
changes in the territory's limits or the emergence of regional demands and demands 
new technologies of governance to ensure that state elites are capable of asserting 
themselves locally. This additional element of the challenges of governance and order 
defined the major political challenge of participatory local development. 
 
The relevance of these arguments to India will be explored in the following chapter but 
it is important to emphasise the fact that the types of challenges discussed here find 
salience beyond the democratic context. As Huntington argues, the important 
distinction between governments lies less in the type of political systems than in terms 
of the degree of governance (2006).  
 
In this section, I have set out to show how the concept of political development serves 
to encapsulate many of the key challenges of governance and development that have 
tended to be downplayed by a unified concept of the polity. While it is important to 
focus on the interplay of state and society, there is cause to question the relationship 
between local politics and the larger polity and the extent to which a similar set of 
assumptions can be applied in terms of the nature of politics encountered across the 
different levels of the polity. 
 
A ‘developing polity’ approach can be proposed as a means to assess the structural 
distinctions in the political system in developing countries. As Weiner argues, there is 
cause to consider the existence of ‘two political worlds’ that operate in a developing 
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polity, each of which functions according to a different set of rules. Just as the polity 
approach focuses attention on the interplay between state and society, there is equally 
a need to explore the interplay between these at different levels in the system. In the 
context of participatory development, the focus of attention needs to be on assessing 
this process of interplay between the state and the community (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Developing polity approach 
 
 
 
The model proposed here builds on the same set of assumptions regarding the primacy 
of state elites as drivers of participatory development but sets out to challenge the 
assumptions of the unitary concept of society. Introducing the distinction between 
society and the community assumes that state elites are most likely to be concerned 
with the effect of polity on larger social and hence political relevant 
structures.However, the arena of interaction and hence, feedback takes place at the 
community level. While it is recognised that the local state of implementing agents play 
a role in shaping these interactions, emphasis is given to the autonomy of the locality 
as a political space. 
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1.3 Implications and Questions for Research 
 
The degree to which this autonomy is established is the first additional research 
question that this model aims to suggest. The political behaviours of community 
members cannot be assumed. At times, their actions are based on their perceptions of 
supra-local politics. At other times, they respond to their direct experience of politics, 
based on encounters in their localities. The nature of this relationship cannot be 
deduced; rather it needs to be a core question for analysis. 
 
The second new question this approach raises is the degree to which the state level 
political leadership is capable of making its influence penetrate the locality. While the 
major focus of this debate has been on understanding the relationship between 
authority and incentives within the bureaucracy, this approach suggests a different 
emphasis - one that focused on the extent to which the state is capable of affecting 
political dynamics in the local arena. It is recognised that these dynamicsare forged 
significantly through the relations between the community and the agents of the local 
state.However, there is cause to treat these as a single cohesive and blurred element as 
opposed to the supra-local state and society. 
 
The model of a ‘developing polity’ enables a new approach to thinking about political 
strategy in a way that responds to the specific nature of the participatory development 
as it is evolving in Andhra Pradesh and other developing democracies. The proposition 
can be stated as follows. Politicians have an interest in improving development 
outcomes at the community level in as far as this provides a 'fit' with the established or 
potential alliances on which they depend on for their re-election. Direct engagement at 
the local level has the potential to deliver these outcomes more effectively and to 
overcome many of the structural hindrances to institutional change. However, the 
success of this approach is likely to have broader and significant impacts of the 
informal structures of political participation, namely, in terms of altering the 
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fundamental basis of political behaviours of the rural poor.  As a result, the 
understanding of these structures, the capacity for change and the implications of 
these changes will shape political strategy. An analysis of the process requires thinking 
like a politician and the need to pay greater attention to understanding the hidden 
structures that inform policy choices. 
 
This research set out to explore various aspects of these broad questions relating to 
the nature of the developing polity, with reference to the specific issues arising from 
the new politics of localisation. Three key questions form the basis of the following 
political analysis: 
 
RQ1: What are the drivers of local electoral politics? 
 
The process of electoral politics is one of the most important windows through which 
to observe the strength of the relationship between local and national politics. 
Democratic decentralisation provides the opportunity to understand this further. While 
a direct comparison between political behaviours in local and national election is 
beyond the scope of this research, there is scope to assess the extent to which the 
factors that influence voters’ decisions are shaped by local or national issues. The 
influence of parties and aggregated caste dynamics are two important aspects of this in 
the Indian context, which can be compared to the influence of local actors, issues and 
events. In the context of Andhra Pradesh, where formal decentralisation has been 
undermined both formally and informally, a further aspect to this research question is 
the extent to which the local election remains important, and if so, why? 
 
RQ2: To what extent do parallel initiatives in community-based development give 
rise to new patterns of local politics? 
 
One important aspect of the new politics of localisation is the direct focus on 
institution building at the local level, parallel to democratic decentralisation. For the 
first time, the case of Andhra Pradesh provides the opportunity to explore the 
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cumulative impacts of a range of different types of local institutional strategies which 
have the highly visible political support of the Chief Minister. The extent to which this 
centralised political push extends to the local space is key to understanding the nature 
of the developing polity. Whether or not the national political leadership is able to 
shape the local space through these initiatives and the extent to which the resultant 
dynamics is associated with this higher-level influence, are two important aspects of 
penetrative politics. This process of penetration, when mediated by local dynamics can 
be both positive and negative for the regime. Equally, the association with higher-level 
politics can potentially create new dynamics that rise above local politics.  
 
RQ3: Who are the ‘leaders’ at the local level, and how are leadership networks 
shaped by new local institutions and opportunities created by participatory local 
development?  
 
The importance of local elites in shaping the new politics of localisation has been 
discussed above. This research set out to further this discussion in the context of the 
multiple process of localisation in Andhra Pradesh with a view to better understanding 
the extent to which ‘local’ leaders are defined as distinctive actors in the polity and the 
extent to which this leadership is influenced by aspects of the higher level of the polity, 
namely political parties and higher level party aspirations.  
 
These research questions form the basis of the structure of the empirical sections of 
this thesis, which are discussed further in the final section of this chapter.  
 
1.4 Conclusion and Structure of the Thesis 
 
This chapter has explored the challenges of applying the framework of politics to 
understand the new politics of localisation. The polity approach provides an important 
means to overcome the statism of politics of state-periphery relations but downplays 
the distinctiveness of the developing polity. Analysis based at the local level overcomes 
these problems and also draws out both the complexity and the salience of local 
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politics in creating political change.  As theorists of the everyday state have argued, 
these quotidian practices and the daily interactions that take place locally are 
important not only for the people involved but also in terms of defining the state.  
 
Understanding the dynamic interaction between state and society is an important step 
in the direction of understanding the dynamic process of state formation and the 
extent to which social demands (and potential demands) shape the polity. The 
adoption of the polity approach in the developing country context provokes new 
thinking of the policy making process, based around the search for an ‘institutional fit’. 
This chapter has set out to show how there is a greater need to explore the potential 
for this ‘fit’ to take place between different types of politics, as theorists in the 1960s 
were aware when they were promoting the concept of political development.  
 
The developing polity model aims to provide a means of encapsulating the type of 
complexity noted by the local perspective on participation and political change and to 
link it to the state. New questions emerge from this approach, namely, the extent to 
which state level politicians can engage with local politics and more importantly, the 
extent to which political behaviours can be characterised and are forged between the 
local and supra-local level.   
 
The next chapter provides a more detailed account of the methodology underpinning 
this research and the broad focus on comparative analysis using both quantitative and 
qualitative techniques and the ways these were adapted to meet some of the key 
challenges that arose in the field. Chapter 3 (Developmental Politics in Andhra Pradesh) 
traces three decades of politics in Andhra Pradesh, and the transition from Congress-
dominance to regionalist populism. Indicative of the broader pattern of political change 
in India, the latter phase serves as an example of what Kohli terms as the 'crisis of 
governability' (1991). Set against this backdrop, the chapter provides an outline of the 
broad strategy adopted by Naidu to create a 'new politics of development'. While 
capturing the attention of international audiences, Naidu’s strategy was oriented 
toward domestic compulsions. The analysis focuses on the broad principles of his 
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strategy to reconfigure politics through radical and controversial innovations directed 
at the rural voters, and in turn, resting his fortunes on the impact of these innovations 
at the ground level. 
 
The chapters that follow explore three distinct arenas of local politics: 
Chapter 4 (Electoral Politics: The Distinctiveness of the Village Polity)explores 
participation and processes around village elections in four localities. The gram 
panchayat elections provide an important lens through which to understand both the 
political challenge of rural development, as well as, the construction of a developing 
polity. Despite being starved of formal powers, village elections are the most intensely 
fought contests in the political system. The chapter explores the general patterns of 
participation across villages and uses detailed analysis of local events, issues and actors 
to understand the drivers of participation and electoral outcomes. 
 
Chapter 5 (Participatory Politics: Changing the Narratives of Village Politics) focuses on 
the institutional innovations brought in by Naidu as part of this strategy to develop a 
new politics. The significant penetration of this strategy was manifest in three key 
mechanisms (village interface, community mobilisation and community contributions). 
Drawing on the analysis of perceptions, the analysis highlights the systemic distortion 
of implementation by local actors and its implications for the image of the state. The 
analysis highlights the importance of the aggregate impact of these initiatives in 
sharpening local identities and creating political resources that stimulate village 
politics. 
 
Chapter 6(Elite Politics: Systems of Capture) delves deeper into the issue of leadership. 
The analysis explores the emergence of a new type of village leadership that combines 
the pragmatism of new elites with the structures of factionalism.  The chapter presents 
a model for understanding village leadership through disaggregation and explores the 
wide range of drivers within the inner working of political groups in the village. It 
highlights the extent to which leaders drive the process of politicisation at the village 
level, enabled by policies projected on the village from above. 
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Chapter7(Conclusion) provides an overview of the key findings of the research and 
examines the implications for both understanding Indian politics and the politics of 
development. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
 
2.1 Overview 
 
The previous chapter highlighted the importance of making the influence of the state 
level politics leadership penetrate the locality. The developing polity approach aims to 
focus attention of the interface between the ‘two worlds’ of politics, which in turn, 
raises the question regarding the pattern that shapes politics in localities. This chapter 
shows the methodological approach used to uncover the hidden narrative of local 
politics.  
 
The methods used to understand rural politics play a significant role in determining the 
findings and therefore, conclusions. The spread of participation and its use in large-
scale programmes has led most researchers to frame their approaches in a way that 
understands the aggregate trends arising from micro-processes. More intensive 
ethnographies have demonstrated the added value of what Geertz (1973) described as 
'thick description' which at the same time, demonstrates the challenges of generalising 
findings. This research sought to find a middle ground between intensive approaches 
and generalisation. 
 
This research was conducted in two phases. During the first, a detailed analysis of 
politics and participation was carried out in four villages, sampled to reflect differing 
political relations between the village and the higher levels of politics. In these villages 
a range of issues was explored, including the relationship between electoral politics 
and participatory development project and the role that gender, social relations and 
political activity played in determining the pattern of participation. One important 
finding of this research was the degree to which the ‘political stratum’ was 
distinguished from other villages and the extent to which relations within the stratum 
determined politics in the village. In order to investigate this further, a second phase of 
fieldwork was designed, which focused on identifying leaders and analysing their 
relations in a large sample of 13 villages. Interviews with a broader set of informants at 
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the district and state level were carried out to support the village analysis, with the 
main focus being on the former. In all, fieldwork was carried out over the period of one 
year (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Phases of Field Work 
January 2002 – February 2002 Interviews and secondary data collection in 
Hyderabad to determine sampling and 
recruitassistant. 
February 2002 Piloting questionnaire (Nalgonda) 
February 2002 – April 2002 Field research in two villages in Nalgonda 
May 2002 Preliminary analysis of data 
June 2002-July 2002 Field research in two villages in Prakasham 
district 
August 2002 Preliminary analysis of data (UK) 
September 2002 Piloting of ‘Political Stratum Analysis’ 
October – December 2002 ‘Political Stratum Analysis’ in three locations (13 
villages)7 
 
 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into three parts. The following section (2.2) 
discusses development of the methodology, based around the concept of comparative 
case analysis, and the way this was adapted to the key research questions. Section 2.3 
provides further detail on the application of this methodology, namely issues of 
sampling and the design of the research instruments. The final section (2.4) discusses 
some of the main key challenges and opportunities of this type of research and 
implications of the analysis.  
 
                                            
7
 Piloting of the political stratum analysis was carried out in a new mandal in Nalgonda, not covered 
during the first phase of field research. The original intention was to return to this mandal for final 
data collection, but this was not possible due to personal constraints. 
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2.2 Methodological Approach 
 
Addressing the linkages between village politics and the policies and strategies at the 
state level required an approach that combined depth and scale and which most 
importantly, allowed for a flexible and exploratory approach. From the outset, there 
was little doubt in my mind that intensive village studies would be revealing in terms of 
unveiling patterns of politicisation that have been largely overlooked by large scale 
quantitative research. As the previous chapter shows, the critical question for 
understanding the new politics of localisation was in the extent to which rural citizens 
could be understood to be ‘villagers’ (or members of a specific village) or individuals 
who are shaped by aspects of an identity (i.e., gender, social and political) that is not 
tied to the locale.   
 
In order to address this question, a hybrid approach was needed that both compared 
the villager’s political behaviours and the context in which these behaviours were 
potentially shaped. The traditional methodological choice between randomly 
sampledor large N quantitative studies on the one hand, and intensive village case 
studies on the other, both presented limitations in term of the depth of exploration 
and the generality of the findings. There are issues that have been explored in-depth 
by Charles Ragin and formed the basis of what he referred to as the qualitative 
comparative methodology(1994).  
 
Intensive case study analysis, according to Ragin, results in an 'empirical intimacy with 
case studies (that) comes at a very high price' (1994:301), namely, that of complexity 
and the lack of comparability. In Ragin’s formulation, the number of comparisons that 
can be addressed increases geometrically as the number of cases increases. In short, 
case-based research increases variables. The complexities of relationships that 
determine events in in-depth case study research results in what Ragin refers to as an 
‘indecipherable cacophony of co-linearity' (1994:307) that defies comparison. 
Quantitative research, on the other hand, aims to reduce the complexity. In doing so,it 
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underplays the importance of the specific factors that determine an event or outcome, 
while offering more ‘robust’ replications of the validity of findings.  
 
Ragin’s characterisation of the different approaches aptly describes the methodological 
challenge of this research design. If we assume the village is a ‘case’, there are equal 
dangers of representative sampling (largeN) and in-depth analysis (small N). Whereas 
the former responds to the need to reflect within-state variation, the inherent 
compromises in terms of depth mean that the important variables will be overlooked. 
Small-scale studies cannot claim representativeness. Ragin’s approach seeks to find a 
balance between these approaches by selecting a small number of cases that display 
the key mix of factors that are pertinent to research. 
 
Taking Ragin’s model of comparative case study analysis as a guide, the selection of 
these cases aims to capture the key variations that were pertinent to the specific 
research questions, namely, the relation between local party support, the regional 
political profile and the state. In addition, the importance of reservations in the 
panchayat elections provides an additional set of core indicators. In contrast to the 
longitudinal or experimental approach, the selection of ‘village types’ forms the basis 
of this analysis. Taking this framework as a starting point, the objectives of the 
approach aims to explore the complexities of local variation as a means of isolating or 
capturing the key driving forces of local politics. 
 
The questions that guided this research required a further level of methodological 
innovation, besides the drawing of the optimal lines of intensity and comparability 
between cases. In order to test the extent to which the ‘village’ or the local polity was a 
significant factor in shaping political or participatory behaviours, the design also 
needed to enable the analysis of other factors that shape behaviours; factors that were 
less tied to the local polity and instead, were influenced by supra-local identity. To do 
so, a qualitative methodology was built into the comparative case approach, by 
random stratified sampling respondents with the four villages in a way that ensured 
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representation of gender and social groups. By doing so, a relatively high intensity of 
sampling was carried out, taking one in every fifth household, to ensure that the 
nuances of participatory behaviour would be captured. This process set out to ensure 
that the differential political behaviours of caste, gender, political affiliation and level of 
political activity would be accounted for, so as to account for the potential of these 
independent or supra-local identities to influence local politics.  
 
The combination of quantitative methods and case based analysis has certain 
limitations. Unlike traditional quantitative studies that seek to downplay the esoteric 
qualities of the locality, drawing a relatively sizable sample from only four villages 
means that these effects are ever present. However, as the following section shows, 
the process of sampling was designed in a way that would ensure that key political and 
social factors were accounted for, so as to reduce the potential bias that could be 
expected.  
 
2.3 Application of Methodological Approach 
 
This section provides more detail on the way in which the methodological approach set 
out above was applied in practice, including the selection of field sites, and the design 
of the interviews.  
 
2.3.1Selection of Field Sites 
 
Andhra Pradesh is a highly diverse collection of regions, people and histories; its very 
cohesiveness has constantly been questioned since the formation of the state in 1954. 
The historical evolution of the state of Andhra Pradesh has given support to the view 
that the modern state is the merging of three distinct regions of Rayalaseema, coastal 
Andhra and Telangana. Accordingly, there has been a tendency for researchers and 
policy analysts to build empirical representation on a design that covers all three 
regions(see Rao and Dev 2003).  However, the village level case study approach opens 
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a far broader set of challenges that limit the reliability of regional comparisons. There 
are significant differences between regions, for example, from the rich Delta Krishna 
district to the tribal-dominated border areas of Srikakulum in the ‘coastal’ region. As 
this research shows, looking at the drivers of politics ‘from below’also reveals 
significant differences between localities even in seemingly similar political and 
geographic areas.  
 
Figure 4: Selected districts in Andhra Pradesh 
 
 
 
Basing the sampling strategy on the key research variables rather than on the broader 
social and economic variation in the population suggested a clear focus on political 
assessment. Thus, a three stage selection process was established, keeping in mind the 
specific research questions to be addressed:based at the district, mandal and village 
level. The fact that party-based elections are held at the mandal level in Andhra 
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Pradesh meant that it was possible to draw in detailed electoral data issues by the 
electoral commissions, based on the 2001 panchayat elections. 
 
Keeping in mind the broader social pattern in the state, analysis of the three main 
regions in Andhra Pradesh revealed a higher degree of similarity in the party political 
variables between the coastal region and Rayalaseema, contrasted to Telangana, where 
opposition parties had a stronger presence. Further, in order to reduce the effects of 
the divergent levels of social and economic development within these regions, it was 
decided to base research in areas with similar development levels,using data from the 
state level of the Human Development Index (HDI) in Andhra Pradesh and from the 
National Census Bureau, Nalgonda (in Telangana) and Prakasham districts (in coastal 
Andhra). These two districts ranked thirteenth and fourteenth respectively, out of 22 
districts in terms of HDI (see Annex 3).  The first stage of sampling aimed to reduce the 
effects of varying levels of literacy, the level of urbanisation and downplay the role of 
tribal governance systems and administrative arrangements. 
 
The second stage of sampling aimed to identify areas within these districts that 
highlighted the differences in political support drawing on data at the mandal level 
elections, as well as,the assembly and parliamentary elections in order to finalise the 
selection of mandals. The selection was influenced by the degree of access to field 
areas and proximity to localities where it would be possible to be based outside the 
village for an extended period of time. In view of the confidentiality agreements with 
the participants (discussed below), the actual selection of research localities is not 
declared. 
 
The third level of sampling involved the selection of village, or gram panchayats for the 
research. The process of selection involved discussions with key informants (KIs) at the 
mandal level but, more importantly, field visits to at least five villages in each region to 
determine the actual electoral dynamics at the village level. The selection of the four 
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villages that formed the sample for the first phase of research was further informed by 
the allocation of reservations for lower-caste members for the position of sarpanch.  
 
Table 2: Electoral outcomes in four localities 
(Female members at all levels except in the wards are shown in bold; reserved seats are indicated in 
brackets) 
 
Mandalcode/district  SP – NALGONDA KP – PRAKASHAM 
Village code Year of 
election 
KB IP BVP PGP 
Present sarpanch  
Winning margin % 
2001 TDP (BC) 
9.4 
INC (SC) 
7.8 
INC (SC) 
4.5 
TDP 
2.9 
Main contestant 
 
2001 INC 
 
TDP 
 
TDP 
 
INC 
 
Ex-sarpanch 1995 TDP INC TDP (BC)
 1 TDP (BC) 
Mandal panchayat 
committee member 
2001 INC (BC) CPI(M) (SC) TDP (SC) 
Ex-mandal panchayat 
committee member 
1995 CPI(M) (SC) CPM TDP 
Composition of gram 
panchayat 
(ward members) 
2001 5 INC 
6 TDP 
3 CPI(M) 
3 TDP 
3 BJP 
1 INDE 
5 TDP 
5 INC 
5 TDP 
5 INC 
Member of the State 
Legislative Assembly  
(MLA) 
Runner up and margin 
1999 INC 
defeated TDP by 7.45% 
TDP 
defeated INC by 0.23% 
Ex-MLA 
Runner up and margin 
1994 TDP 
defeated INC by 21.53% 
Independent 
defeated INC by 7.17% 
Notes on assembly 
election 
 SC reservation in both terms Seat did not change hands 
over this period 
1 
There was a lot of ambiguity over the affiliation of this candidate. The dominant story is that he was elected under 
INC (as the TDP candidate was withdrawn) and then he changed allegiance to the TDP within the first year. 
Source : Andhra Pradesh State Election Commission and field data  
 
As Table 2 shows, the objective to delineate the party alignment at the panchayat level 
is complicated by two factors. The first is the narrow margins of the winning candidates 
at the village level which, as discussed in chapter 4, is not only lower at the village 
level, it is also the product of the highest levels of participation of any democratic 
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contest in the Indian political system. Secondly, while the sarpanch is recognised as the 
main political position at the village, the multi-tiers and overlapping system of direct 
and indirect elections means that there are other analogous posts in the village and in 
an important relation to the higher level of the political system. As chapter 6 discusses, 
the proliferation of these posts is a way of accommodating leaders within parties and 
managing the opposition. As a central subject of the research, the political identity of a 
village does not offer a straightforward criterion for selection.  
 
Equal weightage was also given to ensure representation of social variables, namely, 
gender and caste. In India,the panchayati raj system aims to ensure representation of 
lower castes and women though a system of reservation that runs from the ward to 
the assembly levels. Here too, there are complications in that, often, candidates 
elected under reservations are ‘proxies’ for higher caste men and party leaders; this is 
discussed in greater depth in Chapter 4.  
 
Overcoming these challenges requires intensive work at the stage of sampling, as it was 
only by visiting a selection of panchayats in the selected mandals, that a sense of the 
local dynamics could be ascertained. Given that the core hypothesis of this thesis, 
roughly states that ‘village politics vary considerably between localities based on a 
combination of actors, issues and events’, the main purpose of these visits was to 
confirm the victory and strength of the different parties, as well as, a mix of politically 
prominent and poorer more marginal localities, in areas that shared a political and 
social context.  
 
2.3.2Outline of the selected villages 
 
KB village  
 
Located on the banks of the River Musi, this village enjoys semi-irrigated lands and 
proximity (10km,with good connections) to Suryapet, which is one of the important 
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towns in Nalgonda district. Politically, this village is relatively peaceful, though it has 
good representation from the INC, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) {CPI(M)} and 
the Telegu Desam Party (TDP). The reign of the TDP, now in the hands of the elected 
backward class (BC)sarpanch, is supported from the sidelines by the Reddy ex-
sarpanch. There are some petty contractors but no real dominant powers. The 
noticeable feature is the level of conflict negotiation that takes place in the village, 
which draws on all parties and all castes openly and freely. High caste domination is not 
noticeable any more in this village which has a large BC population dominated by the 
Goudsthoughthere are no Malas in the village. The village is reasonably unified, 
spatially and socially and earns considerable funds from the auction of the sand 
collection contract from the riverbed. This contract is illegal, yet accepted as necessary. 
The administration of the funds has, in the past, resulted in conflicts, which villagers 
choose not to discuss in any depth with outsiders.    
 
IP village 
Compared to KB, this village is a lot more isolated with fairly poor connectivity.  It has a 
strong identity from the past, with the CPI(M) fading to the new, young and BC 
dominated TDP. High caste power is still a major issue in the village – Reddy houses are 
located in a separate area of the village and walls surround most of the larger 
dwellings. The village is divided into clear BC, SC (Mala and Madigal) colonies and 
further divided into two sub-sections on either side of the tank. The village has a large 
number of active youths and youth groups and in the whole district, it was voted as the 
one of the success stories for the Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas 
(DWCRA). At present, politics in the village is becoming diverse, with active members 
from all the major parties like CPI(M), INC, TDP, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), as well as, 
from Telegana Sadhana Samithi (TSS) and Telegana Rashtra Samithi (TRS). Currently, a 
coalition of anti-TDP parties holds the panchayat.  
 
BVP village 
BVP is the smallest and probably the poorest of the villages despite being near a main 
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highway and a small town. Due to flouride contamination in the groundwater and 
overcrowding in the main village, the scheduled castes SCs were moved to their own 
colony some ten years ago, which seems to have contributed to the lack of unity in the 
village.   While currently the sarpanch is a dalit from the Congress party (and living in 
the colony), the high caste TDP from the main village are its biggest power brokers and 
control most of the funds in the village. The TDP party has some old leaders and some 
younger and ambitious cadre who are very powerful. The village is factional with two 
groups (TDP, INC) which divide people within castes. While there is a lot of house 
building in the village, especially in the SC colonies, the allocation of thisis highly 
politicised. In the allocation of land, though the Reddiescontinue to dominate and are 
favoured, nowthe Naidus are strong contenders for the allocation of land as well.   
 
PGP village  
Though PGP village has many Reddy households, the Naidus have clearly achieved a 
hold over power in the village. The TDP Naidu sarpanch managed to win the election 
by proxy in the last term and rose to his true position of domination after his wife had 
been elected sarpanch. He is close to the MLA and personally manages all contracts – 
sharing very little with the TDP cadre. Development activities in the village are 
frequently covered by the local press, reflecting the fact that this is a well-known and 
politically important village in the mandal. The Reddys are mainly from the Congress 
party and have no power or even means to contest under the regime. Violent conflicts 
have arisen in the past and now, they do not dare to get involved. The Mala colony is 
home to the TDP mandal president, so the success of the TDP reaches sections of both 
high and low castes. The Madigals are more divided than the Malas and lack 
leadership.   
 
2.3.3Defining the locality 
 
This brief account of the main features of the sample villages serves to highlight the 
challenges of selection based on a simple typology or core variables. It also serves to 
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show the extent to which the politics in each village is a contest between various 
groups and the extent to which the elite drive this politics. Yet, it cannot be assumed 
that the politics of the elite equally affect all people who live in the political unit. In this 
section, further details on the importance of identifying a political unit will be 
provided.  
 
The concept of the 'village' as an analytical unit has long since been a subject of 
debate. Dumont and Pocock (1957) famously argued that the Indian village is only an 
architectural and demographic fact.  Fieldworkers confer on the village a kind of 
sociological reality which it does not possess. The approach taken in this research 
maintained the notion of the 'village' as a subject for empirical enquiry, a notion that 
was constantly being questioned. Unlike other states in India, Andhra Pradesh adopted 
a system of local governance that is based on relatively small local units. Most of the 
villages visited were ‘single village panchayats’ which implies that the lowest unit of 
administration is largely synonymous with a locally understood notion of a village. 
However, when working within the village, it soon becomes apparent that villages 
consist of various parts, including hamlets and colonies that are administered together 
with the main village, caste-based neighbourhoods (or pallis) normally consisting of the 
lowest castes, and even multiple pallisor habitations of different lower castes.  As such, 
the village is rarely a homogeneous unit. 
 
As stated above, sampling of households was carried out on the basis of household lists 
that were complied for ‘official’ purposes of health monitoring or voting. In a number 
of cases, it was found that selected respondents lived in a hamlet or part of the village 
that was considered to be separate from the ‘main village’ where most of the samples 
were found.  Figure 5 shows the political ‘sketch map’ used to define the political 
locality with the IP village panchayat. As most other panchayats, IP comprised of a 
number of different habitations, each with its own character and different composition 
and political dynamics. Also, like most villages, IP has a ‘main village’, which in this case, 
was dominated by high castes, where most of the main political meetings took place, in 
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preference to the more open panchayat building which was also located there, along 
the main village road.  
Figure 5: Identification of a political locality (sketch) 
 
Source: Author’s field notes 
There were two other areas of the village that were a key part of this main panchayat 
politics. The first was a largely BC area, and the second was a mixedSC area. Two other 
habitations in the village were found to be marginal in the affairs of this political 
locality. A tribal hamlet to the north of the village was of little interest to the Reddy 
elite of IP village, except when it came to the time to vote when the elite would woo 
them with money. At all other times, it was the tribal leaders who would approach the 
powerful Reddy leaders in the neighbouring panchayat. At the south of the village 
separated by the main road, there was a mixed caste hamlet of around 50 households. 
Discussion with the members of this small hamlet made it clear that they chose to stay 
clear of politics in the main village, and that they had their own sub-set of leaders and 
competition within their own unit. Based on these findings, the decision was made to 
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restrict the sample to members of the ‘effective political locality’ and exclude others 
whose views would reflect a different set of concerns and dynamics.  
 
While these cases were rare, they nonetheless serve the purpose of highlighting the 
term ‘village’ which is used loosely to describe effective units in which the politics was 
played out. In many cases, hamlets and sampled respondents were left out of the 
research on the basis of the fact that their responses reflected a different set of issues 
and concerns. In other cases, where villages were divided into a main village and 
significant hamlets, the sampled respondents were included. By doing so, a definition 
of village politics was implicitly adopted that focused on the politics events, issues and 
actors that took place around an identified concept of a village. Thus, the importance 
of assessing the extent of the socio-geographic marginalisation in rural areas needs to 
be flagged as a topic that requires further research. 
 
 
2.3.4Structured survey 
 
The design of village level research aimed to draw on the analytical rigour of qualitative 
research with the depth of the perspective of ethnography. During the first phase of 
the research, the key element of this strategy was the adoption of a high-density 
sampling approach. In each village, secondary data resources were located and used as 
a basis for the sampling. In two villages in Nalgonda, recent household level records 
collected by the local health provider were used. In Prakasham district, voter lists that 
had been marked up by local political leaders to indicate householders were found to 
be the most reliable source of information of households in the village. In order to 
capture the diversity of the experience within the village, a random sample of one in 
five households was selected by counting down through the ordered list. Using a 
higher ratio of respondents in the village than usual was found to be an important 
approach to access and analyse localised dynamics. 
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The first and most important purpose of the village-level household sample was to 
select individuals for the structured survey. Sampling was carried out at the household 
level in order to ensure wide coverage within the village, across castes and 
neighbourhoods. Within the households, individuals were identified as respondents. 
Using the village lists, it was possible to select individuals within the households to 
maintain an even balance between men and women, young (less than 40 years old) 
and old. Replacement was allowed at the individual level (within households) but not 
of households. Overall, the response rate among those present in the village was high, 
but there was some bias towards male respondents which was at the behest of family 
members. 
 
The high density sampling approach and structured questionnaire served two 
important purposes. The first was to elicit key information of participation in various 
arenas at the village level. The second, and the most important purpose, was to ensure 
that all social groups in the village were covered during the village research. The need 
to take steps to ensure that the research was not biased by the opinions of ‘elites’ or a 
core of villagers underscored the development of techniques to interact with the 
village as a whole, the most well known of which is the transect walk. Often, these 
approaches can significantly alter preconceptions of researchers. In the case of political 
analysis, ensuring that the marginal voices of the village are heard is of paramount 
importance. By taking a high-density sample, it was possible to ensure that any bias 
from the central part of the village of higher caste villagers would be avoided. While 
random sampling techniques provide a similar assurance, the approach adopted in this 
research allowed for a more detailed examination of the multiple voices and 
experiences in the village (see below). 
 
The structured questionnaire (see Annex 5) was piloted in Nalgonda district prior to 
implementation. It was not, however, possible to test this questionnaire in both regions 
prior to implementation. As a result, some minor modifications needed to be made to 
reflect the specific contexts. 
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Questions in the structured questionnaire were divided into six main sets: 
 participation in elections 
 party support 
 participation in Janmabhoomi 
 membership of CBOs 
 social and economic background 
The use of a questionnaire provided an opportunity to interact with a wide cross 
section of the village in a private space. Villagers, on the whole, were found to be used 
to people arriving in the village with questionnaires in hand. There was a high degree 
of curiosity and, at times, suspicion that selected participants would be eligible to 
receive ‘benefits’ but this tended to lessen over time. On the whole, the questionnaire 
proved to be a good tool to make space to interview people in their own homes, 
without the intrusion of onlookers. Interviews normally lasted an hour and allowed for 
adequate opportunity to discuss issues related to the questions or those which were of 
a broader nature. The ‘use’ of the questionnaire as a tool for private discussion was 
found to be an important part of the quasi-ethnographic approach. 
 
2.3.5Key informants and leaders 
 
Over the course of the first phase of the research, a total of 111 KI interviews were 
carried out, most of which were with politically active men and women at the village 
level and at the mandal level. These interviews were unstructured and were designed 
to develop an understanding of the underlying issues, events and the actors that shape 
local politics. The information from these interviews was further reinforced by the 
discussion that followed the structured interviews, where respondents would develop 
key issues. As discussed below (section 2.4.2), the gradual development of an 
understanding of the context was an important aspect of this research by whichfurther 
discussionscould be had and more informationprobed for; to fundamentally construct 
a ‘narrative’ of local politics from fragmented sources.   
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During the first phase of this research, a rough guide for selecting KIs was made, which 
was used develop a basic understanding of the issues in the village. This included: 
 present sarpanch 
 ex-sarpanch 
 Mandal committee member 
 at least two members of the gram panchayat committee, especially those who 
support a different party from the sarpanch, as well as, low or high caste members 
 any caste leaders 
 heads of village party committees, or leading party activists. 
 
In addition to these, other informants included local members of the legislative 
assembly (MLAs), mandal party presidents and members of the district panchayat 
committee, depending on whether these actors were involved in village politics. 
 
2.3.6Phase two: understanding the political stratum 
 
A key finding of the first phase of this research was that a defined sub-set of villagers 
could be identified in each village, referred to as the political stratum. The members of 
the political stratum were activity engaged in politics as party workers or leaders and 
were widely recognised by the rest of the village as such. The importance of 
understanding this was that it led to the development of a second phase of research, 
which extended the original research objectives. This focused exclusively on the 
identification and analysis of the political stratum which was based on a larger sample 
of villages.  
 
 The members of the political stratum are widely acknowledged by ‘ordinary villagers’ 
in Andhra Pradesh who often refer to them as ‘leaders’ (using the English term) or the 
Telugu words karikatalu (village worker or grassroots cadre) or nayakalu (broadly 
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means leader, generally the older established leaders8 are referred to as nayakalu).  As 
the analysis in Chapter 6 shows, there are important internal divisions between the 
leaders at the village level, with clearly a defined hierarchy of importance, as well as, 
divisions (or groups) along factions or party lines. Understanding these dynamics and 
testing the extent to which these patterns were common between villages required a 
different methodological approach that was evolved into a rapid leadership analysis 
tool.  
 
The key challenge in understanding the leaders was that they are not defined by their 
position. In many villages, the ‘official’ leader or sarpanch, was not the most important 
person in the village party or their political group. Often the most powerful people did 
not hold any formal positions and tended to allocate positions to lower level party 
workers. As such, the only reliable method for identifying leaders was ‘reputational 
sampling’. Given the level of politicisation and awareness in the villages of Andhra 
Pradesh, this was made possible by simply asking, ‘who were the most important 
leaders in the village’. The challenge lay in ensuring that the analysis was not limited to 
the views of a limited set of prominent leaders or a single group. To overcome this, a 
structured approach was developed which aimed to ensure that a cross section of 
perspectives were taken into account. In each village, at least four or more KIswere 
identified, who were selected to ensure representation of different caste groups, 
women and the main political parties. The various lists of leaders who were nominated 
by these informants were then compared to identity the key common names and a 
sample list of the main leaders was derived from this. This list contained between eight 
to fifteen names of leaders in a village. These leaders were then interviewed using a 
structured interview format, which asked about their experience as leaders, shifts in 
party allegiance, and their social profiles. As with the structured interview, this process 
also provided opportunities for open-ended discussions with key leaders on a one-to-
one basis. In total, 181 leaders were selected from 13 villages using this approach.  
 
                                            
8
 My thanks to Nageshwar Rao for clarifying these terms.  
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The leadership analysis was carried out in the same mandals as in the first phase, 
where two or three more villages were purposely selected, for the sample to reflect a 
broad range of issues or typologies. For example, cases where high levels of 
factionalism or conflict were observed were included, as well as,the more cohesive 
villages.  
Table 3: Overview of data sources 
Method Number of informants 
Methods of selection 
research instrument 
Sample area 
 
Type of information 
 
Survey 
 
Comparative 
analysis  
Survey 244 villagers 
- random sample of one 
in five households, then 
one individual was 
selected, chosen by 
gender (half were 
women) and age (half 
were less than 40 years 
old) 
- questionnaire 
 
Two 
proximate 
localities in 
two regions: 
Telangana and 
coastal 
Andhra 
 
Participation and 
perception of local 
governance to 
understand the key 
dimension of 
inclusion/exclusion 
(according to caste, 
gender, age etc.,) 
Comparison 
between different 
localities and the 
factors that 
dictate these 
differences 
 
Personal accounts 
of events, issues 
and actors in the 
village. 
 
Key 
Informants 
111 KIs 
- informal - village 
leaders, party workers, 
journalists, government 
officers, school teachers 
etc., 
- unstructured 
interviews 
 
Four localities 
(as above) and 
the 
surrounding 
area 
Issues relating to 
development 
programmes and 
politics from informed 
participants/actors 
Detailed 
information on 
specific local 
issues, events and 
actors, 
investigation 
through 
‘snowballing’ 
Leaders’ 
Analysis  
181 leaders 
- reputational sample 
based on five points of 
reference 
- semi-structured 
interviews 
Thirteen (4+9) 
localities from 
three 
locations 
(this phase of 
the research 
was piloted in 
five additional 
localities) 
Who are the leaders? 
Background, activities 
and affiliations 
Ranking of 
leaders, their 
relationships, 
constructing 
village histories 
 
Villages where parties had managed to hold onto power for more than one electoral 
term were selected alongside those where the party had changed in the last elections. 
Again, using Ragin’s model of comparative qualitative analysis, the objective was to 
include as many variations as possible, in order to provide a basis for analysis of 
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generalisation. In addition to these two mandals, one further mandal was selected in 
Prakasham district where four villages were selected. The second mandal in Nalgonda 
district was the site for the pilot study of the leadership analysis, as it was not possible 
to return to repeat data collection using the comparable formats that had been 
developed. 
 
2.3.7Data handling 
 
The methodological approach that was developed for this research evolved from the 
core objective of testing the influence of the locality in structuring political 
participation and therefore, the need to strike an effective balance between 
comparative analysis of localities and rigorous assessment of patterns of participation. 
The methods described above were developed, tested and refined in the field and 
include the addition of new phases of research to follow up on key findings and to test 
these further. Together, this year long field study resulted in a rich body of data that 
included quantitative and qualitative evidence (Table 3), which forms the basis of the 
following chapters. 
 
The analysis presented in the following chapter draws on a combination of quantitative 
and qualitative data. Data from structure surveys was entered into excel spreadsheets 
and analysed using the statistical software SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences). 
During the analysis, proxy codes and indexes were also used to explore relationships. 
One example of this is the Political Activity Index (PAI) presented in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Quantitative data was used primarily to explore trends in participations (by locality and 
social variables) and to a limited extent, to explore correlations between participation 
in elections and other participatory fora. Though the sample size for the first phase of 
the research is large (n=244), it was decided not to rely on further statistical measures 
to explore these relationships. Two reasons are given for this. Firstly, the sample is 
drawn from a limited number of villages. While respondent selection was carried out 
on a stratified random sampling basis, this was not designed to be representative of a 
larger population. Secondly, the use of the quantitative data (in both phases of 
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analysis) is limited to developing indicative trends that are explored through the 
qualitative data. This process is reflected in the structure of the following empirical 
chapters.  
 
There are a number of sources of qualitative data that are drawn on in the analysis: 
verbatim comments from the structured questionnaires, interview notes and case 
studies. Verbatim comments were entered into a word processing package and 
analyses using coding methods. Field notes were drawn on to develop case studies 
used in the following chapters.  
 
2.4 Challenges and Opportunities in the Field 
 
Extended field studies of this kind helped to reflect on the research process and the 
complexity of ‘data gathering’. This section explores some of the key challenges and 
opportunities that arose on the field, many of which had an implication on the analysis. 
The following discussion aims to highlight the degree of learning that takes place in the 
field, as part of a continued process of reflection and iterative analysis. These 
refinements and development of the methodology are as important as the constant 
reconsideration of the research questions or core issues that the research aims to 
address. The following section aims to draw attention to the importance of these 
decisions that are made in the course of the fieldwork, during the many hours, days 
and months spent in the village, and the extent to which the refinement of the 
methodology during research can help to better reflect the issues encountered in the 
field. 
 
2.4.1Relating to the subject 
 
Data collection required weeks to be spent in the village, during which time we became 
increasing involved in village life. From the outset, I decided to stay in a neighbouring 
town and travel to the village daily, mainly to avoid being identified with any particular 
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household or area of the village where I was to spend two months and also so that I 
would be able to move between different villages in the same area.  My presence 
naturally attracted attention and although this waned over time, I was constantly 
aware that people participated in my discussions in part due to some expectation that 
by this,they would gain some form of entitlement or benefit from the government. I 
was also aware that people entered into discussions with me regarding the 
performance of government programmes and corruption in village affairs with the 
expectation that I would relay these grievances to high authorities. Despite my best 
efforts to explain myself, it is difficult to avoidthese issues in rural India. 
 
Fieldwork at the village level was conducted mainly in Telugu and sometimes in Hindi. 
It was, therefore, necessary to work with a research assistant who would administer 
the questionnaire in my presence which allowed me to engage in participant 
observation. In the village we used a questionnaire that was written and filled out in 
English, with Telugu translation, which also allowed me to be involved in the process of 
probing and exploring for responses. In many ways, working with a translator shaped 
the interactions in the village and conditioned the process of access. During the year in 
the field, I worked with three different assistants, each of a different caste, background 
and origin. The contribution of thosewho helped me to interact with the villagers is 
greater and far more significant than has ever been acknowledged in literature on 
fieldwork.  
 
I soon became aware of the fact that the villagers were very eager to know the 
background of my assistant. During the months in which I was involved in fieldwork, I 
worked with a man who was a Muslim.He preferred to use his short name Abbas. Soon 
he was asked to disclose his full name which revealed his religion and through further 
questioning, his origins and family background. Once this process of identifying the 
‘newcomer’ in the village was established, it was equally clear that interactions with 
certain parts of the village were easier than with others. This was further validated by 
the fact that when I returned to the village for the second phase of the research on 
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leaders with another assistant who came from a different background, interactions in 
the villages were subtly different. This can be explained, one could argue, by the skills 
of the researcher, but as the following case shows, aspects of identity are often more 
obvious for ‘locals’ than to the foreign visitor. The establishment of a commonality 
between the interviewer and the respondent opens and by interpretation can close the 
lines of enquiry.  
 
One example serves to highlight the complexity of the relationship with respondents 
and the extent to which one's identity is drawn into the research. 
 
While interviewing an elderly dalit woman, we asked her which party she 
supported. She grew suspicious and persisted in challenging our motivation for 
asking all these questions. We told her that this was part of an academic research 
project and that we had not come from the government or any political party. We 
told her that we were also going to talk to a lot of other people in the village and 
that we would not tell anyone what her answers to our questions had been, 
assuring her that we could miss out that question or strike her name off our record 
if she so preferred.  
Her concern was that her sons were government employees and that they would 
scold her if “something happened”. 
‘You can say, “trust me”, or “believe me”, but how can I know for sure? No one has 
come to this village and asked people like me these questions before.’ 
Not satisfied with our explanation, or by our assurance of confidentiality, she 
wanted to know which party we supported. We told her that since I was from 
another country,I could not vote in India, but she insisted on being told which party 
my assistant supported, which he did. Reassured, she told us that she too 
supported the Congress. She then proceeded, for the next hour, to tell us about her 
problems with the current TDP leaders in the village and how the leaders from her 
party have no power under the current regime. Finally, she wanted to check that 
her name had been included in the questions, lest she miss out on any loans or 
other benefits from the government! 
Excerpt from the author’s field notes 
 
2.4.2 Constructing Village Narratives 
 
The following chapters draw heavily onthe analysis of village events, issues and actors, 
which are constructed from various discussions. In such cases, there is rarely a single 
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'truth' or an objective source and the researcher is constantly engaged in the process 
of the construction of narratives. During the course of the research in each village, I 
became aware of the fact that I was in the process of constructing this ‘narrative’ on 
the basis of fragmented parts of a whole that possibly did not exist for any single 
individual who was located in a particular sub-context within the village scene.  
 
Some examples of this include the construction of events that led up to the last 
panchayat election, where the various strategies and machination of actors took place 
between clear, single parties or factionally divided groups. Often, lower level leaders 
confessed limited knowledge of the ‘actual events’ that were eventually recounted to 
me by lead protagonists and there was always a slightly different version of the same 
event that could not easily be resolved. As such, the construction of narratives was 
necessary by a largely interpretative process in contexts where seemingly insignificant 
events were of great importance to the people who lived in a particular village.  
 
The process of constructing narratives often entailed adapting to the different 
perspectives of the respondent. In a context where party divisions were so clear, and 
where the identity of being a ‘leader’ so important, it become important to be able to 
see village events and issues through the eyes of the respondents. Particularly in the 
case of leaders’ interviews, understanding the networks within parties and the issues 
within the cadres was an important means to steer interviews to specific issues that 
concerned the respondent. Party affiliation, as well as, the immediate concerns of their 
part of the village defined the concerns of ‘ordinary’ villagers. The creation of a 
narrative of local politics was a construction. Awareness of this and the constant 
questioning of the validity of these constructions were on-going issues for me during 
fieldwork.  
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2.4.3 Ethics and presentation 
 
The type of material presented in this thesis is sensitive and requires adequate 
measures to protect the respondents who haveparticipated in the research. A lot of the 
discussion that follows explores cases of corruption and other aspects of malpractice. 
More specifically, the research took place at a time when these issues were a topic for 
discussion in the state media and the state assembly and at times, were being debated 
at the national level. As such, measures have been taken to ensure the anonymity of all 
respondents, and their locations. Names have, therefore, been changed, or codes used, 
for all places below the village level and all local respondents. 
 
Field notes were the main unit of record keeping. As all interviews were conducted in 
Telugu (or Hindi), I was reliant on the translations given. During the write up, 
quotations were further 'sanitised' to convey meaning but only to the extent that these 
reflected the substance of the discussion that was verified with my assistant in the 
field. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has dwelt on the broader approach of responding to the key research 
questions set out in Chapter 1 and the specific processes for implementation. The 
challenge of striking a balance between qualitative research and representation has 
been discussed, along with the strategy for implementation through sampling and 
choice of research tools. As the following chapters show, this methodology resulted in 
a rich body of data and allowed for the development of analytical approaches during 
the fieldwork process and during analysis based on the finding that emerged from the 
field, and in response to the specific issues of political change and development 
strategy in Andhra Pradesh that are discussed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 3: Developmental Politics in Andhra Pradesh 
 
‘… the priority in India for the new century is that both old-style politics 
and old-style governance have to change, the country can no longer afford 
them’ (p10) 
 
‘… the end of politics is governance, not mere ruling. … the politics of 
populism can be replaced by the politics of development. The latter too 
can be made to pay electoral dividends’ (p17) 
(Naidu 2000) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the political context in Andhra Pradesh as a means of 
understanding the specific strategies pursued by Naidu when he assumed the posts of 
Chief Minister of the state and the President of the TDP in 1995. Once the southern 
citadel of the Congress Party, political change in Andhra Pradesh was shaped by 
institutional decay, identity politics and populism, which, coupled with the distinctive 
features of regionalism and centre-state relations, produced a situation that closely 
resembled the 'crisis of governability' hypothesis proposed by Kohli. Against this 
context, Naidu represented a new breed of politicians who openly acknowledged these 
challenges and promoted solutions that appealed to the international community.  
 
As the quotations at the head of this chapter taken from Naidu’s own 
autobiographyshow, there was a conscious attempt to confront the widely 
acknowledged challenges of governance in India, namely, the rise of populist politics 
and competing demands of an awakened electorate. This chapter starts by charting the 
trajectory of political change in a state that is characterised by regionalism and a 
dominant middle caste politics. As section 3.3 shows, this laid the basis for a highly 
successful model of politics of accommodation, making Andhra Pradesh the citadel of 
the Congress party in 1960. As in other parts of the country, the breakdown of this 
model was the product both of the centralisation of the Congress party at the national 
level and the increased assertiveness of the lower castes, which paved the way for a 
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new political force driven by the populist appeal of the early TDP under the leadership 
of the cinema icon, N T Rama Rao (section 3.4). 
 
The reminder of the chapter explores the transition of the political strategy that took 
place when Chandrababu Naidu took over the leadership of the TDPin 1995. Section 
3.5 describes the shift from populism to managerial politics and the emphasis placed 
on governance reform that captured the attention of international commentators and 
donors, notably the World Bank. However, as section 3.6 shows, there was another 
element to Naidu’s strategy that has received less detailed analysis and which was 
played out at the local level. While some attempts were made to follow through on the 
reforms to local governance set in place by his predecessor, the major thrust of Naidu’s 
institutional reforms were informal and designed to be responsive to political 
requirements of managing participation and party building in a highly fluid and 
mobilised polity. The discussion in this section outlines the implementation of 
significant changes in the institutional structure and incentives for local political leaders 
through the Janmabhoomiprogramme and the associated rapid proliferation of user 
groups, which served to refigure the local institutional structure without undertaking 
formal governance reforms. In doing so, this chapter sets up the context for the 
following three chapters, which examines these interactions between institutions and 
local politics in the study villages.   
 
3.2 Context and Governance Challenges 
 
Andhra Pradesh, the fifth largest state in India, has a population of about 85 million 
people (India census 2011). While a number of estimates have ranked Andhra Pradesh 
as one of the most successful states in terms of poverty alleviation (Harriss 2000) and 
other aspects of social and economic development9, it remains relatively backward. 
The literacy rate has risen in the last decade from 44.09 percent to 61.11 percent 
(1991-2001) but has fallen slightly below the national average of 65.38 percent (Suri 
2002:7). Female literacy rates in rural areas (1991 figures) are as low as 29.7 percent in 
                                            
9
The State of the States, India Today, May 19 2003 
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the region of Telangana, with a state average of 34.9 percent (Dev and Rao 2002). 
Roughly, 73 percent of the population resides in rural areas and nearly 80 percent of 
the workforce depends on agriculture. 
 
Andhra Pradesh was the first state in India to be formed on linguistic principles. It is 
composed of three regions that were combined in two stages. In October 1953, the 
Telugu-speaking parts of the Madras Presidency, coastal Andhra (or the Circars) and 
Rayalaseema, combined to form the Andhra State. The present state of Andhra Pradesh 
was not formed until three years later, when the largest princely state in British India, 
the dominion of His Exalted Highness, the Nizam of Hyderabad was included and 
Hyderabad city became the capital of the new state. Inter-regional disparities and the 
politicisation of regional identities of Telangana (part of the former Nizam’s state), 
coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema, have affected politics in the state since its formation. 
Demands for accommodation of locally powerful regional leaders have been a key 
factor in party politics (Ram Reddy 1989). 
 
Most observers have agreed that ‘caste has been the basis of political grouping and 
mobilisation of electoral support (in Andhra Pradesh) right from the beginning’ 
(Srinivasulu and Sarangi 1999:2449). It is therefore useful to outline the major groups 
in the state. The emergence of two intermediary castes, the Kammas and the Reddys, 
has been central to the political and social history of the state. Despite the fact that the 
Reddys and Kammas constitute only 6.5 percent and 4.8 percent respectively of the 
population (Srinivasulu and Sarangi 1999), they have become what Srinivas describes 
as ‘dominant castes’ in the state.  Their influence is regional, with the Reddys 
concentrated in the Telangana and Rayalaseema regions, and the Kammas in the delta 
region of the coast. However, diversification of economic interests, strong horizontal 
networks across regions and their mutual claim to ‘ruler’ status have contributed to 
their dominance, despite their traditional inferiority to the Brahmins (3% of the 
population) and Vaishya castes. 
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Other rich peasant castes such as the Kapus, Velamas and Rajus, have played a more 
limited role in state politics (Suri 2002:12), largely due to the fact that their presence is 
concentrated in smaller pockets. Various caste groups that are known by the names of 
traditional hereditary occupations, mainly artisan and service occupations, have come 
to be collectively known as the BCs. In 1982, the Second AP Backward Classes10 
Commission recorded this diverse group as representing 44 percent of the total 
population, making them a complex but vital political force in the state. The 
heterogeneity of this group undermined their political impact (Kohli 1990) but 
reservation policies in economic, political and administrative positions were one of the 
main political tools used bysuccessive governments in Andhra Pradesh to co-opt the 
growing elite within these groups (Ram Reddy 1989: 298). The lowest castes or SCs, 
have been of political importance for a longer period than the backward castes, 
especially following Indira Gandhi’s pro-poor campaign to alleviate poverty in the 
1970s. The attempt to develop a lower-caste vote bank had the unintended effect of 
mobilising the BCs as an electoral force which contributed to the decline of Congress-
style politics in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In Andhra Pradesh, the SCs collectively 
represent 17 percent of the population (Srinivasulu 1999). Among these, around 90 
percent fall into two sub-castes, Madiga and Mala, whose division has increased 
owning tothe emergence of autonomous demands between sub-castes and 
subsequent re-categorisation. The other two important social groups in Andhra 
Pradesh are tribals (6%), who are largely concentrated in the forest areas of Andhra 
and Telangana and Muslims (7%).  Muslims have a distinctive presence in the urban 
and semi-urban unorganised service sector (Srinivasulu 1999), but their political impact 
has been concentrated in the city of Hyderabad and parts of Telangana. 
 
The dominant middle caste, combined with divisions among the middle and lower 
castes, helps explain a high level of political awareness among the Andhra Pradesh 
electorate. Indeed, overall turnout figures during elections put the state roughly third 
among all Indian states, following the Left-dominated states of Kerala and West Bengal 
                                            
10
 The ‘class’ aspect of defining backwardness or disadvantaged social groups has been interpreted 
largely in caste terms in Andhra Pradesh (Ram Reddy1989:299) 
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(Annex 1). As we see below, this has had important implications for the pattern of 
electoral altercations in the bi-polar polity post-1983, where relatively small swings 
have produced massive electoral changes at the state assembly and parliamentary 
level. This in turn, one can argue, has demanded the employment of increasingly 
creative political strategies that I trace below through an examination of the three 
main phases of politics in the state. 
 
3.3 Phase 1: Decline of the Congress Citadel 
 
The formation of the state of Andhra Pradesh settled much of the political factionalism 
of the post-independence break-up of the Madras Presidency and established the 
Congress Party in the middle ground of politics. The influence of the high-caste 
Brahmins, who had been important in the pre-independence politics of the Madras 
Presidency, became negligible as the result of an intense period of competition and 
compromise within the Congress between the late 1940s and the 1950s11. The capacity 
of the Congress to act as the main political institution (Suri 2002, Weiner 1967) meant 
that opposition parties led by dissidents had limited enduring impact and served 
largely to mould and reshape the party machinery through the politics of alliance.  
Competition between factions became a source of strength for the party during this 
early period. Factional leaders were an important source of local support in this 
regionally heterogeneous new state. 
 
The accommodation of elites and regional interests was managed in a way that aimed 
to balance stability within the party as well as factional interests within the state. This 
was a balance that was constantly under negotiation and eventually led to the downfall 
of the CP. The emergence of a powerful state-level figure, N Sanjeeva Reddy, from the 
initial contest for chief minister, was contained by Jawaharlal Nehru, who personally 
persuaded Reddy to take over as president of the party in January 1960. The first 
dalitChief Minister, DSanjeevaiah from Rayalaseema, was appointed as his successor in 
a tactical move to woo the weaker sections of the party and to create a more neutral 
                                            
11
 See Weiner 1967 chapter 8 for a detailed account of this period. 
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focus for rival factions within the party. The strategy was not just symbolic. In May 
1961, Sanjeevaiah’s government issued orders for a 25 percent reservation of seats in 
educational institutions and jobs in government services for the socially and 
educationally backward classes (Suri 2002). This provoked controversy within the party, 
but proved to be an important step in creating a lower-caste base for the party. 
 
The Congress was successful in usurping the ideological ground of the most successful 
regional Communist movements in India, an achievement which was aided by 
ideological splits between the Leftist parties in the mid-1960s (see Srinivasulu 1999, 
Suri 2002, Selig-Harrison 1956). In the first elections to the new state in 1962, Congress 
managed to poll 47.3 percent of the popular vote and win 177 out of 300 seats in the 
state assembly. Up until 1983, Congress held a clear majority in the assembly and won 
between 46.8 percent and 57.4 percent of the popular vote in parliamentary elections, 
and 52.3 percent and 39.3 percent in state elections (Suri 2002). During this period, 
Andhra Pradesh remained a stronghold for Congress despite its nationally fluctuating 
fortunes. In the 1967 Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament) election, the party was 
routed in as many as eight states but managed to retain Andhra Pradesh. 
 
Similarly, in the 1977 election, when the Congress was completely routed in almost 
every corner of the country following Indira Gandhi’s authoritarian rule during the 
emergency period, the party sent a record 41 members to the Lok Sabha from Andhra 
Pradesh. Other parties that contested during different phases had only a marginal 
influence. The Swatantra Party was the only party to establish an effective non-
Congress and non-socialist political ground but proved to be no match for Congress in 
playing caste and regional cards to build popular support. The brief revival of the 
mainstream anti-Congress movement by the Janata Party was similarly short lived (Suri 
2002:20). 
 
Following the leadership vacuum created by Nehru’s death, Sanjeeva Reddy returned 
to prominence as a member of the ‘syndicate’ of senior Congress leaders (Suri 2002). In 
the absence of Nehru’s leadership, state-level factional struggles intensified, and 
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initially, were accommodated within a flexible and open-party structure. However, the 
zero-sum nature of personality clashes and struggles between the state and national 
command became evident from 1966 when an agitation broke out over the location of 
a steel plant (Reddy 1989). The then-Chief Minister, K Brahmananda Reddy, sought to 
embarrass his rival and former faction leader, Sanjeeva Reddy, who was at that time, 
the Union Minister for Steel and Mines in Delhi, by pushing for the location of the plant 
in Andhra Pradesh. A similar destructive personality battle was fought when demands 
for regional separatism in Telangana developed an explicitly political dimension under 
the control of a key faction leader within the Congress, M Chenna Reddy (Srinivasulu 
1999:10). As with the case of the steel plant, the impetus for these disagreements 
came not from the opposition parties, but from dissident factions within the Congress 
and had long-term effects of cementing enduring resentments and rivalries between 
the party elite. 
 
In the 1970s, inter-party conflicts took on a different turn under the leadership of 
Indira Gandhi. A series of tactical, non-factional loyalists with little or no political base 
in the region were promoted by the party high command in Delhi to the position of 
chief minister. The first was a Brahmin from Telangana, PV Narasimha Rao and then, 
after his resignation, J Vengala Rao, a member of the Velama caste who was from 
Telangana but close to the Kammas of Andhra Pradesh.  Indira Gandhi’s strategy in 
appointing these figures was to undercut and destabilise the dominant castes and 
factional leaders who could pose a potential threat to control from the centre (Ram 
Reddy 1989:284). This strategy was supported on two fronts, through the creation of 
high-profile, anti-poverty programmes that could mobilise sizeable vote banks directly 
and through rebalancing the party leadership in the state by giving more seats to 
weaker sections. 
 
This new thrust from the high command of the party changed the face of the assembly, 
50 percent of which was occupied by newcomers, with significant increases in female 
and Muslim candidates (Vaugier-Chatterjee 2009). However, restructuring the party 
was more far-reaching and costlier than intended. The anti-poverty campaign was 
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orchestrated from the centre and aimed to directly reach the poor. The use of radical 
popular slogans (‘garibi hatao’: abolish poverty) and bureaucratic channels of 
implementation intentionally bypassed local intermediaries and power brokers among 
the rich peasantry and regionally powerful factional leaders (Srinivasulu 1999:11). The 
breakdown of patron-client relations resulted in a failure of political communication 
(Reddy 1989:285). A weakened local leadership meant that there was no renewal of 
the party organisation at the local level resulting in a void in leadership and a lack of 
dynamism at the periphery of the party structure.    
 
The strategies of Indira Gandhi paid off in the short term at the state level. Yet despite 
the fact that the party held out in the post-emergency elections, the subsequent splits 
in the national party polarised the state-level leadership. Brahmanada Reddy chose to 
remain with the ‘official’ Congress Party and led the state-level party in rejecting Indira 
Gandhi’s new Congress Party, describing its formation as ‘illegal, unconstitutional and 
dictatorial, aimed at destroying collective leadership and establishing a personality 
cult.’ (Suri 2002: 25). The split saw the return of the dissident, M Chenna Reddy. This 
was a complex period in terms of the balance of power between the state-level party 
and the Delhi high command with four chief ministers installed during one legislative 
term (1978-1982). Indira Gandhi became the sole factor in the Congress power 
structure that was relevant to the state-level party. The government was highly 
centralised and most of the state leaders turned into sycophants or dissidents (Suri 
2002:26). The feeling that local interests and state autonomy were being undermined 
was not restricted to the elite. Discontent was rife within the electorate, paving the 
way for a new entrant onto Andhra Pradesh's political stage. 
 
3.4 Phase 2: Limits to Charisma – the Initial Years of the Telugu Desam Party 
 
Into this vacuum stepped a highly popular film star, N T Rama Rao (popularly known as 
NTR), who founded the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) in March 1982. With no prior 
political experience, NTR’s success can be attributed to both the strength of the anti-
Congress sentiment, as well as, in no small measure, to his iconic status in the popular 
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imagination. NTR, a multi-millionaire actor from the Kamma caste, entered state 
politics with virtually no political base but within nine months, he managed to garner 
leaders and votes by capitalising on the strong anti-Congress wave in the state. His 
party manifesto spoke of clean administration and the elimination of corruption and 
the removal of economic restrictions on investment and enterprise. The new party 
promoted candidates with professional backgrounds12, whose claims to a clean slate in 
terms of corruption were guarantees based more on their political inexperience than 
their moral fibre (Kohli 1990:86). 
 
Much has been written about the importance of NTR's mythical status and popular 
following and his expert use of stage-management skills in his public appearances. NTR 
was a household name across Andhra Pradesh having acted in 274 Telugu films and 
was especially popular among rural illiterates and women. He was best known for his 
portrayal of gods from Hindu mythology who saved the poor and disposed of all that 
was wicked. He skilfully drew on the imagery and idioms of cinema in his campaign 
speeches, which he delivered to breath-taking effect, promising to restore the self-
respect of 60 million Andhra people (aarukotla Andhrula atma gauravam) and to end 
the corrupt political culture that had flourished under the Congress. As Kohli argues, 
‘clad in his saffron robe – the traditional garb of India’s holy men – and riding around in 
a convertible transformed to look like a chariot, NTR might have been a figure from the 
Mahabharata, reincarnated to protect the dispossessed from worldly evils’ (1988:998). 
 
NTR's cinematic backdrop also had a more practical political application. His use of 
modern media on the election trail and his existing fan base of some 600 NTR fan clubs 
across the state made him a radical and forceful entrant onto the landscape of Andhra 
Pradesh politics (Kohli 1998, Bernstorff and Gray 1998:Ch 1). In 1983, the TDP ended 
the Congress party’s dominance with a landslide victory, securing 46.8 percent of the 
popular vote and 198 seats in the state assembly. The power of the party was tested 
                                            
12
Rather than seek to draw these discredited professionals into the TDP, NTR made it a point to promote 
professionals into politics who, like himself, were considered ‘clean’ because of political inexperience. In 
1983, 125 of TDP ticket holders were graduates, 28 were post-graduates, 20 were doctors, 8 were 
engineers and 47 were lawyers. 
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one-and-a-half years later when the Congress supported a coup d’etat within the TDP. 
Former Congress member Nadendla Bhaskar Rao spearheaded the split when NTR was 
in the United States undergoing heart surgery. Congress used the office of the state 
governor for this purpose. The coup failed when mass protests under the banner of 
‘save democracy’ lobbied in favour of NTR with the result that Congress was forced to 
withdraw its support to the defectors. In the 1984 Lok Sabha election following this, 
Congress went from an all-time high of controlling nearly all of AP's 42 seats in the 
Parliament, to an all-time low of just six. After being reinstalled in 1985, NTR called a 
mid-term election and managed to increase his share of seats in the assembly to 202, 
three more than in the 1983 election.     
 
NTR's election success in 1985 was the culmination of a number of factors. His 
dethronement evoked a wave of sympathy in the state and consolidated his electoral 
alliance with anti-Congress parties. As a result of considerable infighting within party 
factions, the Congress party’s response was tempered by their inability to project a 
single credible leader.  Added to this, the populist polices already put in place by NTR 
were more concrete than anything Congress could propose (Ram Reddy 1989:289-
291). These elections also displayed the political maturity of NTR as a political tactician. 
Due to the increased importance of regionalism that had emerged in the 1983 
elections, NTR contested and won in constituencies chosen from all three regions of 
the state in 1985. This was the first time this strategy had been adopted in Andhra 
politics, and served to successfully appease discontent and expand his popular support 
in the state. NTR chose to retain his seat in Rayalaseema, the region that was the most 
volatile (Ram Reddy 1989: 291). 
 
NTR’s period as chief minister up until 1989 cannot be merely described as populist. He 
set in motion a series of reforms that struck at the heart of the system of governance, 
setting in place a new relationship between the state leader and the people. The policy 
of reducing the retirement age for government employees from 58 to 55 years was 
heralded along with pronouncements and criticism of these employees by the Chief 
Minister himself. He accused them of becoming anti-people and corrupt in a way that 
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had never been heard in the state before (Suri 2002:30). Despite legal battles from the 
ruling Congress Party in Delhi, NTR successfully abolished the Legislative Council and 
village officer’s positions, both of which were important bastions of the Congress Party 
(see below). He also established the highly popular Rs. 2/kilo of rice scheme and janata 
cloth, which was another subsidised scheme for clothes and reduced power tariffs for 
farmers. Yet after sweeping the polls in 1983, the TDP lost the election to Congress in 
1989 but returned with a massive mandate in 1994. 
 
Until this point, the state seemed to have settled into a pattern of sorts - of a 
collaborative two-party system driven by anti-incumbent altercation with neither 
Congress nor the TDP showing any capacity of effecting any real change in governance. 
The Congress Party cadre below the state level were bolstered by their electoral gains 
in the 1987 panchayat elections. This was also an indication of the positive effects of 
the new local party organisation, which had devolved authority over candidature to the 
district-level committees (Suri 2002: 32).  The state assembly and parliamentary 
elections were both held in November 1989. Congress won 39 out of Andhra Pradesh's 
42 Lok Sabha seats and 51 percent of the popular vote. In the Assembly elections, 
Congress got 62.1 percent of the seats and 47.2 percent of the popular vote. Congress 
held the Assembly until 1995, under three chief ministers but the party was beset with 
factionalism, rising communal and Naxalite violence, as well as, allegations of serious 
corruption. The sympathy wave following the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi was vital in 
ensuring that Congress survived the 1991 Lok Sabha election (Suri 2002: 34). 
 
During the 1994 elections, Congress president, PV Narasimha Rao, personally oversaw 
the party and championed the successes of his economic liberalisation policies at the 
national level. This campaign was countered with welfarist rhetoric by NTR, backed by 
promises to reintroduce the two rupee rice scheme, impose total prohibition and 
provide power at subsidised prices to farmers. His pro-poor policies earned him the 
backing of the Communist parties. The TDP swept the polls, securing a three-fourths 
majority in the assembly on its own and 51.3 percent of the popular vote with the help 
of two Communist parties, the CPI and the CPI(M). 
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3.5 Phase 3: The New Era of Telugu Desam 
 
The turning point for the TDP came in 1995, when NTR’s son-in-law, Chandrababu 
Naidu (CBN), organised a successful coup within the party and assumed leadership. 
Naidu had played an important role in fending off the previous coup in 1984. This time, 
he used his skills as a backroom party organiser to end the era of a charismatic 
leadership with a new phase characterised by pragmatism and economic reform (Suri 
2002:39)13. The assumption of party and state leadership by Naidu did not result in 
the same pro-democracy outbursts that had followed the earlier coup and the new 
regime was consolidated when NTR died four months after being forced out of office. 
NTR's wife challenged CBN’s right to the NTR legacy but in the 1996 and 1998 Lok 
Sabha elections, this challenge was nullified. By 1999, state politics had settled into a 
volatile two-party contest. Yet, despite capturing nearly three percent more votes than 
the TDP in the national election, Congress gained only five seats in the Lok Sabha, 
compared to the TDP’s 29. 
 
When Naidu took over as Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, he faced three main 
problems. First, he was a career politician who understood the workings of party 
organisation though he lacked the charismatic appeal of his predecessor. While the 
former attribute played a major role in confirming his right to succession among the 
party legislators, he, nonetheless, faced a significant challenge in establishing his image 
among the electoral masses. Second, over a decade of political altercation between 
Congress and the TDP had forged social cleavages in a state dominated by two rival 
castes, the Reddys and the Kammas, and a highly complex set of alignments among the 
lower castes. As in other states, while the logic of caste dominated politics, it did not 
provide a base for effective governance. Third, the populist policies pursued by TDP's 
                                            
13
 Naidu was elected to the Andhra Pradesh legislative assembly in 1978 from the constituency in 
Chittoor district. He subsequently became a minister and held the portfolios of archives, 
cinematography, technical education, animal husbandry, dairy development, public libraries and 
minor irrigation between 1980 and 1983, under the Congress government. He lost his (Congress) seat 
in the 1983 election, and three days later, he joined the newly formed TDP to work alongside his 
father-in-law, NTR, as the general secretary of the party. 
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founder had led to a severe financial crisis, one that Naidu was already aware of since 
he had held the post of finance minister under NTR. 
 
The distinctiveness of the ‘Naidu era’ has been widely recognised by commentators of 
this period. Much of this attention has been focused on the ambitious set of 
governance and economic reforms that he put in place. While Naidu was certainly not 
the only chief minister to embark on reform, he was certainly the most high profile 
(Mooij 2003) and professional. When a World Bank team visited the state in 1996, 
Naidu succeeded in securing an unscheduled meeting where he presented a 
powerpoint presentation of his model of economic development in the state. 
Impressed, the World Bank president apparently turned to his country director and 
asked how soon they could get a team to Andhra Pradesh (Kirk 2004:34-6). This agenda 
is articulated in a document called Vision 2020 (1999), which was commissioned by 
McKinsey, a management consultancy firm. The document outlines critical economic 
sectors and strategies for rapid growth, along with recommendations for people-
centred governance.   
 
The engagement of external experts and the courting of international finance earned 
Naidu a controversial reputation in the state, especially among the vociferous Left. Yet, 
as the following analysis aims to show, the ‘real politics’ pursued by Naidu was far more 
complex in that the mantle of neo-liberalism merely diverted attention away from a 
new brand of developmental populism. As one commentator put it, ‘like a political 
wizard, Chandrababu Naidu pulls out one welfare scheme after another from his hat, 
averaging one every week’ (Suri 2002), in an effort to forge new and effective coalitions 
of support and fundamentally, to respond to the internal pressures of awareness and 
decay in the state.  Another eminent observer called him, ‘(the) first politician in India 
who did not talk in terms of the weaker sections and the poor, even during times of 
elections’14. It was this conscious effort to recast the electoral equations in the state 
                                            
14
D. Narasimha Reddy, Dean, School of Social Sciences, University of Hyderabad, quoted in Frontline 
Magazine. 
 
79 
 
 
that formed the basis of Naidu’s efforts to influence the mass or internal political 
culture in the state. 
 
One important and largely unrecognised aspect of Naidu’s strategy was the extent to 
which he continued to draw on the mantle of the Telugu Desam founder, despite the 
fact that he personally had engineered his downfall. NTR's name and legacy was 
referred to in Naidu's party campaign materials, yet the roots of this connection were 
far deeper as became clear during my discussions with party cadre at the village level.  
Naidu also proved himself adept in the use of communications tools through the 
reinvention or repackaging of on-going policies and programmes, namely the women's 
self-help groups movement and the broader issue of local development funds. 
 
The other mantle Naidu took on was a project from the national level.  From 1998, the 
TDP formed the largest state-level partner in the ruling National Democratic Alliance, a 
position that Naidu used to its full advantage15. Not only did he establish himself as 
force to be reckoned with but also it was a force that appeared to typify the new 
direction that had come to characterise economic and political change in India. It had 
very real and politically important ramifications in terms of the leeway that this gave 
him to pursue controversial policies at the state level. 
 
3.6 Politics of Localisation 
 
Successive regimes in Andhra Pradesh have made extensive and often pioneering use 
of the instruments of public policy to achieve social and political mobilisation. The land 
reform programme under Congress started in 1950 and continued through the 1970s, 
and created fundamental changes in the tenancy laws by dismantling the system of 
landlordism (see Ram Reddy 1989). Reservations for disadvantaged castes in education, 
administration and political institutions have been consistently used in Andhra Pradesh 
                                            
15
 CBN had also been rumoured as a potential candidate for prime minister of the United Front (1996-
1998), but he made it clear that his agenda was focused on his state and was content to play a 
‘kingmaker’ role in negotiating the candidates of two successive prime ministers, as well as, key 
cabinet assignments, among the disparate parties in the coalition (Kirk 2004:34) 
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from a relatively early period, as a means to co-opt the growing elite from non-forward 
castes. Policies of reservation were put in place on a caste basis and have served to 
promote political and economic advancement of elites within castes, as well as, 
reinforcing caste divisions, particularly within the backward castes (Ram Reddy 1989). 
 
3.6.1 Reforming the formal system of local governance 
 
One of the most important policies from the perspective of grassroots mobilisation was 
the initiation of one of the first formal systems of local governance in the country in 
1959 based on a three-tier structure (district, intermediary and village)16. Effectively, 
the emphasis of this system was on the intermediary level, the panchayat samiti. In a 
1964 amendment, the size of this tier was enlarged, and roughly approximated the 
assembly constituency. The panchayat samiti was an important body of political 
control17 as well as of political accommodation. These early enactments of democratic 
decentralisation were relatively progressive on paper, and included provisions for the 
reservation of seats for women and SCs and STs. However, effective powers devolved to 
these bodies were limited and their autonomy in political and administrative 
mattersrestricted. Changes to this system were relatively minor until the TDP entered 
the political scene. 
 
Early in his first term in office, NTR successfully removed or reformed three institutions 
perceived to support the Congress Party power. These were a) the system of the village 
officers (see Eashvaraiah 1985) b) the legislative council and c) the panchayat samiti. 
Of these, the last was the most ambiguous and indirect as a political manoeuvre. The 
330 panchayat samitis were replaced by 1,104 mandal panchayats and reservation for 
positions was raised from 21 percent to 50 percent, following the addition of BC 
quotas. The creation of mandals implied two things, establishing the institutional 
structure for moving the government closer to the people and vastly increasing the 
                                            
16
 For a full review of the legislative changes to the panchayats in Andhra Pradesh see ISS 2000 and 
World Bank 2000. 
17
 Political calculations were made on the basis of the dual channels of the members of legislative 
assembly and the panchayat samiti president. Where the Congress lost one seat, efforts were made 
to capture the other. Effective powers were mediated though the seat held by the party (interview 
with BPR Vithal, Chief Secretary of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, March 2002). 
81 
 
 
number of positions within the political system. The impact of this reformation was 
initially limited by political and bureaucratic reluctance to surrender power to local 
bodies (ISS 2000). 
 
Figure 6: Structure of elected local governance posts in Andhra Pradesh 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The passing of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment for democratic decentralisation at 
the national level led to the State Panchayat Act of 1994 which retained the three-tier 
structure of gram panchayats at the village, mandal and district level. Elections to 
mandal and district posts in the Andhra Pradesh panchayat system were to be 
conducted on party lines18. The decision to hold direct elections for candidates to the 
three tiers, as well as, for the village president had three consequences. Firstly, 
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 The 73
rd
 Amendment gives states discretion to decide if intermediary and district level bodies are to 
be elected on party lines. It does however prohibit party based election to the village level. The 
argument as to whether parties should be allowed to participate openly in local bodes dates back to 
the Ashok Metha Committee report in 1957, and has been heavily influenced by Gandhian idealism. 
The small size of the mandal level in Andhra Pradesh effectively makes a mockery of the attempt to 
formally isolate the village from party politics.   
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constituting the local bodies required voters to cast ballots in four elections. This did 
not deter voters and turn out remained high, exceeding that of assembly and 
parliamentary elections. Secondly, positions and opportunities for political engagement 
and direct campaigning were greatly increased. Finally, organic linkages between tiers 
were severed with the introduction of direct elections at the ward, Sarpanch, Mandal 
Praja Territorial Constituency (MPTC) and Zilla Parishad Territorial Constituency (ZPTC) 
level. (World Bank 2000:24). Given the fact that the sarpanch and MPTC tend to cover 
the same constituency, this meant that these posts were often shared between 
opposition parties, as we see in the following village case studies. One can surmise 
from the reluctance of the regime to reform this latter aspect that the political strategy 
of politicisation is deliberate, not so much in terms of guaranteeing electoral 
supremacy but in terms of broadening the scope of political participation from the 
village upwards. 
 
The TDP held all the district president posts and 63 percent (the remaining were won 
by Congress) of mandal president positions in 1995. The 2001 elections saw this grip 
eroded when the ruling party held onto only 12 out of 22 districts and maintained a 
margin of only 46 mandal president seats over Congress (480 versus 434). However, 
the percentage of votes polled by the TDP in this election was slightly more than the 
percentage of votes it polled in the 1999 assembly elections, leading some observers to 
rightly conclude that the extent of the loss was not as great as the figures would lead 
one to believe (Suri 2001). The Naidu regime refused to accede to demands for the 
devolution of the functions and finances of the 28 rural development functions that 
the 11th Schedule of the Amendment recommends for transfer to the local bodies. As 
in other states, sporadic mobilisation by civil society and even organised interests 
within the local government failed to have any real effect on the state policy towards 
decentralisation, which itself was entering into new and largely unchartered territory.   
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3.6.2 Informal reforms in local governance 
 
Janmabhoomi  
The formal system of decentralisation from 1995 was accompanied by the initiation of 
an alternative system of grassroots participation by the TDP. The extent of these 
informal reforms was arguably the most important aspect of Naidu developmental 
politics in the rural areas. Naidu transformed an experiment by NTR to ‘bring the 
government to the doorstep of the people’ in 1997, into the high profile campaign in 
development politics called the Janmabhoomi (JB) programme, a flagship initiative of 
the party. Janmabhoomi was not just a government programme. In the operational 
guidelines, it was described as a ‘people’s movement for reconstruction and 
revitalisation of society’ (GoAP 1997). No specific funds were allocated to the initiative. 
It was conceived as a new approach, which draws resources from existing government 
schemes, both state and centrally funded (Naidu 2000:203). Its primary objective was 
to mobilise people to become active participants in development and to recast the 
perception of the government in public opinion - from provider to facilitator. 
 
The JBprogramme had three core components: taking the government to the people, 
micro-planning and the voluntary contribution of labour. The initiative was centred 
around village-level meetings, conducted by teams of local bureaucrats who toured the 
mandal in a campaign-style exercise spread over a week or ten days. The entire village 
was invited to participate in these meetings where development programmes were 
announced and grievances and applications for schemes collected. The initiative 
provoked  a lot of controversy, much of which centred on the fact that these gatherings 
were parallel to and potentially usurped the gram sabhas (or village meetings) and the 
system of democratic representation that is prescribed in the Panchayat Act. 
 
Initially, the village gatherings were held four times a year but after 2001, they were 
held twice a year. The JB rounds were more akin to a campaign than a sustained 
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process of institutional and administrative reform19 in part due to the intensity of the 
communications campaign that surrounded each round20. A mandal-level team of local 
officials from all departments, headed by a deputed coordinator called the Nodal 
Officer, toured the mandal conducting up to three meetings in different villages in a 
day. The programmes were advertised through both the state public relations 
department and the local press and television. In the week leading up to the meetings, 
jeeps fitted with megaphones and Janmabhoomi banners passed through the mandal, 
and the State Planning Department organised the dissemination of advertising 
materials on a massive scale. State and district level politicians and bureaucrats also 
used the JB to interact with the villagers. The Chief Minister himself travelled by 
helicopter and conducted high-profile village meetings along with a panel of high-level 
politicians and bureaucrats21, and the media was invited to cover the events.   
 
The village meetings provided a platform for senior bureaucrats as well as local 
politicians to directly confer schemes and projects on villages, proving a means to 
stamp the identity of the ruling party as one that was responsible for the distribution 
of funds. It is estimated that nearly 60,000 projects, most of which were considered 
small works of between 1-3 lakh rupees ($2,000-$6,000) were implemented in the 
scheme's first five years (Deshingkar and Johnson 2003). No funds were allocated to 
the programme under a specified budget heading for Janmabhoomi. Instead, funds 
were channelled from various central and state-level government schemes in what was 
basically a repackaging exercise aimed at stamping the identity of the regime on all 
                                            
19
 The campaign aspect of the JB programme is not just restricted to the scope and scale of the 
programme. The time of the JB programme is one of frantic activity in mandal and district offices. 
Demands on officers are sometimes considerable. By way of illustrating this, the Government Order 
(GO Rt. No. 295) issued by the Planning Department containing the guidelines for the 17
th
 JB due to 
be held on the 1-10
th
 June was issued only two days before the commencement.   
20
 For the 16
th
 JB round in the state, the publicity materials produced were as follows: 970,000 Telugu 
posters, 30,000 Urdu posters, 1,420,000 Telugu handbills, 30,000 Urdu handbills, 450,000 JB caps, 
49,500 JB flags, 70,000 stickers, and 100,000 stickers for school children (information from the 
District Public Relations Officer, Nalgonda). It was not possible to obtain estimate of the budget 
publicity, but observers openly suggested that it was higher than any other development programme 
in the state. 
21
  In one of the CM’s village meetings – 2 ministers, 1 Politburo member, 2 MPs, 2 MLAs, the director of 
the Women Financial Corporation, the district collector, and the superintendent of police were also 
present (The Hindu 05 May 2002). It is not surprising that it is these meetings, where VIPs attended, that 
got the most press coverage. For an account of two such meetings see Ayyangar 2000. 
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funds that reached the village level. The diversion of funds for the JB programme 
provoked fierce protests from the opposition at the time and even statements from the 
central government. It was, however, notoriously difficult to trace the source from 
which funds were drawn (Reddy 2002), through it was well known that the funds 
channeled to the JB committees far exceeded the (negligible) funds devolved to the 
panchayats (World Bank 2000). 
 
Yet it is important to note that even the World Bank failed to articulate a clear position 
on the virtue, or otherwise, of this creative channeling of funds. On the other hand, as 
Reddy (2002) surmised, donors were impressed by the extent to which this strategy 
seemed to be effective in making funds move to the local level, though they 
hadreservations in terms of the long-term implications for the democratic 
decentralisation processes. 
 
The programmatic scope of the JB was deliberately ambiguous, and it came to be used 
as a platform for the implementation of a number of other special schemes under the 
TDP. The most important of these was the Food for Work programme. Between 
September 2001 and July 2002 the Government of Andhra Pradesh (GoAP) received 
rice allocations from the central government which had a market value of 30 billion 
rupees (Deshingkar and Johnson 2003). The scheme was implemented across the 
country as a rapid poverty relief initiative. The GoAP distinguished itself in its ability to 
use its sway with the ruling coalition at the centre22 to avail of over half of the total 
allocations for all Indian states, and at an alarming pace, amidst allegations of rampant 
corruption (ibid). 
 
User Groups 
The JB also became a central organising principle for a range of concurrent government 
programmes, many of which were supported by donors, aimed at promoting self-
                                            
22
 The TDP held 28 Lok Sabha seats, and was the second largest partner in the ruling NDA coalition in 
Delhi. Naidu threatened to withdraw support from the BJP following the communal massacres in Gujarat 
and he was pacified with more rice and allowed to continue the food for work programme until the end 
of June despite widespread allegations of malpractices (Deskingar and Johnson 2002). 
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reliance through user groups. User groups were formed at an unprecedented speed in 
Andhra Pradesh during the Naidu regime and covered a wide array of development 
issues including watershed management, forest management, education and maternal 
and child health (Annex 2). These committees were formally included in the 
Janmabhoomi meetings, during which the progress was assessed and scrutinised. By 
far the most prevalent of these were the women's SHGs, a programme that pre-dated 
Naidu but was given a new identity as part of the broader development strategy of his 
government. According to one observer, by 2002, approximately 20 percent of rural 
women were part of women's SHGs (Mooji 2002).  
 
The user groups were more than just a part of the Janmabhoomi, they represented a 
new approach to development that spanned sectors and projects. Broadly stated, the 
constitution of user groups followed the emerging principles of the citizen’s 
engagement in design and management of local development that were promoted by 
donor programmes. The initiatives in this direction in Andhra Pradesh extended far 
beyond this, not only in the rapid expansion of women’s groups but also through the 
creation of state specific programmes for the formation of youth groups, mothers’ 
committees, as well as, the specific innovation of the Janmabhoomi coordination 
committee.  
 
The sheer scale of this proliferation demands an approach of analysis that looks 
beyond the sectoral or service delivery impact and instead, that sees the process of 
organisating of communities or interest groups as one that has its own inherent 
qualities. In doing so, there is scope to cast the frame of analysis in broader terms and 
explore the linkages between the proliferation of development committees by Naidu’s 
Telegu Desam and the parallel initiative reinvigorate the process of party organisation. 
One of the most important innovations undertaken by Naidu was the creation of a 
plethora of committees within the TDP, including at the village level. Unlike other 
parties, the village committees were organised with the post of the village president 
created. Using data provided by the central party office in Hyderabad, it is suggested 
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that approximately two thirds of the total TDP members would hold postsin an official 
party committee.  
 
The impact of this proliferation is explored in greater detail in Chapter 5, as part of a 
focused analysis of the impact of informal reforms in the local space in the patterns of 
participation. To date, this is the first analysis of this kind in Andhra Pradesh and 
possibly in any contemporary political development context, and in conjunction with 
analysis of the dynamics around formal local governance institutions, explores the 
broader picture of state penetration to the local level.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the broader patterns of political changes in 
Andhra Pradesh and the challenge of governance. Set against this backdrop, the widely 
held image of Naidu as a new breed of professional leader in India takes on a different 
perspective - as a leader who was faced with serious political challenges that were 
firmly embedded in the specifics of state politics. This chapter has shown how the 
response to these challenges took two forms. The first took the form of highly 
publicised and ambitious reforms that sought to replace the politics of populism with 
the politics of development in ways that courted the attention of international 
observers and major donors. The second was more informal yet arguably more far 
reaching and focused on the creation of new institutions and incentives at the local 
level through the implementation of the JBprogramme and the rapid proliferation of 
user groups. Of these two, the latter strategy of developmental politics has received 
less attention that it deserves, both in terms of the effectiveness of these informal 
institutional changes and the political objectives that underpin them. The following 
chapters will explore this in greater detail, through a local level political analysis of 
participation, politics and leadership in selected localities.  
 Chapter 4:Local Democracy -The Distinctiveness of 
Village Politics 
 
 
‘Village panchayat elections are intensely political even where political 
parties do not participate. The principle is simple, where there is power, 
there is always politics. If you want to eliminate politics from local 
government or any level of government, then you must take away 
power. If there is nothing left to fight over, then politics will wither away.’ 
(Weiner 1962:209) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the political processes around village elections in Andhra 
Pradesh. Despite being systematically weakened by the state, political activity has 
anything but withered away at the local government level. The election of the village 
president (sarpanch) is the most intense contest in the multi-tiered democratic system, 
attracting nearly 10 percent higher turnout than in other elections. While this confirms 
the broad narrative of the distinctiveness of India's democracy in comparison with 
more developed countries (Yadav 2000), the implications this has for understanding 
the rural voters' encounters with politics have not yet been subjected to a detailed 
analysis. The following analysis explores the extent to which the participation gap is 
driven by similar factors that have shaped Indian politics in general, namely identity, 
corruption and party politics and the adaptation of these factors to the special context 
of rural localities.   
 
Village governments (gram panchayats) have long played an ambiguous role in the 
Indian political system. The concept has its origins in a traditional system of governance 
that, in many parts of the country, existed long before independence. Traditional 
panchayats took the form of a council (ayat) with five (panch) elders who played a role 
in resolving disputes and were closely linked to the hierarchical patronage networks 
that characterised traditional politics. The emergence of these institutions into the 
modern system of governance took place unevenly between the different states. 
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Andhra Pradesh, along with Karnataka and West Bengal, is considered to be among the 
forerunners in terms of formally devolving powers to rural institutions, having held 
three local government elections (in 1978,1983,1988) prior to the establishment of a 
national framework for Panchayati Raj (Raghavulu and Narayana 1999:123). 
 
The eventual passing of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment in 1993 was a watershed 
moment in the course of decentralisation, setting in place a broad three-tier structure 
of democratically elected governments at the district, intermediary and local levels. 
The amendment also proposed a list of 29 subjects to be devolved to the new 
Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs). However, responsibility for legislation was conferred 
on the states. As a result, the new panchayats have been subject to the influences of 
state politics that in most states has undermined the capacity of the panchayats to 
fulfil the developmental and governance functions for which they were envisaged.   
 
The Panchayati Raj system has nonetheless ensured that India became one of the most 
important laboratories for the study of participatory politics in the world, not only for 
understanding the politics of decentralisation but also for the institutionalisation of 
participatory governance. The new panchayats included provisions for positive 
discrimination. One third of the seats at all levels were reserved for women23 and 
reservations are granted for lower castes and STs on the basis of their proportion in 
relation to the overall population. Despite the tendency for higher castes and men to 
control the reserved posts by proxy, there is emerging evidence of the positive impacts 
of reservations on decision-making (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2001). 
 
The institutionalisation of participatory processes is another important aspect of the 
design of the modern panchayat. Village councils are required to hold meetings, called 
gram sabhas, between two and four times a year to pass major resolutions which are 
recorded in official records. Based on a large-scale, multi-state survey, Beseley, Pande 
and Rao (2005) showed that the lower castes are more likely to attend these 
                                            
23
 Since July 2011, reservations for women in local bodies have been increased to 50 percent. 
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meetingsthan the higher castes. The social determinants of participation have been a 
major focus of empirical research on local governance in India, which has served to 
highlight the extent to which education and access to information are more important 
in determining attendance than social status (Alsop et al 2000, Krishna 2002:12). Yet 
opportunities for participation do not ensure effectiveness. In an innovative research 
project, which analysed transcripts of gram sabha meetings, Ban and Rao (2009) found 
that the more land a person owns, the most likely it is that their preference will be 
discussed in village meetings. Disadvantaged groups participated in these meetings, 
but rarely dominated proceedings. The study also found that where the post of village 
president was reserved for the lower castes, landed groups tended to have more 
control in public meetings held by the panchayat. 
 
These findings have highlighted the need to supplement quantitative analysis with 
qualitative exploration to understand the informal institutional mechanisms of 
participation. In her study of village elections in Karnataka, Anathapur (2007) finds 
evidence to suggest that the emergence of the new institution has done little to 
displace the pre-existing customary institutions, especially senior caste leaders of the 
higher or forward castes. The broader process of political and economic mobilisation 
has not eroded these elite-dominated customary institutions. Rather, the elites have 
been able to successfully adapt themselves to the local government, often controlling it 
from behind the scenes.  
 
One area of agreement lies in the limited role allowed to political parties at the local 
level. With a few exceptions, the state Panchayati Raj Act prohibits the use of symbols 
at the gram panchayat level. In Andhra Pradesh, parties are allowed to participate at 
all levels of the PRI except in the gram panchayats. Even in the case of the overtly 
politicised panchayats in West Bengal, recent empirical research has challenged the 
claim that well organised cadre based organisations imply organisational and 
ideological coherence at the grassroots level (Williams 2001). In other states, the roles 
of parties in village elections have rarely been a subject of research. It can be suggested 
that this oversight is prompted by a combination of the assumed incapacity of India's 
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party institutions and the presumption that discussions of any party involvement is 
illicit or taboo. In the case of Andhra Pradesh, both were found to be untrue. 
 
The emerging evidence of the process of participation at the gram panchayat level 
gives cause to question conclusions regarding institutional outcomes that are based on 
large-scale multi-state studies. As Chaudhuri and Heller (2002) argue, the act of 
participation has an inherent plasticity that is influenced by various factors embedded 
in the local context. Yet, it is also clear that understanding these hidden mechanisms 
requires intensive analysis especially as these mechanisms have produced results that 
are hard to generalise and are likely to vary significantly between states. 
 
The following discussion describes the general narrative of gram panchayat politics as 
it was encountered in four villages in Andhra Pradesh. This is a narrative dominated by 
a type of politics not commonly associated with village governments in India, focused 
exclusively on the contest for elections rather than the accountability and performance 
of representatives.This is partly due to the appropriation of the concept of gram sabha 
by the Janmabhoomi (Chapter 5). The policy to reduce the power of the gram 
panchayats served to alleviate the demands on the state but did nothing to reduce the 
intensity of the contests, which was controlled by the drivers of party politics, 
coalitions of identity and widely acknowledged corruption and vote buying. 
 
4.2 Patterns of Participation 
 
This section draws on the qualitative data from a survey conducted in four villages, 
covering 244 respondents randomly selected and stratified to include roughly equal 
representation along gender and age lines. Compared to similar surveys, the sampling 
methodology was relatively intensive and respondents were selected from 50 to 68 
households per village. This intensive approach enabled a closer exploration of the 
relationships between voters in the local space and allowed comparison between 
different villages. Interviews with respondents were open-ended and included detailed 
discussions on specific local events, issues and actors. This combination of methods 
92 
 
 
enabled the researcher to get a sense of the perceptions, experiences and strategies of 
voters and the local narratives around village elections. The following analysis focuses 
on three important aspects of this narrative: the participation gap, political 
stratification and political space.   
 
Table 4: The participation gap 
 
Tier 
Number 
of voters 
Turnout 
 
% 
Winning 
vote 
share 
% 
Margin 
of 
victory 
% 
No. contestants 
polling >5% of 
vote 
Total number of 
contestants 
Draw from 
sample Area 
 (18 sample 
points) 
GP 
(sarpanch) 
2,554 82.15 52.9 9.43 2.22 2.94 
MPTC 2,857 73.79 55.16 15.70 2.39 2.78 
Random 
sample of 18 
sample 
points from 
across 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
 
ZPTC 35,934 70.35 50.65 12.65 2.61 3.28 
MLA 
 
174,939 69.41 51.56 12.46 2.11 6.55 
Source: Field data  
 
4.2.1 The participation gap 
 
While it is recognised that the intensity of democracy increases as one travels down 
the political system in India (Yadav 2000), the implication of this demands more 
analysis than has been given to date. The establishment of PRIs meant that rural voters 
participated in a multi-tiered democratic system, from the village to the national level. 
A unique data set from Andhra Pradeshwhich includes village elections, based on the 
official records of the Electoral Commission, appears to support this assertion but it 
also introduces a number of important caveats. While we do see a steady increase in 
voter turnout by one to two percentage points between state Assembly, district and 
intermediary tier (mandal) elections, the turnout increases by nearly 10 percent 
between the mandal and the village level elections.  The data also indicates that the 
margin of victory is narrower at the village level and that the number of candidates 
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contesting remains relatively limited. As a result, it is possible to suggest that 
participation rates do not simply increase at the village level but that this intensity is 
evidence of close political competition between clearly defined groups. 
 
Table 5: Political participation in panchayat elections N=244 
 
N= 244          %  Gender Caste group 
 Total Men Women SC/ST OBC General 
Canvassing: 
Did someone ask you for your vote 
before the last elections? 
93.4 92.9 94.0 89.7 95.2 94.5 
Voting: 
Have you voted in all gram panchayat 
elections since you were old enough to 
vote? 
86.9 87.4 86.3 83.8 89.2 87.0 
Political Support: 
Do you support a particular political 
party? 
80.3 83.5 76.9 77.9 80.9 81.5 
Party Activities: 
Attended a political meeting in the last 
one year? 
33.6 44.1 22.2 26.5 44.6 29.3 
Campaigning: 
Campaigned for a candidate in the recent 
gram panchayat elections? 
32.0 42.5 20.5 33.8 34.9 28.3 
Source: Field data 
 
As a seasoned national-level politician observed, rural voters cannot escape politics 
unlike their urban counterparts24. Yet the extent of the participation gap has an added 
salience in Andhra Pradesh, due to the specific institutional structure. The creation of 
the mandal system by NT Rama Rao considerably reduced the size of the intermediary 
tier.  As a result, the constituency of the directly elected members roughly 
approximated the gram panchayat, a unit for which villagers are responsible for 
directly electing a president as well as a local ward member. As a result, the 10 percent 
jump in turnout between the gram panchayat and mandal panchayat does not actually 
                                            
24
 Interview with Jaipal Reddy, then Member of Parliament and President of the Andhra Pradesh 
Congress Party Committee; Delhi, August 2002. 
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represent a significant difference in the size of the constituency covered by the post. 
This apparent anomaly demands a closer examination of the significance attached to 
these posts and the extent to which institutional design shapes participation.   
 
As in any democratic process, participation in politics is not limited to voting. The 
survey data showed that nearly all (93.4%) voters were contacted by a candidate in 
local elections;and about one third were involved in campaigning and had attended a 
political meeting in the previous year (Table 5).  
 
These findings roughly approximate trends in other parts of India25. Out of five people, 
four expressed a clear allegiance to a party, while one in three people had attended a 
political meeting in the previous year. A similar number of people were directly 
involved in campaigning for a party or candidate.  The majority of people (83.5% of 
men and 76.9% of women) supported a particular party. There was, however, a high 
degree of variation in terms of involvement in the party’s political activities. Men were 
twice as likely to attend political meetings and campaign on behalf of candidates than 
women, indicating that women tend to be less engaged in rigorous political activities. 
This finding is surprising, given the extent to which the emergence of the TDP in 
Andhra Pradesh has been linked with appeals to women.However, as we see in the 
next two chapters, the new politics of the TDP focused on creating alterative political 
spaces for women’s active participation through SHGs (Chapter 5), leaving the core 
stratum of political leadership as a largely male dominated space (Chapter 6).  The 
disaggregation of political activities also indicated some divergence in the patterns 
between caste groups, with BCs being more likely to be active in parties than other 
groups. The reasons for this will be explored later in this chapter.    
                                            
25
 In his study of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, Krishna found that only 43% of villagers reported 
campaigning on behalf of any candidate (or discussing electoral issues with others) during the 
previous election to the local government; 33% attended rallies or meetingsheld for electoral 
candidates (2003). Alsop’s study (2000) finds similar proportions to those in my sample, with 42.9% 
of people taking part in campaigns and 32.8% attending party meetings. Manor’s study of Karnataka 
includes data regarding intermediary tier elections. He shows that 23.2% of people took part in 
campaigns, though the levels were far lower for SCs (18.5%). He also shows that marginally more 
people (25.3%) campaigned in an election at a higher (district) level, which is contrary to the 
arguments made here (Crook and Manor 1998). 
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The participation gap emphasises the importance of the sarpanch as an actor in the 
political system.  There is little doubt over the extent to which the elections of all these 
posts, including the majority of ward member posts, are conducted on party lines. As 
the in-depth analysis below shows, party allegiance and complex coalitions that 
emerge at the village level are not always clearly evident, even to mandal-level leaders, 
yet at the village level, the political nature of these contests is evident. The intensity of 
the party-based competition means that candidates invest heavily in these elections, to 
the extent of paying for votes and even transporting migrants back to their home 
villages to vote. As a result, the general picture that emerges is one in which political 
intensity is driven by local politicians who put a high degree of personal and political 
value on winning these contests. 
 
Analysis of the reasons for choosing a particular candidate indicates the extent to 
which party politics prevails. Most respondents gave multiple reasons that affected 
their decision.  The extent to which these reasons are context specific and interrelated 
limits the effectiveness of straightforward ranking. However, analysis of the total 
responses and clustering responses according to themes, shows that the party’s 
political factors were the most important motivation for voting, followed by personal 
qualities of the candidate and the promise and potential of benefits. Surprisingly, caste 
considerations were not widely articulated as factors affecting choice, but as the 
discussion below shows, issues of identity remain deeply embedded in the electoral 
process. 
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Table 6: Reasons cited for choosing a sarpanch candidate 
 Derived coding headings 
 
 
 
Party allegiance 
 
 
Total citations 
116 
Personal qualities 
 
Total citations 
84 
Development 
activities 
 
Total citations 
64 
Caste 
 
 
Total citations 
25 
Requested to 
vote 
 
Total citations 
22 
Family 
 
 
Total citations 6 
Citation 
frequency 
 
Verbatim comment clusters (citations) 
60 
 
 
50 
 
 
40 
 
 
30 
 
 
20 
 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
Voting along 
party lines ( 45) 
Voting for a 
party on the 
basis of 
family/tradition 
/or long term  
support        (42) 
 
Voted according 
 to party 
alliance*                                                
(17) 
Support for the 
ideology/objecti
ves of the party                                                       
(12) 
Failure of their 
old party to 
deliver                                                
( 6) 
Fairness, mixing 
with all 
communities, 
honesty             
(59)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Leadership skills, 
political/official 
connections, 
ability to promote 
development in 
the village                   
( 25) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Promises of 
village 
development 
works (schools, 
road formation, 
drainage);  or 
personal 
benefits (loans 
and house 
building) 
 
                          
(46) 
 
Benefits 
received from 
the party/ 
candidate in the 
past                      
                               
(18) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agreement 
among members 
of caste to vote 
for a particular 
candidate, 
potential 
benefits from 
representation 
from caste 
member, 
support 
nomination of 
own caste 
member                                
(25) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Requested 
during 
campaigning, 
personally 
visited by 
candidate (or 
having 
promised to 
vote for the 
first candidate 
who 
approaches 
them)                       
(22) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supported 
candidate 
from own 
family                        
(6) 
Source: Field data 
 
This section has set out to highlight the main patterns of participation in local elections 
in Andhra Pradesh, and has drawn attention to both the increased degree of intensity 
at the lowest level and the degree to which party politics are implicated within the 
‘participation gap’. In time with the framework set out in Chapter 1, this raises a 
number of important questions relating to the nature of politics: whether this is a 
reflection of higher level politics, where local politics is driven by traditional or other 
distinctive forces, or whether indeed, there is a new politics emerging at the local level. 
The following section uses a more detailed analysis of the quantitative data to further 
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the exploration of the patterns in the local polity, before extending the analysis of the 
qualitative data. 
 
4.2.2 Structuring the local polity 
 
Given the degree to which the party’s political engagement was embedded within 
intense politics in the local space, the contrast between those who were active and less 
active was clear when talking to respondents. While some were both keen and well 
informed about local political affairs, others were either disinterested or decided to 
remain removed from entering into these discussions. These differences in the type of 
respondents (as politically active, passive or somewhere in between) were very 
apparent during the interview process and led the interviews to take on a different 
course, depending on the political activity of the respondent. Where the interviewee 
was politically active, conversations would diverge into detailed accounts of local 
political events, issues and actors. Where respondents were politically passive, there 
was often little to discuss on these matters. Where they had consciously withdrawn 
from village politics, respondents often took the opportunity to discuss their feelings 
on the negative changes in local politics, parties and leaders.  
 
In order to explore the varying levels of participation in more detail, an index of 
participation was constructed that combined scores for six main indicators. While a 
useful tool for interpretation, political stratification is often difficult to define in 
empirical terms. Methodologies for measuring political participation have been 
developed by theorists (Almond and Verba 1965, Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, Verba 
et al. 1978 and Brady,Verba and Schlozman 1995), which are largely based on Western 
politics, in the context of national elections. Adapting these concepts to the local 
setting in a developing country requires that the specific indicators that are salient 
within a specific political setting need to be identified. 
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Given the comparatively small size of the sample and the intensity of the contextual 
analysis, it was possible to experiment with various models and indicators on political 
participation to derive a best fit or proxy variable for analysis. The PAI that was 
developed had six key variables, which included some less-widely adopted indicators, 
in addition to participation in elections and party politics. It was also decided to include 
an indicator relating to involvement in 'political corruption' practices, where increased 
political participation was defined by the rejection of offers of money for votes or 
personally contributing to election campaigns. Hence, the construction of this index 
was grounded in the quantitative and qualitative data as it emerged, rather than being 
defined at the design stage.  
Figure 7: Politicalactivity index 
 
The structured interview identified six political activities to measure people levels of 
participation. The responses from these questions were simply combined in order to construct a 
PAI. Scores of one or zero were assigned to respondents.Hence, the maximum score would be 6. 
All respondents said they had participated in at least one activity.  
 
The activities and scoring system are as follows:  
 
 Voted in panchayat elections since old enough to vote: all/ most (1), few / never (0) 
 Campaigned in last panchayat elections – yes (1), no (0) 
 Attended political meeting in the last year – yes (1), no (0) 
 Member of a political party – yes (1), no (0) 
 Any members of family are politically active – yes (1), no (0) 
 Regarding incentives to vote did you – spend money yourself/refuse any offer of money 
(1), accept/not offered (0) 
 
The sample was divided into three categories, based on the scores and were therefore, 
classified as either Low, Medium or High depending on their level of political activity.  
 
PAI Description n % 
Low One activity 92 37.7 
Middle 2-3 activities  95 38.9 
High 4-6 activities  57 23.4 
Total  244 100 
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Table 7: Factors affecting levels of political activity 
 Political Activity Index  
  Low Medium High Total (%) 
Gender Men 36 (28.3) 49 (38.6) 42 (33.1) 127 (100) 
 Women 56 (47.9) 46 (39.3) 15 (12.8) 117 (100) 
Caste  Scheduled Caste 31 (45.6) 23 (33.8) 14 (20.6) 68 (100) 
 Backward Caste 24 (28.6) 38 (45.2) 22 (26.2) 84 (100) 
 Other (Forward) Caste 37 (40.2) 34 (37.0) 21 (22.8) 92 (100) 
Education  None 55 (43.7) 54 (42.9) 17 (13.5) 126 (100) 
 Primary 12 (26.7) 14 (31.1) 19 (42.2) 45 (100) 
 Secondary  21 (38.9) 22 (40.7) 11 (20.4) 54 (100) 
 Higher 4 (21.1) 5 (26.3) 10 (52.6) 19 (100) 
Age  18-30 29 (37.2) 33 (42.3) 16 (20.5) 78 (100) 
 31-40 28 (38.9) 22 (30.5) 22 (30.6) 72 (100) 
 41-50 18 (40.0) 15 (33.3) 12 (26.7) 45 (100) 
 51+ 17 (34.7) 25 (51.0) 7  (14.3) 49 (100) 
Party  INC 28 (36.8) 33 (43.4) 15 (19.7) 76 (100) 
 TDP 28 (28.6) 34 (34.7) 36 (36.7) 98 (100) 
 No Party  31 (64.6) 16 (33.3) 1  (2.1) 48 (100) 
 Other 5 (22.7) 12 (54.5) 5 (22.7 22 (100) 
Village KB 31 (45.6) 25 (36.8) 12 (17.6) 68 (100) 
 IP 11 (17.5) 25 (39.7) 27 (42.9) 63 (100) 
 PG 30 (47.6) 24 (38.1) 9 (14.3) 63 (100) 
 BVP 20 (40.0) 21 (20.0) 9 (18.0) 50 (100) 
Total ( %)  92 (37.7) 95 (38.9) 57 (23.4) 244 (100) 
Source: Field data 
 
Discussions at the village level highlighted the fact that political activity tended to be 
defined at the household level. In cases where the husband was politically active, wives 
tended to be relatively involved even if they were not party members. The PAI (Figure 
7) provides a proxy estimate for typologies of political participation. Based on the 
distribution of scores across the sample, the individuals were assigned levels of 
participation26 and further analysis was carried out to understand the strength of 
the factors that shape participation in the local space. The actual assignment of the 
                                            
26
 As Ahmed (1975) argues, the distribution of behaviours between the strata of participants is rarely 
even, and that a relatively small number of active participants have a disproportionate role in 
shaping electoral processes. Given the complexity of the factors that define qualitative typologies, it 
is recognised that this qualitative measure is relatively crude and does not reflect the same 
typologies of voters that draws from qualitative data. 
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levels of activity has been designed to roughly divide the sample into groups, where 
people who scored one or less are termed as ‘low’ (37.7% of sample), those who 
scored between 2 or 3 were termed as ‘medium’ (38.9% of sample) and those scoring 4 
or more were termed as ‘highly active’ (23.4% of sample).  
 
The PAI serves to highlight the significant gender disparity in participation, with 33.1 
percent of men falling into the category of ‘highly active’as against only 12.8 percent 
women. As suggested above, there are some differences between caste groups but 
these are marginal, with the proportion of caste that is ‘highly active’ ranging from 20.5 
percent for SCs, 22.8 percent for Forward Castes, with the BCs being slightly higher at 
26.2 percent.  
 
The index also allows for a closer examination of the extent of other social 
determinants of participation. Education, or access to information, has been widely 
cited as a determinant of participation at the local level in India (Alsop et al. 2000, 
Krishna 2002), yet the data from Andhra Pradesh suggests that this relationship could 
be more complex. Over half (52.6%) of the respondents with higher than secondary 
education and 42.2 percent of those with primary education are highly active in 
politics. People with no education are the least likely to be highly active (13.5%). 
However, this trend is not even. Only 20.4 percent of people with secondary education 
are highly active in politics, which is lower than would be expected. Hence, while there 
is a general pattern to support the claim that educated people are more likely to be 
active in politics, there is evidence of different factors at work for different groups that 
require further analysis. Age does not seem to be a significant factor, however, older 
respondents (50 years and above) are less likely to be active in politics. There is a slight 
clustering of highly active people around the 31-40 years age range, which is supported 
by the more detailed analysis of village leaders in Chapter 6.  
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Figure 8: Political activity in villages 
 
Source: Field data 
 
The fact that party affiliation affects the level of activity is a highly significant finding, 
though it is one that has received little attention to date. Over two thirds (36.7%) of the 
TDPsupporters were highly active, against 19.7 percent of the Congress Party 
supporters. Surprisingly, those who do not support any particular party are unlikely to 
be politically active. This finding highlights the qualitative differences between parties 
and their organisational capabilities. As discussed below (Section 4.3.3) and in Chapter 
6, the Telugu Desam has been far more effective than the Congress in terms of 
generating its party base through the creation of party posts and associated positions 
on developmental committees, which have incentivised cadres and opened up space 
for new entrants to enter into active politics. The Congress, on the other hand, was 
widely perceived to be stagnant, with the same party leaders dominating local party 
units for decades, with less emphasis being given to mobilising new party members.  
 
The other significant finding is that patterns of political stratification are relatively even 
between villages but can be shaped by specific factors that affect the political 
opportunity and issues locally rather than at the higher level (Figure 8). The sample on 
which this analysis is based is drawn from two regions and, therefore, from different 
parliamentary and assembly segments. Thus, one would expect to see regional or 
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higher level political differences being reflected in the local trends, indicating a higher 
level of political activity at the regional level. However, this does not seem to be the 
case, as the breakdown of the three strata of political participation is similar among the 
villages, implying that each has an established set of ‘highly active’, ‘active’ and 
‘passive’ participants.  
 
There is one important exception in this.In the village of IP the number of the ‘highly 
active’ participants is far higher than in the other villages. This apparent anomaly can 
be explained by the fact that five main parties were found to be active in IP, as opposed 
to the two or three parties found in the other villages. The inclusion of the additional 
parties, namely the Telangana based party (Telangana Rashtra Samithi) and the 
national level Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) which became locally active owing to 
alliances with the other parties, opened up political space in the village for additional 
leaders to emerge and hold positions of authority. The importance of the opening up of 
political space and the ways this can be done outside the party system is discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 6.   
 
The emergence of similar patterns of political activity in the villages suggests that there 
is a process of internal stratification that takes place in villages that are politically 
aware and thereby, politically mobilised. The existence of political activists is influenced 
by the availability of opportunities. The presence of politically active villagers is also 
likely to affect the behaviour of others in the village, either making them dependent on 
their leaders or alienating them from active politics27. The increase in the numbers of 
the politically active strata is not necessarily commensurate to the proliferation of 
opportunities in the village. Rather, that it is likely that there will always be a group 
who choose to withdraw from active politics for a variety of reasons including lack of 
interest. Further, as mentioned above, it is likely that increasing active politics in the 
village is likely to result in the growth ofa group of villages who are ‘actively passive’ 
and who withdraw from politics out of protest or a sense of alienation. While the data 
                                            
27
The relational quality of participation has been explored by Pritchett (2006) in his study on social 
capital in Indonesia.  
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does not allow for the distinction to be drawn between the ‘passive’ and ‘actively 
passive’ voter, this would be an important consideration in future research on the new 
politics of localisation.  
 
4.3   Political Drivers and Local Contexts 
 
The analysis of the quantitative data on political participation has highlighted the 
significance of the gaps between the local and the higher levels of the political system, 
and the extent to which this is driven by ‘modern’ politics. The analysis also serves to 
show how the local space retains a salience rather than being eroded by political 
activity. Political activity is affected by local events, issues and actors and retains an 
internal cohesion that resembles a more traditional notion of politics. This section 
draws on the qualitative analysis to examine the three key drivers of local politics in 
more detail, namely, caste, entrepreneurship and political institutions through the 
analysis of the specific events, issues and actors that shaped electoral outcomes in the 
2001 gram panchayat elections in four localities.   
 
The purposive selection of cases sought to represent the varying political relations 
between regional politics and the village, as well as, the role of reservations for women 
and the lower castes. In three of the sample villages, the post of sarpanch was reserved 
for people other than the forward castes and in the remaining village, the post was 
reserved for a woman. The contest for sarpanch was the main focus of village elections 
and was fiercely fought with a margin of victory as low as 2.9 percent in one case. 
Despite the closeness of these contests, the outcome of the sarpanch election serves 
to define the political identity of the village. In discussions at the mandal level, political 
leaders would commonly refer to villages as TDP or Congress villages. Yet a closer 
reading of these contests point to the need to situate these elections within the multi-
tiered democratic system, as well as, the long-term process of political change. All but 
one village selected a representative from a different party to represent them in the 
mandal panchayat(see Figure 6 in chapter 3). While party control over the sarpanch 
position changed only in one village between 1995 and 2001, all villages had new 
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representatives, in part due to the policy of revolving reservations between terms. In 
all villages, the gram panchayat committee was divided between a relatively equal 
number of members from parties opposed to and supporting the leading party. 
 
In order to understand the political process around the gram panchayat election, it is 
important to take into account the broader context of political histories and the 
interplay between the various levels in the political system. The qualitative component 
of this research uses in-depth interviews with a wide range of stakeholders as a means 
of developing a narrative of political events around the last election. This process of 
developing political histories demanded piecing together information from sources 
that are inherently biased. As others have argued, this process highlights the 
limitations of adopting Western notions of a public sphere in the context of the village 
(Ruud 1996) and challenges the notion that proximity can be equated with 
transparency and openness of discourse.  In practical terms, constructing village 
narratives or political histories involves the researcher as an active participant who is 
required to make judgements on the character and motivations of actors in the 
absence of any reliable means of verification. As evidence of this, two of the three key 
'drivers' that have been identified, i.e., identity and corruption, were virtually absent in 
the responses to the direct question of 'how did you choose a candidate in the 
sarpanch elections?' Yet, as the following examples aim to show, these, together with 
party political factors, play an important role in defining the space in which these 
choices are made. 
 
4.3.1 Caste: identity politics 
 
Literature on developmental politics reveals an ambiguous narrative on the role of 
caste in local politics. The broad narrative of political change in India that was explored 
in Chapter 2 is perhaps worth restating here in brief. Viewed from the macro level, the 
emergence of identity-based politics played an important role in eroding the 
dominance of local elites and paved the way for a democratic upsurge among the 
lower orders of society (Kohli 1970, Kothari 1997, Jaffrelot 2003, Kaveraj 2000). 
Identity-based politics has enabled the lower castes to assert their numerical strength 
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in state and national politics, yet the process of institutional decay has meant that the 
benefits of this transition have not penetrated evenly to the local level. In this context, 
institutional provisions for reservation in local governments have ensured that caste 
identity has remained integral to rural votes, which raises important questions 
regarding the extent to which the politics of aggregation and decay influence the local 
level. 
 
Reservations along the lines of caste were introduced together with gender-based 
reservations with a view to introduce equality of opportunity. The general finding from 
these four villages was that there is little cause to suggest that women's reservation 
has had a major impact on Andhra’s highly politicised gram panchayats. If a woman 
was elected as sarpanchshe had been elected on behalf of her husband and it was 
widely accepted as the norm that she would, in that role,be only a proxyfor her 
husband. A few cases of politically active women were found, most of whom were 
household heads. These findings appear to contradict the more positive analysis of the 
women's reservation policy in India (Jain 1996, Strulik 2003, Chattopadhyay and Duflo 
2001). The reasons for this lie in the broader context of developmental politics in 
Andhra Pradesh that sought to promote women's empowerment outside the 
panchayat system, which is discussed in the next chapter. In comparison, caste-based 
reservations are a key driver of the political process at the gram panchayat level, which 
challenges general narratives of identity politics and political proxies. 
 
The emphasis given to numerical aggregation among the lower castes as a driver of 
political change has long since underplayed the importance of distribution. While this 
is an issue that has received little detailed analysis, it is clear that there are significant 
variations between castes and even politically powerful groups tend to be 
concentrated in certain regions.  While the importance of these variations is less 
obvious in state or national elections, they are critical for understanding the politics of 
localisation. 
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Table 8: Analysis of respondents by caste 
District Nalgonda Prakasham  
Village KB IP BVP PGP Total 
Scheduled Castes/Tribes    (SC/ST) 
Madiga 18 12 7 10 47 
Mala 0 7 6 1 14 
Scheduled Tribes 2 0 1 0 3 
Total SC/ST 20 19 14 11 64 
Backward Communities   
Yadav (cowherd/milkseller) 1 15 5 0 21 
Mutrasi (fishermen) 2 13 0 0 15 
Gouda (toddy tappers) 13 1 0 0 14 
Munuru Kapu 10 0 0 0 10 
Kumhar (potter) 4 0 0 4 8 
Vaddera (stone cutters) 0 1 1 5 7 
Rajaka/Chakali (washermen) 0 2 1 2 5 
Padmashalli (weavers) 3 0 0 0 3 
Mangali (barbers) 0 1 1 0 2 
Vadrangi (carpenters) 1 0 0 0 1 
Kamsali (blacksmiths) 0 0 1 0 1 
Total BC 34 33 9 11 87 
Other (Forward) Communities (OC) 
Reddy 11 10 13 18 52 
Telaga Naidu 0 0 23 10 33 
Arya Vasya 0 0 2 0 2 
Kamma 0 0 1 0 1 
Muslim 3 1 1 0 5 
Total OC 14 11 40 28 93 
Total 68 63 63 50 244 
Source: Field data 
 
107 
 
 
Detailed analysis of the caste distribution of the randomly sampled respondents in four 
localities highlighted the extent to which the logic of caste-based politics can vary 
between localities (Table 8). The classification of voters in terms of scheduled castes, 
backward and forward communities belies a wealth of complexity in terms of the more 
tangible caste identities that fall within them. In Andhra Pradesh, the divisions between 
Malasand Madigas cut though the larger pattern of state politics. In IP and BVP, both 
communities were present in significant numbers, but in KB and PGP, most SCs were 
from the Madiga community. Similarly in the case of the forward caste groups, in two 
villages in Prakasham District (BVP and PGP) the Reddy and the TelagaNaidu 
populations are predominant, though in Telangana, the Reddys are the only major 
forward caste group. The case of the BCs is more complex. Even this limited sample 
included twelve distinctive caste groups, and only in Telangana are the BCs a major 
social group. Within these two villages, the dominant population is very different, 
despite being located within the same mandal. In KB, the major BC groups are the 
Goudas and Munuru Kapus, while in IP it is the Yadavs and the Mutrasi. 
 
The numerical strength of castes has long since been understood as a driver of political 
contests at the village level (Srinivas 1959). The variation of the configuration of castes, 
together with the allocation of reservations, provides an important indication of the 
nature of the political contest that emerges in a single locality. The general pattern is 
that a reservation for a BC sarpanch, for example, tends to result in opposing parties 
selecting candidates from different communities, as was the case in KB village. 
However, parties cannot rely on a single caste block to win the elections and, therefore, 
the party division tends to spread to other caste groups. As a result, the entrance of 
the lower castes into village politics is often an externality of the struggles between 
them and the higher castes. The case study of BVP village serves to show how this 
process of induction can serve to undermine the political strength of the lower castes. 
 
Case Study: Dividing the lower castes 
When the post of sarpanch was reserved for a SC candidate in BVP village in 2001, the 
high caste party leaders were forced to select candidates. As in many villages in Andhra 
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Pradesh, the SC population is divided between Malas and Madigas who live separately. 
In the case of BVP village, the two caste groups occupied the same palli located along 
the entrance road to the main village, but situated on either side of the road. This sub-
caste division becomes the logical point through which the higher castes sought to 
mobilise votes and undermine the numerical strength of the SCs. Most of the lower 
castes in the village were Congress supporters, and the party leaders selected a man 
who had no political experience but was widely considered as a Madiga caste leader. 
By offering political and financial rewards, the TDP, without any difficulty, mobilised a 
controversial local figure from the Malacommunityto stand against the Congress 
candidate. As a result, the divisions between the SCs were aggravated to the point that  
SCs spoken to during the course of this field research refused to enter certain streets in 
their own colonies. These resentments further worsened when it became apparent 
that the Madiga sarpanch was powerless and was being used by the higher castes who 
undertook village wars in his name. Reflecting on this case, one BC leader feelingly 
concluded that ‘the high caste leaders are using the SCs as karipaku28 in their parties, 
but we are actually the salt which is necessary for every curry’. 
 
The localisation of identity politics blurs the boundaries between caste and family. In 
many of the villages studied, the term ‘lineage’ was found to be more useful in 
understanding loyalties and dominance29. Lineage, in this sense, refers to extended 
family groups, where the family name is retained, yet the groups are larger than the 
extended family but smaller than a clan that extends across villages. For example, the 
sarpanch of IP village came from the Nakrekanti family, the largest group sharing a 
family name within the SCs in the village. The extent of the Nakrekanti/non-Nakrekanti 
split was considered more important than the competition between the Mala and the 
Madigalcastes within the local SC community. In the same village, the Nagareddi 
                                            
28
 Curry leaves, flavouring used in food in South India 
29
 Thanks to Dr Siva Prasad for making this distinction clear to me. Lineages of this kind are different 
from the extended family in that the rules relating to rituals after a death are not generally strictly 
adhered to. This is because it becomes impractical to follow such restrictive traditions when the 
lineage extends to a large number of people. Lineages are sometimes referred to as clan, but 
normally only when they spread over a wider geographical area than the ones being discussed here.    
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lineage is the numerically dominant subsection of the Reddy caste. The Nagarreddis 
had played the dominant political role in the village for generations. In BVP village, the 
Anam clan, also from the Reddy caste, claims to account for 60 percent of the 
population of the main village. A member of the Anam lineage had played the 
dominant role of munsif30 in the past and kingmaker and continues to hold great 
influence over the choice of candidates for political officein the present day. 
The necessity of vertical alignments between high and low castes can also be a force 
behind political change in the village. In the village of KB, the election of a BC in a 
reservation post was a long-term struggle between the higher castes, as the following 
case shows. 
 
Case Study: Caste as a means to political change 
Until about 15 years ago, a follower of a powerful, regional Congress politician 
dominated KB village. Acting as a feudal elder, this leader managed a group of goondas 
(thugs) who engaged in extortion and theft of toddy, crops and animals. The elder also 
had powerful links to the MLA and the tehsildar31. His dominance was challenged for 
the first time when an upper caste youth returned to the village after completing his 
education in the city. As a student, the youth had been active with the youth 
Communist Party. On returning to the village, he joined the newly emerged TDP and 
joined forces with the Goud caste leader. Owing to the numerical strength of their 
caste in the village, the Gouds provided an important entry point for the youth leader. 
The Gouds were not ready to join the TDP though most of them sympathised with the 
party, but supported the youth leader in opposition to the Congress elder. 
 
In the elections for the Goud sangham (association of toddy tappers) president, the 
TDP managed to win. However, the Congress elder drew on his connections with the 
                                            
30
 One of the regional names given to the village head before reforms in democratic decentralisation. 
31
 Local administrative head under the old administrative system. As tehsils were larger than mandals the 
tehsildar was more like a mini district collector than a mandal development officer. 
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local officials32 to declare the results void on the basis of the fact that the old sangham 
(that he controlled) had not been formally dissolved. The TDP youth leader took six 
months to lobby the excise ministry to overturn this decision, and in the mean time, 
the Congress elder distributed toddy trees for the year and production started. The 
Congress elder managed to collect dues from about 70 percent of the Gouds saying 
that the money would be invested to develop the sangham. When the next elections 
came, he threatened to retain the money unless his choice of candidate remained as 
Peda Goud (head of the Goud sangham). He was successful in coercing the Gouds to 
elect his candidate for a final time. In the third election, the TDP managed to get their 
candidate elected. Two months of serious, violent conflict ensued in the village, as 
people were unwilling to accept the shift in power in the village, finally ending in a 
meeting where the majority of the Gouds joined the TDP. The domination of the 
Congress elder ended, forcing him to leave the village.       
 
Set against this context, the decision of the former sarpanch to promote a Goud leader 
reflects a longer struggle within the village. The new sarpanch of KBvillage was widely 
considered to be fair and honest and was the ex-president of the numerically dominant 
Goud caste in the village. As one BC woman from KB said,“The sarpanch is such a man 
that if he had one handful of rice, he would distribute it equally to all people.” He was 
also noted for his ability to move with and maintain relations with leaders from all 
communities. It is also common knowledge that he was a heavy drinker, illiterate and 
among the local leaders, was comparatively poor. Some, but not all, voters saw the 
latter as a virtue.As one woman said, “The present sarpanch is poor and as we are also 
poor, we think he may be able to solve our problems.” Hence, we can conclude that 
support for the TDP candidate can be attributed to both the personal standing of the 
Goud leader and the political tactics of his Reddy supporters. One important factor was 
that despite his antagonism towards the opposition, the TDP leader allowed the 
Congress Reddys to control the post of the MPTC, which was unreserved in the 2001 
election. This subtle process of political accommodation was brokered through the 
                                            
32
In relating this case, we were told that the elections to the Goud sangham were organised by the 
excise ministry, and their local officials, as ‘toddy’ were subject to taxation.  
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leaders in the interest of ensuring a degree of harmony between opposing groups in 
the village. 
 
These contrasting cases serve to underline the fact that, while caste plays a vital role in 
village elections, the exact form that this takes is determined by factors that are deeply 
rooted in the local context. These cases also serve to show how the concept of proxy 
leadership, or management of positions by higher caste leaders, is a graduated 
concept. Cases were found of lower caste elected leaders who were puppets in the 
hands of their high caste patrons, as in the case of PGP village cited below. However, 
the complex nature of the caste alignment means that these relationships are 
necessarily managed in a way that reflects the mutual dependency between parties 
and is based not a on defined logic but rather on the skills and strategies of individual 
actors. 
 
4.3.2 Entrepreneurship: Money Politics 
 
The linkage between money and politics has been a consistent theme in studies of 
contemporary Indian politics. In her reflection on the 'disarray' of party politics, Hassan 
states that, 'parties and politicians have been accused of eroding the democratic 
system by practising corrupt politics, eschewing a long-term stand on national interest 
and maximising their personal gains and influence' (2002:2). One of the claims in 
favour of localisation is that leaders at the local level are more likely to be held 
accountable for their actions and that corruption would therefore be reduced. 
However, in Andhra Pradesh this was not found to be the case, and money was widely 
accepted to be the oil in the electoral process.  
 
Village level political leaders were not shy when it came to talking about their 
involvement in the corruption of politics for personal gain. The level of 'investment' in 
local elections was viewed as an indication of their importance and capacity. As a 
result, it was relatively easy to develop a unique data set (Table 9) on electoral 
expenditure of 15 villages, which reveal important trends that have received little 
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attention to date. In considering this data, it is important to note that there was very 
little party financing involved in village elections in Andhra Pradesh, as candidates were 
largely responsible for mobilising funds themselves. Also, unlike other contexts in India 
namely West Bengal33, the funds were largely used to pay voters for their votes rather 
than being used in other forms of ‘bribery’ in the election process.  
 
Table 9: Spending on 2001 sarpanch elections 
Data collected from 15 villages; amount in lakhs (Rs. 100,000) 
 Average 
expenditure 
incurred by 
winning 
candidate 
 
 
Average 
expenditure 
of main 
contestant 
 
Total 
expenditure 
Maximum 
spent by any 
candidate 
 
Minimum 
spent by any 
candidate 
Number 
of villages 
All villages 2.3 1.5 3.8 10 0.3 15 
SC reserved seats 1.2 0.7 1.9 1.5 0.5 4 
BC reserved seats 2.8 1.2 4 10 0.3 6 
Unreserved seats 2.6 2.6 5.2 8 0.7 5 
Seats reserved 
for women 
2.4 1.3 3.6 10 0.7 7 
Open seats 2.3 1.8 4.1 8 0.3 8 
Source: Field Notes 
 
The average expenditure incurred by a sarpanch contestant in 2001 was Rs. 2.3 lakhs , 
which is roughly 11 times the Rs. 20,000limit set by the Election Commission. 
Unsuccessful candidates spend, on an average, two-thirds (Rs. 1.5 lakhs) the amount 
spent by the winners and the minimum spent by any candidate was Rs. 30,000. 
Expenditure incurred by SCs on reserved posts was roughly half of what was spent by 
other castes and despite reservations, backward communities spent marginally more 
than forward castes. No variation was seen in cases where seats were reserved for 
women, indicating that male proxies led these contests. Indeed, the highest 
expenditure (Rs. 10L) was spent on a seat reserved for a woman. 
                                            
33
My thanks to Glyn Williams for this information (pers. comm) 
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Total electoral costs are an open secret in the village. While there is little doubt that 
the majority of funds are used to buy votes, voters themselves are generally unwilling 
to admit that they have accepted money. As one man put it,“A thief cannot tell you that 
he is a thief.” When respondents were asked if they had received incentives, only one 
in five people admitted that they had received incentives. The extent of under-
reporting is suggested when we consider that nearly half as many reported that they 
had personally contributed to election funds34. Broader discussions revealed that cash 
incentives ranging from Rs. 100 to Rs. 500 were often distributed over a number of 
days (and even after the elections). In some cases, the flow of spending rose 
significantly and unexpectedly in the evening before the elections as a result of one 
candidate suddenly feeling insecure about his chances of success. Non-monetary gifts 
were also important. Evidence was found that sari blouses and men’s shirts, soft drinks 
and trips to the cinema for the youth were offered around election time. One ward 
member even undertook the construction of a small temple in his ward, recounting 
that he felt people would respect the fact that he did not waste money on alcohol. By 
far, the biggest incentive is alcohol, distributed in the week leading up to the elections. 
 
While there is clear evidence that higher expenditure tends to lead to victory, it is hard 
to determine the extent to which the vote buying ensures that votes are polled. The 
linkage between vote buying and polling cannot be disregarded35. As one SC man told 
us, “We took Rs. 200 from the TDP; if anyone had given us more, we would have voted 
for them.”  Some voters confided that they had taken money from both parties, 
                                            
34
Out of those questioned, 12 percent refused to answer, or said they did not know. Nine percent of 
people said they had contributed money themselves to the candidate or campaign fund. Sixteen 
percent said they had been offered incentives, but they had refused them. 
35
 It should be noted, however, that not all election money is spent on buying votes from individuals. 
Money is also used for conducting campaigns, arranging vehicles to get people to the polling booths 
and even to hold rallies of supporters in tractors when filing nominations. Also, lump sums are given 
to vote bank holders, as well as, other political leaders to limit the competition. Discussions with a 
senior police officer revealed that giving money to the local police is an important means of ensuring 
elections are ‘controlled’. While this is common in assembly, zilla and mandal elections, I could find 
no evidence that this was the case in village elections. The lack of evidence does not mean it does 
not happen. In other villages, the role of the police was crucial which suggests that this support may 
have been purchased. 
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believing that this is all they would ever get out of the panchayat.  For many voters, 
short term guaranteed returns were more attractive than the long term (greater) good 
of transparent and fair local elections. 
 
It is clear, however, that certain portions of the electorate expect elections to be a time 
when liquor flows freely and when people return to the village with the help of the 
candidates. As another man belonging to the SC told us, 
 
“You could rename this ‘election liquor’ It is not good or tasty. I normally buy better 
brands myself. But the sarpanch had sent a tempo to bring me and 20 other 
workers back from Mysore to vote; he gave us food and drink for a week which 
means that we should vote for him. It is only fair.” 
 
The importance of money politics adds a dimension of risk to the process of 
participation. A number of the respondents felt that prolific spending on elections was 
a negative trend and voted against the parties that had spent the most. People refused 
bribes for a number of reasons. Some refused out of fear of recrimination. One person 
belonging to the BC told us, “If we take money and the candidate loses, after the 
elections, they will come and scold us.” However, it seemed that nearly an equal 
number of people refused money on principle.An elderly man told us,“To take money is 
to degrade one’s social standing, as once people take money, they lose the power to 
ask anything of the leaders after the elections.”He went on to say,“It’s not worth 
getting a bad reputation for the sake of just 50 or 100 rupees.” 
 
The scale of election spending suggests that it is a minority of voters who feel that vote 
buying undermines free choice and democratic rights. Nonetheless, discussions with 
the elder people, who felt free to criticise money politics, highlighted the broader 
impact on participation. In the words of one villager,   
 
“Politics is linked with money – that is why I do not attend party meetings. I 
refuse the offers of liquor and money and I cast my vote for the candidate and 
party I wish to support, my vote is not for sale. The elections were not fair 
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because all the people were bribed by liquor and money and this influenced the 
result.” 
 
One of the unique features of India's democracy is the extent to which the 'dirty' 
aspects of politics are openly discussed - both at the national, as well as, the 
community level (Ruud 2000). In the case of Andhra Pradesh, we find that the 
recognition of the machinations of the political leadership can also have a tangible 
impact on the villagers' sense of security on the local political space. The case of the 
Vaishyas in PGP village is especially poignant. This small community of 15 families 
come from a successful business community. The families from this community were 
interviewed in the initial sample and they reported that they had voted in all village 
elections. It was during discussions with one of the younger members of one of the 
families that a story was revealed, which was subsequently verified. None of the 
Vaishya households had voted in the last elections. Ten years ago, when the TDP 
candidate had lost the election by just one vote, he had accused the Vaishyas of voting 
for Congress and had beaten them severely. Disturbances had also broken out in the 
build-up to the last elections. As one of the Vaishyas told us, “The situation is very bad, 
so we, as a caste, will stay away from the elections.”We discovered this was not the 
only case. One woman belonging to BC eventually confided in us.At first the TDP 
candidate came and made her promise her vote, then the Congress candidate who 
visited her told her not to cast her vote. She stayed away from the polling booth, saying 
“We cannot support any single party in the village – for if we do, we cannot live here.” 
 
Minority groups are most at risk in Andhra Pradesh’s highly charged local elections. In 
PGP village, members of the Muslim and Kamma community were interviewed; both 
were migrant communities and both chose not to cast their votes in the elections. A 
few other cases emerged from other communities. Comments from one member of 
the BC adequately sums up the attitude of this small neutral minority. 
 
“Both parties came to us to campaign for our votes – so we should remain neutral. 
We have two votes; perhaps in future we should give one to each party. We are 
barbers, we work in this village and we need the help of both groups.” 
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There is some evidence that the increasingly high stakes around local elections is a 
relatively recent phenomenon.  Some of the older members in the village who used to 
be politically active also chose to stay away from politics for different reasons.  The 
perspective of this group serves to place the changing political culture at the village 
level in a historical context. As one formerly politically active, forward caste man told 
us, 
 
“The present generation of political leaders is not listening to the older generation 
leaders. Even if we give suggestions, no one bothers, so I do not wish to offer 
advice anymore. Personally, I do not like the behaviour of the villagers and the 
political leaders. (These days) each individual aims only to get the maximum 
personal benefits out of everything. For this reason I now stay away from elections 
and politics.” 
 
4.3.3 Political institutions: party politics 
 
The narratives regarding the role of caste and political corruption serve to highlight the 
extent to which local politics are shaped by specific actors, events and issues at the 
local level. The discussion has also served to show the extent to which political parties 
are deeply embedded in the local context and the extent to which party politics 
emerge as the main reason on which voters base their choice of candidate. This section 
explores in more depth the two aspects of party politics at the local level, pragmatism 
and ideology and the implications this has for understanding political behaviours at the 
village level. 
 
The general picture of party politics at the village level is one of pragmatic alignment 
that is weakly linked to party institutions. The existence of a multi-party system 
provides a structure around which activists have been able to articulate rivalries that 
are deeply embedded in the local context. Leaders invest significant amounts of money 
to win elections in the name of the party, but there is little evidence that higher-level 
party leaders contribute significantly to these campaigns. The party units at the mandal 
and district levels play a role in recognising local leaders and deciding on whom to 
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allocate the unofficial party ticket, it is normally given to people who are capable of 
mobilising the funds required to contest. However, the village leaders have a high 
degree of autonomy when it comes to engineering the alignments that are necessary 
at the village level.  The following two cases serve to highlight the different ways in 
which party politics is articulated through highly localised and personalised 
machinations of the village leadership.   
 
Case Study: Coalitions of Caste and Party 
During the 1980s, IP village was dominated by the CPI(M) under the leadership of an 
influential Reddy who was still in the village at the time of this research. The CPI(M) 
leaders used to have a strong following among the SCs and certain active youths from 
the BCs. However, during the mid-1990s there was a gradual shift away from the 
CPI(M), initiated by some of the BC and SC youth, as they were not getting 
opportunities within the Reddy-led party. The village Congress was dominated by a 
powerful group of five Reddys who controlled the majority of contracts and 
committees at the village level. Though parties have always been important, 
dominance was really expressed through Reddy power, and time and again, parties 
have colluded to perpetuate this dominance. 
 
In the lead up to the 2001 panchayat elections, it seemed that this situation was set to 
change. An active BC leader who had joined the TDP two years earlier had been 
instrumental in mobilising many of the new development programmes of the ruling 
party, including setting up night schools for adult learners and supporting women's 
SHGs. Sensing the growth in numbers of TDP sympathisers, the Reddy leaders decided 
to form an alliance between the Congress, BJP and CPI(M), despite the fact that these 
parties were in opposition at the state level, in an effort to stop the new TDP leaders 
from coming into power. 
 
In the election just before this research was conducted, the post of sarpanch was 
reserved for an SC. The Reddy alliance agreed they would support a Congress candidate 
for sarpanch, and arrangements were made to allocate ward member seats. A 
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financially crippling struggle between brothers (one from TDP and one from Congress) 
in which each spent more than Rs.1.5L resulted in the Reddys getting their candidate 
elected. The BJP candidate was allocated the post of up-sarpanch (name given to the 
deputy sarpanch)and an SC woman from the CPI(M) was elected as the MPTC. It was 
widely known that the SC sarpanch was a puppet of the Reddys who used to 
appropriate all contract works in his name. With an SC in the post of sarpanch, the 
Reddys were able to hold significant sway in the gram panchayat. In contrast, the TDP 
was effectively sidelined. This was despite the fact that among the sample of 
respondents interviewed in the village, the TDP held the largest proportion of 
supporters of any single party within the village. 
 
Parties play an ambiguous role in village politics. Intense engagement in village politics 
brings voters into close contact with party politics in their everyday lives and demands 
that they express party loyalties. Yet the nature of these local contests means that the 
identities of parties and the axes of competition are highly mutable and subject to the 
machinations and strategies of pragmatic local leaders. This paradox has important 
implications for understanding the aggregation of local politics. Party politics provide 
the most important link between the local and supra-local level in the political system. 
The multi-party system at the state level also provides the opportunity structure for 
new political forces to emerge which challenge the entrenched dominance of high 
caste leaders. This raises the question - what types of patterns emerge? 
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Figure 9: Reasons for supporting political parties 
 
Source: Field data 
 
Despite the evidence that shows that party identities are shaped by local events, issues 
and actors, clear evidence emerges to suggest that political parties in Andhra Pradesh 
have clearly defined identities. Figure 9 compares the reasons respondents gave for 
supporting a particular party and shows clear differences between the character of the 
parties, the TDP and the Congress. As the oldest and most established national party, 
the Congress Party relies heavily on the long-term support of families based around 
caste identities and proximity to the national level leadership. Support for the TDP, in 
contrast, was largely based on the perception of the current state leadership and the 
specific policies that Naidu was identified with. Importantly, TDP supporters also cited 
the effectiveness of local party workers, or cadres, and party discipline as reasons for 
supporting the party. 
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The strong identities of political parties are closely linked to loyalties that are openly 
recognised in the village. Long-term support to parties is considered to be critical to 
accessing benefits. The latter point was made clear when we spoke to members of the 
Madiga community in KB village who had continued to support the Congress since the 
time of Indira Gandhi, some three decades ago, when some of their communities had 
received houses under her anti-poverty schemes. The fact that they had received little 
from governments since, and that the village had elected a TDP sarpanch for the last 
two terms did not induce them to change parties. Rather, they felt that their long-term 
support means that they would be first in line when the Congress came to power in the 
village. More generally, 'party jumping' as it was referred to, was considered by most 
people to be a sign of bad character and something that is not undertaken lightly. 
 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
The analysis of village elections examined in this chapter highlighted the distinctiveness 
of the village as the arena in the political system. This distinctiveness is evident both in 
term of the participation gaps between the village and the next level in the political 
system, which is shown to be as much as ten percent, a fact which has so far received 
little attention in current discussion on the democratic upsurge and democratic 
decentralisation in India. The fact that this high level of intensity takes place in a 
context where local bodies have comparatively limited financial and administrative 
power challenges the assertion in the quotation at the head of this chapter, that 
politics is related to power.   
 
The analysis presented highlights the dynamic interplay of local and higher level 
politics. There is some evidence that the ‘village’ can be a significant variable in 
affecting the intensity of local politics, or that the intensity of village politics is affected 
by local factors. As the case of IP village shows, the most important factor contributing 
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to this is the number of parties, which further underlines the fluid relationship of local 
and supra-local factors at the local level.  
 
More generally, there is strong evidence to suggest that there is a pattern of 
stratification of villagers that is common across villages. The PAI has been constructed 
to explore this finding, with the awareness of the limitation of quantifying the 
multifaceted nature of political participation at the local level. Nonetheless, there is 
scope to argue that the disposition to participate in activity is one of the most 
important characteristics that defines a villager and that there is a limited correlation 
between the degree of political activity and caste, though there remains a significant 
gender gap, which reflects the fact that the ‘logic’ of caste politics varies between 
localities in a way that is different from the broader narrative of political change at the 
higher levels of the polity.  
 
The analysis explored some of the drivers of local politics, namely money and political 
parties. The high level of expenditure recorded in Andhra Pradesh not only reveals new 
insights into the working of local elections in India, it also highlights the extent to which 
this is driven by personal ‘entrepreneurial’ incentives rather than more organised party 
financing. Nonetheless, political party affiliation emerged as one of the main factors 
influencing people’s decision to vote, which strong differences evident between the 
identities of political parties at the local level.   
 
The broader picture that emerges from the analysis is that there is an interplay of local 
and higher level politics that shapes the democratic process at the local level. The focus 
on local elections helps to identify the importance of this relationship, but it is evident 
that the process of democratic decentralisation does not drive the intensity of local 
politics alone. The following chapter will explore the influence of parallel initiatives at 
the local level, as part of the new politics of localisation and the role of informal 
reforms in the local space.  
Chapter 5: Participatory Politics: Changing the Narrative 
of Village Politics 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the creation of new participatory spaces at the village level. The 
broad political strategies that informed this radical experiment have been discussed in 
Chapter 2 and need only to be briefly re-stated here. The Janmabhoomi programme 
was used by Naidu as a means to create his own identity through a distinctive brand of 
'effective populism' that built on the legacy of his predecessor, NTR. As a shrewd 
political organiser, he was also aware of the need to overcome the limits of identity 
politics by creating new identities and coalitions of voters in a way that would cement 
his political strength. Set against the backdrop of the previous chapter, here we seek to 
see to what extent these political strategies translated into the local space. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the reforms that are the subject of this chapter are informal 
in the sense that these bypass the formal process of decentralisation and arise, in the 
main, from initiatives that are weakly institutionalised. As this chapter shows, the types 
of ‘reforms’ are not only responsive to local conditions and enable an institutional fit to 
local processes; they also involve a complex relationship between the local and the 
national level that influences their effectiveness.  
 
As Kaviraj notes, policies that are formulated at the state level are often distorted 
beyond recognition by the time they are implemented (2001). The Janmabhoomi 
placed enormous strain on the bureaucracy and demanded fundamental changes in 
practices. The centrally managed programme required unprecedented levels of 
information gathering and reporting, physical visits to habitations for the quarterly 
state-wide programmes and public appraisal on performance, which sometimes 
resulted in well-publicised dismissals. The immense political force behind the 
programme served to ensure that resentments could not be articulated leading the 
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programme to achieve unparalleled success in terms of the degree to which it 
penetrated to the local level. Nonetheless,there was significant scope for distortion in 
the process of implementation, which I argue, was part of the design. 
 
This chapter draws on data collected in the four villages following the same 
methodology discussed in Chapter 4. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first 
describes the three main institutional innovations that were implemented under the 
mantle of the Janmabhoomi programme: a) direct participation b) the creation of user 
groups and c) the mobilisation of voluntary contribution for village development. The 
analysis of these three mechanisms focuses on the de facto process of implementation 
and the way that they were represented in public discourse and practices at the local 
level.   
 
The second part of the chapter explores some of the general changes that respondents 
attributed to the Janmabhoomi, either directly or in the reflections on interactions in 
the village, namely, the bounded nature of empowerment and the complex 
construction of the image of the party.  
 
5.2 Changing Patterns of Participation 
 
Research in four villages was carried out in 2002, five years after the launch of the 
Janmabhoomi programme and two years before the State Assembly election was held. 
Many commentators suggest that the programme was waning during this time, largely 
due to pressure of state financial resources, and that popular discontent was starting to 
become evident36. As a programme that had drawn considerable attention, with 
several observers suggesting the programme was linked to the broader neo-liberal 
economic agenda associated with Naidu (Reddy 2002), there had been very little 
analysis of the impact at the local level. 
 
                                            
36
 This is based on discussions with K. Srinivaslu and K Suri during the course of 2002. In addition, an 
internal media analysis conducted by the District Public Relations Office in Nalgonda district shows 
that the majority of press coverage was negative. 
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Table 10: Perceptions of qualitative change in development since the Janmabhoomi 
 
  Yes Some/same/ 
no difference 
No Dk/ref Total 
N 
(100%) 
A. Do you feel there has been 
more development work in 
your village since JB? 
Total 63.1 17.2 9.0 10.7 244 
Men 68.5 17.3 11.0 3.1 127 
Women 57.3 17.1 6.8 18.8 117 
B. Since the JB, do you feel that 
the real needs of the people 
have come forward and been 
heard?
 2 
Total 45.1 (7.0) 22.5 25.4 244 
Men 52.0 (8.7) 26.8 12.6 127 
Women 37.6 (5.1) 17.9 39.3 117 
C. Since the JB, have the 
schemes intended for the poor 
reached those that need them 
the most?
 2 
Total 22.5 27.9 32.0 17.6 244 
Men 24.4 28.3 37.8 9.4 127 
Women 20.5 27.3 25.6 26.5 117 
D. Since the JB, has the 
selection of beneficiaries 
become more open and 
transparent?
 1, 2 
Total 11.6 28.0 31.6 28.9 225 
Men 12.0 31.6 41.0 15.4 117 
Women 11.1 24.1 21.3 43.5 108 
E. Since the JB, has your 
knowledge of development 
schemes increased? 
Total 61.1 - 14.8 24.2 244 
Men 72.4 - 13.4 14.2 127 
Women 48.7 - 16.2 35.0 117 
F. Since the JB, do you think 
that corruption has increased? 
Total 33.2 25.8 13.1 27.9 244 
Men 44.9 22.8 15.0 17.3 127 
Women 20.5 29.1 11.1 39.3 117 
G. Do you think that the JB 
should continue? 
 
Total 64.3 2.5 10.7 22.5 244 
Men 66.1 3.9 16.5 13.4 127 
Women 62.4 0.9 4.3 32.5 117 
1 
This question was added after the first 19 interviews had been conducted, hence the base is 225 
2 
The option of ‘some of the needs…’ was not part of the structured questionnaire. As with questions d) 
and e) we found that in the coastal districts, some people replied that these responses were only true in 
the case of TDP cadre. In the case of d) and e), these answers have been added into the category of 
‘some of the time’.   
Source: Field data 
 
The degree of awareness around the programme cannot be overstated. Without 
exception, all the people we spoke to in the village knew what Janmabhoomi was, and 
to varying degrees, strongly identified the programme with the ruling party and the 
Chief Minister himself. As such, questions regarding the performance of the 
programme were intricately linked to statements of broader performance of Naidu's 
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TDP. As Table 10 above shows, nearly two-thirds (63.1%) of the respondents felt that 
the programme had resulted in increased development in their village and a similar 
number (64%) felt that it should be continued. 
 
This evidence of the broader support for the programme takes on an additional 
significance when viewed together with the negative perceptions of the programme. 
Over a third (38.9%) of the respondents felt that corruption had increased or had failed 
to improve since the launch of the programme, and the lack of transparency was 
shown to be one important factor. The perception survey also indicated that increased 
awareness and space to articulate needs failed to translate into positive outcomes in 
term of benefits reaching the poor. 
 
The following analysis of the key components of the Janmabhoomi explores some of 
the anomalies between the broadly positive image of the programme and the poor 
performance at the village level.  There is a clear indication that the programme had a 
positive impact on knowledge and awareness, which was felt most strongly among the 
men (72.4%). Two other explanations are explored below: the political polarisation that 
surrounded the programme and the implicit distinction between programme ideal and 
local implementation. 
 
5.3 Institutional Innovations 
 
This section explores some of the key institutional innovations in the local space, 
implemented as part of the new development politics of Chandrababu Naidu. This is 
being done from the perspective of their effectiveness at the local level. This approach 
differs from programme specific assessments, and enables greater understanding of 
the informal processes of implementation, the perceptions that shape participation, 
and the interplay between various initiatives in the local space.  
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5.3.1 Reinventing the gram sabha 
 
The concept of the gram sabha is the foundation of the local governance system in 
India. The recreation of the concept under the Janmabhoomi fundamentally changed 
the nature of the forum, replacing elected leaders with local officials and used these 
forums as a direct means of communication between village and state, both to 
propagate messages as well as collect information. While these changes undermined 
the democratic aspects of participation, they served to stimulate popular participation 
that massively outweighed the formal system of gram sabha under the panchayati raj 
system. This section sets out to explore the ways in which informal changes in the 
institutional structure at the local level altered the nature of participation by creating 
new spaces and new forms of engagement outside the formal institutional and political 
system. 
 
Public meetings held under Janmabhoomiprogramme attracted very high levels of 
participation, not only compared to the gram sabha in Andhra Pradesh, but to other 
parts of the country too. Over half the survey respondents had been to at least one JB 
meeting (53.9% of women and 55.9% of men) though only 11 percent of men and 10.3 
percent of women said they had been to ‘all or most’ JB’s held in the village. Overall, 21 
percent of respondents had, at some time or the other, raised a question in the JB (23% 
of men and 19% of women)37. It is important to note that gender played no significant 
role in affecting participation rates (Table 11), which is sharply contrasted with the 
findings in the previous chapter that showed that there was a significant gender gap in 
more active forms of participation in local governance, namely in terms of attendance 
at meetings. This indicated that Janmahoomi was successful in creating a more open 
space for participation that was distinguished from the more politically intensive 
forums around the gram panchayats. 
 
                                            
37
 The report issued by the Chief Planning Officer of Nalgonda District shows that 38% of the village had 
attended JB. On the basis of reports from the villages we visited, this is likely to overstate the 
attendance in a single and recent round.  
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Table 11: Direct participation in Janmabhoomimeetings 
 
More generally, attendance does not seem to have been biased in favour of any 
particular social group, though there is a weak indication that lower castes, younger 
villagers and educated villagers are more likely to attend the programme regularly and 
participate actively by asking questions. SCs were more likely than forward castes to 
attend Janmabhoomi meetings regularly. It was found that there was a direct co-
relation between education and active participation in meetings. Out of those with 
higher education, 42 percentwere likely to raise questions at the 
    
How often have you attended the 
JB meeting in your village? 
Have you ever 
raised a question in 
the JB? 
   
 
N (%) 
All/ 
Most 
(%) 
Some/ 
few 
(%) 
None 
 
(%) 
Yes 
 
(%) 
No 
 
(%) 
Total  244 (100) 11 41 48 21 79 
Gender Men 127 (100) 11 45 44 23 77 
Women 117 (100) 10 38 52 19 81 
        
Caste 
Category 
SC 68 (100) 15 44 41 28 72 
BC 84 (100) 12 33 55 15 85 
OC 92 (100) 7 47 47 21 79 
        
Education None 126 (100) 7 33 60 15 85 
Primary 45 (100) 18 40 42 18 82 
Secondary 54 (100) 9 52 39 30 70 
Higher + 19 (100) 21 68 11 42 58 
        
Age 18-30 78 (100) 9 44 47 22 77 
 31-40 72 (100) 13 39 49 25 75 
 41-50 45 (100) 13 44 42 16 84 
 51+ 49 (100) 8 38 53 18 82 
        
Political 
Activity 
Index  
Low 92 (100) 3 51 64 11 89 
Medium 95 (100) 7 40 53 16 84 
High 57 (100) 28 58 14 46 54 
        
Party 
Affiliation 
None 48 (100) 0 46 54 8 92 
TDP 98 (100) 17 44 39 28 72 
Congress 76 (100) 7 36 58 18 82 
Other 24 (100) 17 38 38 25 75 
        
Source: Field data 
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Janmabhoomimeetings while only 30 percent of those with secondary education 
would possibly do the same,as against only 15 percent of those with no education. Age 
seems to play a limited role in influencing the decision to attend meetings but people 
below 40 years old seemed more likely to raise questionsat these meetings.   
 
While there is evidence that the Janmabhoomi initiative created a more open space, in 
which women in particular were included, there remains a strong correlation with 
other forms of political participation. Those that were classified as ‘highly active’ in 
gram panchayat politics, as defined by the PAI, were the most likely to attend meetings 
regularly and only 14 percent of these highly active people did not attend any meeting, 
against an average of 48 percent. Nearly half (46%) of those who are highly active in 
local politics are also likely to raise questions at the Janmabhoomi meetings, against 
only 11 percent of those who were in the lowest category of political activity.  
 
We also find that party affiliation plays a role in shaping participation in the 
Janmabhoomi. TDPsupporters were more than twice as likely to attend meetings 
regularly when compared to Congress supporters (17% of TDP, 7% for INC) and only 
those who supported a particular political party reported attending meetings regularly. 
The differences on party lines appear to be significant, but possibly less than expected, 
given the high degree of identification between the Janmabhoomi and the ruling party. 
Indeed, this data can be interpreted as an indication of the lack of clear partisan 
orientation of these meetings, in contrast to the reputation of the programme at the 
national level. The reasons for opposition parties remaining involved in the programme 
are discussed at greater length later in this chapter and the next, where it is argued 
that these new fora of participation were designed to both develop the party cadre and 
within the local space,open up space for political engagement. 
 
These findings, based on the quantitative data, suggest that there are some important 
changes in the nature of participation as the result of the introduction of the 
Janmabhoomi programme. While there is a strong correlation with other forms of 
political participation, there is evidence that the space for participation was 
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effectivelyopened up to include those who are less politically active or inclined - 
notably women, the lower castes and the youth. In order to understand this, the 
following section discusses the nature of the participatory forums that were created 
under the JB as a precursor to a more detailed discussion of the qualitative aspects of 
the encounters with the new participatory spaces.   
 
5.3.2 New Spaces for Participation 
 
The success of the JB in attracting interest at the village level was largely due to the 
consistent presence of the state. As noted in Chapter3, the Janmabhoomi was led by a 
‘nodal team’ of local officials from all the main departments at the block level 
administration. District and higher-level officials (at times, including ministers and even 
the Chief Minister) were also involved and they attended meetings selectively, focusing 
on the high profile meetings. While headed by local government officials, emphasis 
was given to involving the representatives from SHGs and other development 
committees who were invited to sit on the dais, as part of the Janmabhoomi team. The 
elected sarpanch and ward members were not formally part of this process, which 
underlines the distinction that was made with the democratic local governance. The 
format of the JB meeting was defined centrally, through the Planning Department, and 
was closely guided by the Chief Minister who ensured that each meeting was initiated 
with a common message from himself (see Ayyanger 2000 for more details38). 
Following this formal opening, the meeting then focussed on developing local priorities 
for national programmes like Neeru Meeru (a programme to create awareness amongst 
people for ensuring their participation in land and water resource management)and 
the JB development project, hearing grievances or petitions and reporting against the 
Action Taken Reports from the previous meetings.  
 
                                            
38
It was a conscious decision not to attend any of the JB meetings as part of the fieldwork, on account of 
the official status of these meetings, the potential for identification with the ruling party programme as a 
monitor, and the degree of local media involvement. Hence, I am reliant on the report by Ayyangar 
(2000) and local media and narratives accounts on the format of the meetings and the report from 
villagers regarding the meeting in their area. 
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 Officials were compelled to hold the meetings on the appointed days. As one nodal 
officer told me, even if the people boycott the meetings, the officials are duty bound to 
attempt to enter the village39. The officials reported that they could not stop coming to 
the village, as these meetings were the direct decree of Naidu, as set out in 
government orders. A local party activist from the Congress Party told us that when he 
challenged an official for implementing the TDP’s programme, he was told, “We have 
to come.If you oppose it, we will come to the entrance of the village and register our 
effort to hold a JB meeting.” 
 
Table 12: Main reasons cited for attending, or not attending Janmabhoomi meetings 
(unprompted, multiple response) 
Reason to 
attendJanmabhoomimeeting 
 
N (sample 244, responses 175) 
% of total 
responses 
 
 
Reasons not to attend Janmabhoomi 
meeting 
 
N (sample 244, responses 296) 
% of total 
responses 
To get benefits/government 
schemes 
27.4 
 
 
Due to agricultural/domestic work 
pressures 
43.2 
To lobby officials for 
benefits/make complaints 
20.0  Not interested 9.8 
Because it was happening in the 
village/ to watch 
18.3  
No point/no benefits/no action 
ever taken 
8.8 
To get information/knowledge of 
village development schemes 
14.9  
Does not attend public meetings / 
stays in the home 
6.8 
Requested to attend by SHG 12.6  
Not called or informed about 
meeting 
6.4 
To do service for the village 4.0  
Due to migration/working away 
from village 
5.1 
Source: Field data 
 
The lengthy agendas of the meetings meant that villagers had to effectively sacrifice a 
full day’s work to attend; yet the opportunity to access government schemes and 
                                            
39
 Another example was reported in the press. Farmers were reported to have stalled GS for the week, 
complaining of poor power supply. The Joint Collector said the gram sabha meeting would be held, using 
police force if necessary. The police did not come and the nodal officer (NO) was mobbed. The youth 
proposed locking the NO in a room, but village elders intervened to stop this. The Collector told the NO 
that he had to stay in the village till the meeting ended and then come back, which he did. (Hindu – 
7/6/02) 
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directly lobby public officials stimulated attendance. The JB was used as a forum for the 
distribution of individual benefits and community development works to the village. 
Villagers reported that this was the major incentive in attending these meetings (see 
Table 12). Schemes like the issuing of ration cards, pensions and obtaining passbooks 
that used to require a trip, or a number of trips, to the mandal office, were now done 
in the village. 
 
Respondents did, however, express a growing sense of disillusionment with the 
meetings, especially with the incapacity of officials to respond to the demands raised in 
these meetings. All 'grievances' raised during Janmabhoomi were meant to be 
recorded and 'Action Taken Reports' were to be read out in the following round to 
report on progress of applications received and the progress of the inquiry. Official data 
shows that nearly all applications made in the JB had been ‘resolved,’40 though this was 
not widely reflected in the discussions with villagers. As one man told us, “The joke is 
that the officials are taking our applications and selling them as scrap paper to wrap 
palli (groundnuts) in.” 
 
The disjuncture between the image and practice of Janmabhoomi was widely evident. 
While even a cursory reading of the state-level press during the JB rounds presented an 
impressive picture of errant government officials being called to account, suspended or 
even sacked on the spot, there was no evidence of such dramatic action in the study 
villages. This concurs with Ayyangar’s (2000) findings, that the effectiveness of these 
meetings was confined largely to the handful of villages where very senior government 
officials were in attendance, along with the media (2000), as part of a carefully 
orchestrated publicity exercise by the Chief Minister to create a pragmatic separation 
between the party and its ideals and the administrative machinery in which it 
functions. Far from being a hidden agenda, the awareness of this aspect of the 
programme permeated local discussions around it. When asked if he had attended 
                                            
40
 The official statistics issued by the Planning Department show aggregate achievement under JB for the 
state in 1-16 rounds of JB - 94.2% of petitions for ‘non-financial community needs’ (2.59L 
applications) and 92.8% of petitions for family needs (59.3L applications) have been resolved. The 
‘resolution’ of these complaints includes rejections of the petition and the passing on of the problem 
to higher levels of administration.   
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these meetings, one villager told us that, 
 
“We are never informed about the meetings – despite the fact that the office 
is next to our house. My knowledge of the scheme is gathered from the 
television. But, I am aware that the party and president are doing the work 
faster now – previously there were delays. We can only get benefits directly 
from the government though for political reasons, we cannot go through the 
president and the panchayat.” 
 
The partisan nature of the JB was widely felt in all villages and there was a clear 
difference in the narratives generated by different party groups in all the villages. It was 
common to be told by opposition supporters that JB meetings were nothing more than 
‘TDP meetings’, and benefits were given only to party supporters. We found no 
evidence to support this latter claim based on the survey data, though there are 
reasons to suspect such data on account of the inherent biases of self-reporting. There 
is, however, evidence to suggest that the institutionalisation of the public meetings had 
little impact on the role of political intermediaries in the allocation of benefits and in 
the informal economy of bribery or ‘speed money’ as a part of everyday village life. 
 
Villagers in the Nalgonda region referred to the need to do pyravee to access benefits, 
a term that was reported by Haragopal and Reddy (1985) in their study nearly two 
decades ago. Pyravee41does not simply mean paying a broker or middleman to get 
work done as many analysts have suggested. It implied a far more subtle and sustained 
process of influence and ingratiation with influential villagers, as well as, officials. As 
we see in the next chapter, it also relies on non-financial aspects of support, 
specifically, political support. When asked what was the most important characteristic 
of someone who received government benefits, over 80 percent of the sample 
respondents across the two regions felt that maintaining good relations with officials 
and having political connections were the most important, which were outweighed by 
other criteria of wealth, education, caste and gender (in order of importance). 
                                            
41
Pyravee refers to the art of approaching officials for favors and making the wheels of the 
administration move in support of such favours (see Haragopal and Reddy 1985) 
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Interviews with officials and local leaders provided further evidence of the extent to 
which the allocation of benefits and projects was managed outside of the public 
forums. Leaders and voters alike were of the opinion that it was impossible to have an 
open gram sabha in the village, as the party would come in the way. In the case of 
meetings of the gram panchayat committee, it would be more correct to say that 
parties defined the meeting. Opposition ward members tend to either not be invited, 
or to stay away. In contrast, it was the local officials and higher-level party leaders who 
acted to shape the performance of JB, so as to ensure that it was a public success. As 
the president of a mandal panchayat in Nalgonda District told us, 
 
“You cannot find out about all the needs of the people through the formal village 
meetings conducted through the Janmabhoomi.  Time is limited, also there are 
many government employees and there is too much of an agenda. Most 
importantly, some people cannot discuss official matters in that forum. What the 
people tell in private cannot be expressed in a public meeting. We have to think 
about political problems and hence the JB has its own limitations. Making 
unofficial visits to the village before the public meetings to talk with the leaders 
can be more effective in knowing the needs and issues of the people.” 
 
High expectations and poor implementation can often produce discontent. As the 
discussion below shows, this was a calculated risk by Naidu that paid off, in the short 
term at least, firstly, due to the capacity of the villages to engage both at the local and 
supra-local level and secondly, the JB was only one part of a complex strategy to 
penetrate local-level politics. 
 
 
5.3.3 Self-Help Groups: Mobilising New Identities 
 
The creation of CBOs was another important aspect of Naidu's vision of people-centred 
development. These groups, he argued, have been 'quite successful in reducing 
leakages in the delivery system while creating a sense of ownership among the people 
benefitting from such development schemes and programmes'42. In an earlier chapter, 
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 Chandrababu Naidu, speech made to the 49th N.D.C. Meeting, 1st September 2001, Vigyan Bhavan, 
New Delhi, access at http://planningcommission.nic.in on 17/05/2006 
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the impressive statistics of this proliferation have been discussed, which raises the 
question of the extent to which this picture was both disaggregated to the local level, 
and the effectiveness and identity of the groups within the local space. 
 
In order to examine the impressive claims of the published data regarding the creation 
of SHGs, the research approach prioritised reported membership by respondents 
rather than officially recorded data. This approach revealed that the overall impact of 
CBOs was far more limited than one would expect, and that older forms of 
associational activity prevailed far more than has been reflected in recent literature on 
this subject. While education committees, mothers’ committees, water-users and 
watershed management groups all existed on paper, people were, on the whole, 
unaware of these groups. 
 
Table 13: Membership of associations by caste/category 
Source: Field data  
 
 
 
Caste 
group 
 
Total 
(N= 
244) 
 
Women’s 
Credit 
Group 
 
Caste 
 
Co-
operative 
Society 
 
Farmers’ 
Association 
 
Religious 
Association 
 
Youth 
Group 
 
Milk 
Society 
SC/ST 68 46 31 8 5 8 6 0 
BC 84 47 56 21 7 2 1 0 
OC 92 32 10 37 8 5 3 6 
Total 244 125 97 66 20 15 10 6 
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Over three quarters of households43 (77%) considered themselves members of at least 
one type of association. Of these, women’s SHGs were by far the most prevalent and 
over half the households had at least one member of a SHG. Importantly, the array of 
newly created education committees, mothers’ groups and watershed and water-users’ 
committees did not feature in their responses, while caste and co-operative associations 
were found to be among the most important groups in the village, both of which are not 
included in the government’s claims regarding SHGs. 
 
There are a number of important differences between women's SHGs and the groups 
that the government claims to have formed in the state. One is the newness of the 
terminology (mothers’ groups, for example) of some of the more recent creations, 
which limited the villager's identification with these initiatives. The women's groups, in 
contrast, have a long history in Andhra Pradesh and many were formed under the 
DWCRA, with the name still widely used at the village level. Another possible reason is 
related to the target-driven formation of these groups by the line department’s local 
officials who had received inadequate training was that they often had insufficient 
interest and who were compelled by tight timelines to meet demands from the district 
and state level. Most importantly, with the exception of women's SHGs, only the office 
bearers are recognised rather than the intended users. 
 
This latter point was powerfully argued by one parent of a schoolchild who had not 
revealed when asked whether he was a member of the school committee; 
 
“Committees are powerful, but are restricted due to the set base of 
beneficiaries. In the case of school committees, the parents just elect the 
committee. Moreover, only the committee chairperson is important, not the 
committee members. In reality, any important function of the committees like 
construction work and anything involving funds is still done through the village 
leaders. In some cases, the leaders even control the process of election. At best, 
the impact of the user committees is to set up an alternative structure of power 
                                            
43
 The data here is presented at the household level, as respondents were asked to include immediate 
family members when answering these questions. 
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to the panchayats, but it is only the village party leaders who can benefit from 
any diversification of power.” 
 
We can further substantiate this argument through the case of Chintam Padma, who 
was elected Village Education Committee Chairperson in 2001 in BVP village. When 
asked about her role, she told us that when the officials come, she goes to the school 
to sign ‘the book’ and that it was her husband who had asked her to contest the 
elections, which she won as there were no opposition. Her husband was not politically 
active but was a supporter of Congress. She told us that they are supposed to meet at 
least three times a year, but “actually they only meet when the JB meeting takes place 
and all the teachers and (women's) SHG members call her.” So far, there have been no 
funds allocated to the committee so she felt that there was no role for her. 
 
Arguably the major factor behind the recognition and visibility of the SHGs related to 
the fact, that much like the Janmabhoomi, these initiatives did not require any formal 
institutional reforms. Unlike the water user groups, education committees and even 
mothers’ groups, the SHGs do not affect the working of any department or existing 
service delivery structure. Hence,they do not reallocate or affect the pattern of power 
and authority at the administrative or local governance levels.They were merely an 
additional space for participation that did not directly impinge on the interest of actors 
or institutions. By the same token, the SHGs had little or no formal power, yet it was 
possible to confer public recognition upon them through the forum of the 
Janmabhoomi or through the region and district meetings. This important distinction 
between SHGs and other organisational innovations in the local space demand more 
attention than it has received in discussions on the new politics of localisation, 
especially in light of the effectiveness of these groups as platforms for broader political 
mobilisation.  
 
5.3.4 Mobilising Women 
 
While the impact of user associations was largely limited to the political stratum in the 
village, women's SHGs were found to have had a major impact on village life, much of 
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the credit for which was attributed to the Naidu regime. A striking 79.5 percent of men 
and 66.7 percent of women interviewed felt that women’s participation in women’s 
development had increased in the last five years. New government policies associated 
with the TDP, especially SHGs and the Janmabhoomi initiative, were the most 
frequently cited factors affecting this increase (Table 14). While only just over half the 
women we spoke to felt that women participated actively in politics, it is interesting 
that the women felt their involvement in campaigning and that the ‘new leaders’ who 
had arisen through the SHGs, were the most important aspects in any perceived 
increase. In contrast, men felt that reservations for women in the local governance 
system was the most important factor in women’s increased political participation, but 
women felt that their increasing ability to ‘move around the village’ independently was 
important. Overall, the increase in women’s participation was among the most 
important changes in the village that was directly attributed to the Naidu government. 
 
Reversed realities: participation and the public space 
 
The members of women’s SHGs were by far the most dynamic new entrants to the 
public sphere, a phenomenon that was closely associated with the JB. As Mooij (2003) 
notes, the focus was on numbers rather than quality. Analysis of the quality of group 
formation was beyond the scope of this research, and emphasis was given instead to 
understanding the emergence of a new symbolic construction of SHGs as a political 
space. Discussion with members revealed that most expected to receive the Rs. 25,000 
revolving grant that some groups had received, but for the vast majority this remained 
an expectation that had yet to be met. More importantly, however, it was widely 
recognised that women were required to participate in public meetings to ensure their 
entitlement to programmes, thus reversing the concept of empowerment that was 
being promoted by donor agencies whereby collective action translated into public or 
political action (see World Bank 2005). 
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Table 14: Major reasons for increased participation of women in village 
development(unprompted, multi-response) 
 
 
men 
n=127 
women 
n=117 
Formation of SHGs 55.1 45.3 
Result of government policy/schemes/JB 30.7 22.2 
Increased awareness, confidence or education 7.8 6.8 
Population increased 7.1 4.3 
Holding public posts 7.1 0 
Availability of jobs 0.8 6.0 
Involvement in contracts 3.9 0.8 
Source: Field data  
 
The dynamism of women’s participation was driven largely by the relationship to the 
JB. A number of the JB rounds had a specific focus on women and in all rounds, 
participation of women was a required aspect of the programme. Village-level 
animators (village level workers)were required to motivate their members to attend 
the JB, and often,they were required to organise women to attend mass meetings at 
the district level. Many times, these meetings were thinly veiled political rallies that 
were commonly referred to as ‘Chandrababu Naidu meetings’. One woman told me she 
had been to the district headquarters, which was 50 kilometres away, to attend a Naidu 
meeting. ‘We were told to wear blue saris and white jackets, and they (meaning local 
leaders) supplied tractors.’  Women saw that participation in these public meetings was 
an exciting new phenomenon. These were not just political meetings, but meetings 
held specifically for women. The publicly hailed success of these meetings was made 
possible due to personal incentives, as well as, the drive by local women’s group 
leaders to facilitate their attendance.   
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The emphasis given to public involvement was equally evident at the village level as it 
was outside the village. As one lower-caste woman told us: 
 
“The leaders of (the thrift) groups came to my house so that I could attend the JB with 
the permission of my husband. I told him that this way we might get a buffalo loan if I 
went to the meeting. Otherwise, my husband would not have let me out of the house to 
attend a meeting.” 
 
These changes in participation were closely linked to the Chief Minister. SHG members 
in the village identified the programme directly with Naidu. The ability of this pro-
woman strategy to penetrate to the village level is remarkable. Many of the SHG 
members told us that they had received ‘letters from Chandrababu Naidu’, encouraging 
them to attend the JB.The letter even included a phone number they could call if they 
had any difficulties. Men and women alike were equally conscious of the pro-woman 
focus of the regime. Some even went so far as to say that, as a result of this focus, 
‘men have become women, and women have become men’. 
 
This section has served to highlight the extent to which the high degree of political 
support for SHGs served to open the space for participation of women, in a relatively 
short time. As discussed earlier, one important reason for this was the informal nature 
of the institutional innovation that did not directly alter any of the existing formal 
institutional structures and created a new basis for mobilisation that was conferred 
salience owing to linkages of the stateto the centre, and especially to the Chief 
Minister. As a result, the performance of SHGs in term of direct financial support and 
saving benefits was secondary to the symbolic importance of these groups and the 
promise of future benefits. Though beyond the scope of this study, the relationship 
between the political and economic significance of these groups and the distinction 
from the formal political process, changed in the years that followed, firstly,the 
observation that SHGs came to be seen as vote banks by local political leaders (Powis 
2007) and later, when the realities of mounting debt promoted by the private sector 
investment in the micro-finance sector began to be widely acknowledged44. 
                                            
44
See for example ‘Andhra’s Small Debt Trap’ in the Indian Express 24
th
 October 2010 and CGAP 2010. 
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During the period of this research, the success of SHGs in terms of creating new spaces 
for participation that indirectly shaped the broader local political space, further 
highlighted the importance of the local space as a unit of developing polity. The 
dialectic between local space and the state is a good example of how the process of 
political mobilisation is not linear, and how localities remain salient, and the 
implication this has for developing newly mobilised groups within the crowded and 
politically intensive, local space. This strategy of Naidu’s to mobilise collective identity 
between these informal local groups was found to be effective in bringing women into 
developmental politics without threatening the interests of the largely male political 
leadership. 
 
5.3.5 Community contributions - institutionalising corruption 
 
The third innovation of the new development ethos that Naidu sought to promote was 
shramadan which literally means voluntary contribution of labouror the spirit of self-
help. In the official rhetoric of the campaign, the concept of shramadan was intended 
to focus on the mobilisation of local teams of students and other villagers to conduct 
development activities like drainage clearance and environmental programmes. While 
there was some enthusiasm in the early years of the JB for this, the impact was 
somewhat limited. Far more important were the conditions of local contributions in 
terms of money or labour as part of the implementation of local civil works, like road 
building, tank clearance and infrastructure development, which were managed through 
the Janmabhoomi.   
 
In formal terms, local officials were required to collect requests for civil work in the JB 
meetings, and this list was then finalised to include the names of local executors, 
normally either the sarpanch, or a SHG. Previously, works of this size had to go through 
a process of tendering but under the terms of the JB, work was allocated on the basis 
of the willingness to raise the required community funds (30%, or 15% if the works 
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were in SC/ST areas). These contributions had to be deposited with the mandal office 
before any funds were sanctioned. 
 
It was an open secret that the vast majority (some say up to 90%) of the contributions 
to these works were paid by single contractors. In the case of small works, generally 
less than Rs. 10L, these contracts went to local leaders, either from the village or the 
neighbouring villages, who implemented work under the name of the formally 
nominated executer who received a small cut as part of the arrangement. The common 
trend was that contractors deposited the amount, entered into informal agreements 
with the officials, and inflated the rate of the works by at least the amount of the 
contribution. While it was difficult to obtain detailed estimates, experienced 
contractors told us that these payments to various officials amounted to approximately 
14 percent of the total value of the contract. It was widely understood that a 
contractor could expect to retain their original 'contribution' as well as secure profits of 
anything between 10 percent-20 percent of the total value. Based on these crude 
estimates, the general pattern was that the value of the work implemented under the 
informal system of contribution was less than half of the actual value of the contract. 
 
Contracting systems of this kind are common in India and had long since been used by 
the Congress government in Andhra Pradesh as a means to mobilise funds for 
members of the Legislative Assembly. The key difference under the JB system lay in the 
reduction of the size of contracts, which led to the creation of a small army of petty 
contractors at the village level45 who were forced to enter into corrupt practices owing 
to the system of contributions. Importantly, these new contracts did not impinge on 
the interests of larger and well-established contractors who operate at the district level 
and possess licences to carry out their work. What JB did was to introduce a new level 
in the contracting process that allowed local political leaders to enter into the process 
within the local arena by bringing into the contracting process small scale works that 
would have formerly have been implemented directly by line agencies.  
 
                                            
45
 Interview with BPR Vittal in Hyderabad, October 2002. 
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The scale at which these new mechanisms for local development projects were 
implemented was significant. In the first 16 rounds of the JB community works 
(covering a five year period), official statistics show that 11,25,350 community works 
were implemented at cost of Rs.18 billion (about US$400 million). According to reports 
from the mandal officials for eight villages, we found that an average of five or six 
works was sanctioned under the JB in the five years since the programme had been 
launched. One village received 14 works, and the total value of the work varied from 
Rs. 600,000 to Rs.1, 800, 000.  At a time when gram panchayats were not providing 
sufficient funds to cover general maintenance costs (Rao 2000), the Janmabhoomi 
provided a channel for high level of discretionary funding outside the system of local 
government. 
 
The success of the programme lay in the alignment of incentives among the range of 
stakeholders between the village and the state. The system of community engagement 
removed the need for tendering and monitoring. As one local TDP leader told us, 
“Transparency under the Janmabhoomi is superficial and is restricted to the issuing of 
notices and writing on walls. In order to find out about the use of funds we need the 
engineers' reports but these are next to impossible to access.  Furthermore, with no 
centralised information on development works, and the potential for replication, 
'double billing' of works was very high46.” 
 
This attention to quantity rather than quality generated impressive statistics at the 
state level regarding the quantum of contributions generated to offset the burden on 
state finances. The high visibility of the programme and the tension between the 
dynamism and the effectiveness of the JB development works were openly debated, 
and the programme was a frequent target for politicised allegations.  The opposition 
made repeated statements regarding not just the levels of corruption, but the political 
                                            
46
 In an interview with an MPDO in Prakasham District, we were told the JB had made it virtually 
impossible to keep track of the works being implemented in his jurisdiction and that there was no 
consolidated list of work implemented under various schemes. This particularly dynamic officer had 
initiated his own system of photographing all development work but still felt that he was unable to 
verify payment claims.    
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biases that aimed to facilitate ‘looting’ by TDP cadres47. While the allegation of 
corruption is beyond question, in this research we found little evidence of overt 
partisanship in the nature of the programme; rather we found a more complex process 
of politicisation, which is explored in greater detail in the next chapter. 
 
At the local level, implicit agreements between implementing officers provided 
incentives for both local leaders and officials to implement civil works, driven by 
private incentives rather than public good. Critical to this was the removal of the local 
government, as one leader told us, 
 
“JB is only about funding – and the government is putting all the money into JB. If 
you give 30,000 you will get 70,000. How can we pay money to the gram 
panchayat?” 
 
The new culture of contracting virtually removed the potential for local accountability, 
as the requirement of advance payment and the risks associated with delayed 
payments and negotiation of 'cuts' to various parties virtually precluded 'ordinary' 
villagers from competing for contracts. Indeed, we encountered a number of cases 
where less-experienced and influential villagers had taken on contracts and lost money 
in the process. As a result, villagers became increasingly dependent on influential local 
leaders to bring development activities to the village. 
 
The comments by a young, male, village-level political aspirant show the importance of 
these local leaders in the development process; 
“Political consciousness is to know how much money there is coming, and what is 
happening in other villages. People have started to ask questions, in the JB 
meetings and outside. But the contractors will not give responsible answers – they 
do not feel accountable to us. There are a few rich contractors and those who take 
the contracts will benefit – these are mostly political leaders and people who 
                                            
47
 To cite one example - Hindu 18/06/02 – ‘ZP chief’s forum to move court action against CM. ZP 
chairperson from Khammam District seeks permission to prosecute CBN for diverting funds meant for 
local bodies, SGSY funds have been given to District Collector’s discretion, and linked it to contribution 
schemes.’ Ranga Rao claims that a District Collector has gone on record saying, “In his district Rs 3.4 
crores from EAS, Rs 3 crores from the rural water supply scheme, Rs 4.79 crores from the 10
th
 finance 
funds and Rs 3 crores from the rural roads scheme were diverted by the state government. (Ranga Rao 
2003:29) 
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resolve disputes in the village. These leaders already have good relations with the 
officers, and these good relations are vital to get anything. Ordinary people are 
living hand to mouth, they are asking for the contracts, and the officers say yes. But 
they have to miss their daily work and go to the mandal office to get them.’ 
 
Reports on the level of corruption in the JB works indicate a high degree of complicity 
on the part of the administration to support the institutionalisation of a ‘skimming off’ 
culture. While accountability controls seem to be weak, this does not necessarily imply 
an overall increase in the level of corruption when compared to previous systems of 
direct implementation. The major change lies in the visibility of the corruption, brought 
about as a result of local involvement in the small scale contracting process that was 
more accessible and open to scrutiny to villagers. As stated above, an important aspect 
of this increased accessibility was the awareness of the need for contractors to make 
pay-offs and therefore to reduce the size of the work against bills.  
 
The contracting culture is another good example of the ‘institutional fit’ in a developing 
polity. The division between local and larger contracting work reflects the distinction 
between the local and the higher level of the polity. Equally, the extent to which the 
ability to execute contracts was linked to the capacity of leaders to use their political 
links, mobilise upfront resources, and negotiate pay-off to local officials, which 
reflected the realities of the local political society and the competitive and hierarchical 
nature of local leadership.  
 
5.4   Aggregate Impacts 
The three key elements of Janmabhoomi discussed above can be interpreted as a 
complex and innovative political strategy to change the narrative of village politics. The 
reinvented gram sabha in the form of Janmabhoomi, served to ensure a direct link 
between the apex and the localities, one that could be controlled and adapted directly 
by the Chief Minister. The mobilisation of user groups, especially women, provided a 
means to create new patterns of political participation and new coalitions of support 
within hitherto under-mobilised voters. The institutionalisation of community 
contributions drew in the potential synergies between the initiative of local leaders and 
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the weak administration to rapidly ground civic works. To the extent that this was true, 
the Janmbhoomi presented an important innovation in developmental politics. 
 
The distinguishing feature of the Janmabhoomi was the creation of an overarching 
mantle for a number of institutional innovations, and the extent to which elements of 
the programme fed into one another. The symbolic branding of the programme 
through the statewide campaign meant that the image and experience of the initiative 
remained distinct from the system of local governance.  However, these aggregate 
impacts also served to create new divisions in the local space. Two main impacts are 
discussed in the last section - the first is the sharpening of identities, which was the 
most apparent among newly mobilised women, and the second was the intensification 
of the distinction between leaders and ordinary villagers. 
 
 
5.4.1  Sharpened social identities 
 
The Janmabhoomi programmedefined a new development era in the village in that it 
reached different people in different ways. While the creation of new identities can be 
seen as a shrewd political strategy to mobilise new constituencies, especially for 
women, it also gave rise to other aspects of identity within the local space. This section 
explores how opening the space for participation resulted in other aspects of identity 
becoming more apparent, namely, education and caste. 
 
Education 
Education was frequently cited as a factor that affected women’s willingness to 
participate in public meetings, as a proxy for a sense of knowledge and freedom.  
Whereas men told us they did not attend public meetings for lack of interest or due to 
pressure of work, women tended to cite their lack of knowledge of public affairs, which 
they explained in the following terms, “In our caste, women do not go outside the 
house. I do not know any of this (questions referring to the JB), my husband and elder 
son know about village development”. However, some of the women we spoke to were 
146 
 
 
of the opinion that it were the restrictions imposed by men rather than the lack of 
interest of women that kept them from participating in the JB meetings.The women 
were aware of these restrictions but were unwilling or unable to challenge them48.    
 
The linkage between gender and education is implicit in both the quantitative data, as 
well as, from our discussions with village women of various social backgrounds.  Half 
the women in the sample said they had received no formal education and it was more 
than likely that a villager with no education was a woman rather than a man (of those 
with no formal education, 69.2% were women and 35.4% were men). The significance 
of education was far greater for women - both in distinguishing them among the other 
members and in terms of the social values of their household or social group. 
 
In-depth discussions with the less-active women revealed the extent to which the 
performance of public participation served to sharpen identities at the village level, 
especially among women. When asked if she participated in the JB, one SC woman in 
KB village told us, “Illiterate people cannot understand the proceedings of the JB, they 
are not even aware of the place where the JB is conducted.” These views were not 
limited to the lower castes. In PGP village, we were told by one woman, ‘We do not go 
to JB because we are illiterate. It is good, but because I have no education I will not give 
it importance. Education is a must.” Similar comments by a member of the minority 
Muslim community in IP village serve to further support the argument that education 
was more important than social identity.”We were also told, “Initiative is taken by the 
politically active people during Janmabhoomi; educated people ask questions, 
uneducated people do not have any value.” 
                                            
48
 From our observations in the villages, we found that social sanctions on women seem to be stronger in 
coastal Andhra than in Telangana. Some of the reasons suggested for this were the participation in 
the anti-Nizam insurrection and the role of women in this movement, as well as, the higher 
prevalence and social acceptance of alcoholism in Telangana. While there is insufficient evidence to 
test, this factor did crop up in conversations with women in the village. One woman said lower-caste 
women are more active politically due to alcohol consumption. The tendency for lower caste women 
to produce and consume liquor was evident in the Telangana region of this study – the social norms 
against drinking being far more rigid in coastal Andhra. It should be noted that the area of Telangana 
that I was working in had a high Goud population. Toddy taping, or palm wine production, was 
common, whereas very little production was taking place in the area in Prakasham district despite 
the fact that the same trees grew there.   
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Caste 
On the whole,lower-caste women were more mobile than high caste women, on 
account of the social sanctions of respectability impressed upon the latter by their 
families. Lower-caste women are clearly freer to move around the village than high 
caste women, one of the reasons being that lower-caste women are more likely to take 
part in daily labour on other people’s lands and to take part in seasonal migration 
work. Out of the 62 people from the sample who said they had migrated out of the 
village for work for an extended period, only five were from the forward castes. 
Roughly half of those who migrated were women. 
 
Sub-village identities became more acute as a result of the renewed vigour given to the 
public sphere since the JB. Diversities of gender, caste, education and political 
involvement became more visible and these perceptions of difference found their way 
into local discourses. One high-caste woman told us that she went to the JB but was 
pushed to the back by the lower-caste women who said that the schemes were 
intended for them. They argued that the JB was for the poor and needy like them. After 
this experience, she did not attend village meetings again. For reasons either due to 
direct experience of this kind or the sharing of such experiences in private spaces that 
we found people talking in terms of gender, education, poverty, political identities and 
assertiveness when discussing their personal relations to the public sphere. We, 
therefore, cannot talk simply in terms of preconditions to participation. We can, 
however, talk in terms of personal attributes that result in inclusion and exclusion – and 
the reproduction of these processes in village discourses49. This process leads to the 
situation in which people will simultaneously support the role being played by the JB – 
i.e., its effects on awareness as well as financial benefits – and at the same time, 
exclude themselves from the perceived benefits. 
 
                                            
49
 We did find some cases of participation being bounded by strategies of those with vested interests. 
Some men in the village told us that they had wanted to raise an issue in the JB, only to be told by 
the leaders that all petitions had to be submitted on paper prior to the meeting. This we later found 
is not part of the protocol. 
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The literature on social inclusion has long since emphasised the multiple aspect of 
identity to counter the narrow focus on gender and other single dimensional aspects of 
exclusion. The dynamic process, by which different aspects come to the fore as women 
become more engaged in local affairs, highlights the practical implications of the 
theory of participatory development. The central theme of this thesis, i.e., the 
importance of understanding the local polity, the process of sharpening identities also 
shows how increase in participation is dynamic and creates reactions based on the 
relations to others, within the local arena. The importance of the new identities stems 
from differences of education and caste rather than gender and is an indication that 
the space for participation is constrained not only by local relations but also has 
broader issues of identity.   
 
5.4.2   Village politics and the state 
 
As noted above, institutional changes were found in the increased visibility of the 
distinction between ‘leaders’ and ‘ordinary villages’. In the absence of longitudinal 
data, the fact the leaders have become more prominent in villages in Andhra Pradesh 
as a result of the initiates associated with Janmabhoomi, can only be tentatively 
proposed. As already stated, comparison to other accounts of local development 
suggest that the leadership has been more dynamic at the local level than in other 
states, and this was reflected in local discourse. As one village political leader told us, 
“JB has had little real impact, as common people are only requesting for ration 
cards. They think, ‘JB is coming, what will we get…?’ Common people do not 
understand what JB is. It is only the political leaders who are asking about 
contracts. But this is not transparent. These contracts are being negotiated through 
the political leaders and officials. The same people are taking contracts, even 
though other names may appear on the paper. As a result, the JB is less a pro-poor 
project than the gram panchayat system.” 
 
Just as there is a high degree of consensus over the divisions between leaders and non-
leaders in everyday discourse, there is a broad awareness of the type of activities that 
leaders are engaged in. The villagers’ acceptance of high levels of corruption and 
supporting the continuation of the programme is evidence of this. In practical terms, 
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‘normal levels’ of corruption are often justified in terms of a return on investments, 
and it is common for voters to express the view ,“It is my opinion that corruption is 
natural as they (the leaders) are spending so much on elections.” 
 
Given the extent to which Janmabhoomi and associated innovations were associated 
with the ruling party, one would expect also to see a sharpening of the divisions 
between leaders from different parties, or partisan attitudes and practices towards the 
current development processes. However, it was observed that this was only partially 
true. While opposition leaders tended to raise objections to the partisan nature of the 
Janmabhoomi during discussions, in practice there was a tendency to limit any forms 
protest or dissent.  Discussion with local leaders revealed that, when interacting with 
thelocal administration government,it was rational to appear to be in harmony and 
unity - across party lines and factions. On the whole, internal factions and competition 
was seen as more likely to lead to a loss to the village as a whole.  
 
To illustrate this, it is important to note that in reviewing the defining moments and 
events in village political histories from all 18 villages visited, events and protests in JB 
were never significant. This does not mean that events like disputes over contracts 
sanctioned in JB were not significant but that these disputes were never articulated in 
the meetings themselves. Conflicts over issues relating to the JB were taken up outside 
of the formal meetings and often through different channels. It was also common for 
political leaders from all parties to conduct informal meetings, sometimes in 
conjunction with higher leaders and officials to formulate a mutual position raising 
these issues in the JB.   
 
Given the extent to which the JB was associated with the ruling party, one would 
expect opposition members to use these local meetings as an opportunity to protest 
against the regime. In fact the opposite was the case. Taking the 16th round of JB in 
Nalgonda District as an example, only 12 villages were officially recorded to have 
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boycotted the JB50. In these cases, villagers stopped the officials from entering the 
village until certain demands were met. This is a surprisingly low figure considering the 
widespread discontentment with the initiative and the fact that all opposition parties 
claim to have organised public agitations in the JB. The local cadre, who had to live and 
work in the villages, told us that they tended to ignore these party orders as they were 
found to be infeasible. The local Communist and Congress leaders we spoke to told us 
that they were told by the party to organise protests at the meetings but did not, 
because despite the strong feeling among leaders that JB was a pro-TDP partisan event, 
trying to stop the JB would be seen by the people as ‘anti-development’. As one local 
Congress leader told us, “When the TDP leaders are doing the work, the Congress 
workers are not opposed to it, as they are doing good work for the village. We should 
not take into account the corruption in the village as the work is small.” Stopping the JB 
would only result in the stopping of benefits from the government. Thus, a desire for 
the benefits forced some degree of unity and collusion towards a common objective 
between parties. While we found a few cases where local disagreements over the 
allocations of work resulted in the work being cancelled, in none of these cases was the 
JB was used as a forum to raise these issues.   
 
One of the reasons for this was that JB cannot be understood purely as a partisan 
programme, as discussed above. While there was a strong degree of identification 
between the ruling party and the initiatives discussed here, the actual implementation 
was not exclusively focused on TDP cadres. Local contractors from opposition parties 
were able to taken on contracts and the process of including all parties and of opening 
the political space was an important aspect in driving these state led initiatives down 
to the local level. The management of these new initiatives by the local political 
stratum is discussed in more depth in the following chapter. Here, however, it is 
important to highlight the extent to which the presence of the state, rather than 
elected leaders, as the front line of the programmes was found to be important in 
                                            
50
 This is based on an official report prepared by the District office in Nalgonda as part of their regular 
reporting to the Planning Department. 
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shaping the political behaviour of local leaders in order to contain their local difference 
within the local polity.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter explores the influence of various informal reforms in local institutions and 
the creation of new spaces for participation. The case of Andhra Pradesh during the 
time of this study was perhaps unique in terms of the degree of institutional innovation 
and, more importantly, the high degree of political ownership for these initiatives. The 
concept of Janmabhoomi is complex and provides a flexible and responsive structure 
for a number of disparate initiatives that had significant penetration due to a highly 
centralised implementation structure. The example of ensuring that messages from the 
Chief Minister were read out in each and every habitation is indicative of this.  
The analysis has shown the extent to which identification with the higher levels of the 
polity was important in motivating the new dynamics of participation, especially 
among women through the self-help initiative. In one sense, the central identification 
behind this highly penetrative initiative enabled women to enter the participatory 
space. The analysis has also shown how this was ‘defined’ and took place largely 
outside the more embedded politics. The rapid pace of mobilisation contributed to 
awareness of the ruling party’s objectives. It also set in place the potential for the 
image of the state to be shaped by local encounters.  
 
The analysis has presented evidence of the scale of corruption in local contracts and 
the broad acceptance of this as a new political culture. Analysis of the perceptions of 
the people also reveals the fact that the villagers could distinguish between the 
intentions of this programme and its actual practice. This is further evidence of the 
distinctiveness of local politics. The following chapter takes these issues forward, and 
probes more deeply into the nature of local leadership and the drivers behind the 
action of the local leaders.  
 
 Chapter 6: Elite Politics: Systems of Capture 
 
 
“For everyone there should be a party for without a party you cannot go to 
the leaders and get support. Active workers in the party will get direct 
support and help from higher leaders. There are cooperative relations 
between party cadres; if there are disputes they can solve them with the 
help of the ‘big leaders’. In case of financial need or accidents, they can get 
help. There are more leaders in the Telugu Desam Party, so it is easy to 
interact with the higher leaders and officers, to get access to information, 
to follow up issues in the office and to help cadres in the village. 
 
Though there is competition among the party cadres yet there are 
opportunities. Hard work and a good reputation will be rewarded. Within 
two years, a party worker can get a position at the mandal level, in four to 
five years he can be a district leader. If he is selfish and ignores the interest 
of the party he will remain at the village level.” 
 
-  Senior village level political leader, Andhra Pradesh 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The importance of village leaders emerged as the pre-eminent theme of the analysis of 
participation and politics at the village level in Chapters 4 and 5. The analysis 
highlighted the extent to which the particular set of policies initiated by the Naidu 
government significantly expanded the space in which these local leaders operated. 
This chapter explores this phenomenon of the rise of village leaders in more detail, 
drawing on evidence from a second stage of fieldwork that focused on leadership 
analysis in a large sample of villages. 
 
The nature of rural leadership is a critical part of the broader characterisation of 
politics. As the introduction shows, the concept of political development maintains as a 
central principle, the contrast between traditional and modern politics, where the 
latter was constructed around ‘multiplex’ relations that blurred personal, kinship and 
faction issues focused on the locality. The emergence of modern politics, under this 
concept, is tied with the breakdown of these local ties and the emergence of new 
identities. The extent to which institutions of governance evolve to respond to these 
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changes was a critical component of the governance agenda as articulated by 
Huntington (2006).  
 
The process of democratic transition has served to challenge the clarity of political 
development and of late, there has been a renewed interest in the potential for 
democratic change to emerge from within local space.  The operationalisation of this 
through decentralisation and participatory local development has served to highlight 
the pervasive influence of local ‘elites’ in shaping this process. The case of Andhra 
Pradesh give cause to explore this in greater detail and to further understand the 
systemic patterns of local leadership and their relations to the broader political 
process.  
 
The following analysis shows the interplay of local and supra-local politics in the 
construction of the local leadership. The analysis, based on comparative analysis of 
leadership networks, highlights the process of stratification within leadership networks 
and the importance of parties in cementing the divisions between them. While these 
patterns resemble the type of factional politics analysed by Brass (1965), the patterns 
of leadership in Andhra Pradesh display a blend of both local and national politics.   
 
6.2 Leadership in the Local Polity 
 
The concept of a leadership network has received little attention in recent studies of 
local development. Seminal analysis by Brass in the 1960s shows the importance of the 
hierarchy of leadership emanating from a central core and surrounded by layers of 
leaders with varying levels of power and influence. The following section sets out the 
model of local leadership that was encountered in Andhra Pradesh, one that is driven 
primarily through a system of stratification that resembles that which is described by 
Brass, and to a significant extent, the more recent characterisation of ‘local elites’.  
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6.2.1 Disaggregating the political stratum 
 
The striking clarity of the concept of the 'village leader' in rural Andhra Pradesh belied 
a significant diversity in the types of leaders. Contrary to studies in other parts of the 
world, the various leaders identified were leaders in terms of the level of political 
engagement rather than the 'domain'51 in which they operated. Moreover, variations in 
terms of the intensity of involvement in village politics translated into clearly defined 
typologies and a general picture of a disaggregated political stratum emerged. 
 
Reputation sampling stimulated only by the question,“Who are the most important 
political leaders in your village?” was made feasible in villages in Andhra Pradesh for 
two reasons. Firstly, the key, prominent party leaders were relatively easy to isolate in 
most villages. These formed the first point of contact for the cross-referencing of the 
sample. Secondly, political leaders have an impact on the villager’s everyday life, and 
hence definitions and clarity of thoughts and ideas regarding this category were well 
constructed within the villager’s own discourse. We can add two further observations 
to this. Other forms of mediation have been overtaken by the compulsion to adopt 
political identities and the mediation of disputes has become politicised. Secondly, the 
distinction between village leaders and higher political leaders (who operate at the 
mandal, district and assembly levels) are well defined. The evidence suggests that the 
process of sampling village political leadership adopted here would not have been 
possible in many other states in India, and indeed in Andhra Pradesh before 1983. 
 
 
                                            
51
 See for example, analysis of leadership in Cambodia which found more than 30 definitions of a 'leader' 
and at least five domains of operation, including knowledge, religion, administration and politics 
(Vimealea 2009) 
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Table 15: Disaggregating village leadership 
 Category 
attributes 
Sub-category 
description 
N (%) 
within 
sample 
1 Apex leaders 
Persistently lead in events 
(key agents in multiple 
events) 
Own political relations 
outside the village 
Key source of patronage 
locally 
High (personal) investment 
in politics 
 
 
1a Consensual leaders 
Uncontested local leaders, with a long history of political involvement. 
Usually drawing their role from a strong nexus between personal and 
political status. Unlike any other village leaders, the consensual leader 
holds significant sway in all major decisions and actions of other party 
workers within the village 
12 
(6.6) 
1b Faction leaders 
Factional relations, active in creating splits within parties at the village 
level. Possessing a strong personal support base but limited by the 
presence of a greater number of rivals. More often than not, rivalry is 
temporary and is resolved in the long-term by defections or changes in 
the party hierarchy. 
14 
(7.7) 
1c Emerging uncontested leaders 
New leaders who have assumed a dominant position, often by filling a 
void left by a lack of leadership within a village-level party. Their position 
is often the result of having defected from their parties to head a weaker 
party organisation 
3 
(1.7) 
2 Secondary leaders 
Dependent on higher 
leaders 
Own sources of patronage, 
used to build personal 
support base 
Importance in one or few 
events 
Prepared to invest in party 
development 
Politically very 
knowledgeable 
2a Current ‘secondary’ leadership 
Prominent in local affairs, well known for being political leader, play a 
leading role in village affairs and spend time dealing with everyday 
issues. More accessible to ‘ordinary villagers’ than the apex leaders, but 
tend to work with a particular group (caste, farmers, area of village 
etc.,) 
29 
(16.0) 
2b Silent leaders 
Either:has status on the basis of being a formerapex leader or:currently 
involved in political activity outside the village 
Still has important effect at the local level, though tends to defer to apex 
leaders in matters of execution.  Likely to be acknowledged by party 
people outside the immediate locality. Usually behind the scenes, has 
the potential to play a lead role when the occasion demands 
13 
(7.2) 
3 Cadre/party workers 
Working for the leaders and 
the party 
Politically aware, but rely on 
information from local party 
leaders 
Dependent on local leaders 
for position, opportunities 
and promotion 
 
3a Primary cadres 
Achieved local recognition and aspire to develop political careers 
38 
(21.0) 
3b Secondary cadres 
Pure followers, active in party affairs (albeit limited scope), some 
ambitions but not dynamic in achieving them 
41 
(22.7) 
3C Tertiary cadres  
Followers with no real political ambitions (including proxy candidates) 
25 
(13.8) 
4 Others Problemcadres 
Cadres who were selected for promotion and positions, and then 
became problematic to the party (disrespect for ‘order’) 
2 
(1.1) 
Old style leaders 
Members of the old school of leaders but those who have ceased to play 
an active role in village politics and are not recognised outside the village 
4 
(2.2) 
Source: Author’s field notes  
The typologies of village leaders set out in Table 15 are based on an interpretation of 
leader’s status drawn from the analysis of political histories and events in each of the 
villages studied. Leadership was divided into three main categories: 1) apex leaders 2) 
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potential or actual agents (or secondary leaders) and 3) supporters or cadres. One 
further level (4) has been added to describe a small set of ex-leaders, who used to be 
influential in the villages but currently have no effective voice in village politics – which 
in itself we find to be evidence of the changing political culture in villages in Andhra 
Pradesh. 
 
The principal factors that differentiate levels within the political stratum are control 
over patronage, information, autonomy and political relations. Continuity of leadership 
or the degree to which leaders have played an active role in a series of village ‘political 
events’, is also a significant factor. Brass’ (1965) statement that there can only be one 
leader in a faction is not merely accurate, it also provides an insight into the process of 
party competition and the functional hierarchies that develop between political leaders 
at the village level. The importance of apex leadership and a leader's inner and outer 
circles are not simply an extension of historical dominance. A significant number of the 
‘apex leaders’, in the villages we studied, rose to positions of power in the last seven 
years through their ability to imbibe the values and skills of the new political culture of 
village politics in the state. As the evidence below suggests, the displacement of the 
old leadership due to village-level political manoeuvring by current apex leaders, as 
well as, the support of well-organised party organisation in the case of the relatively 
new TDP, was more common than some of the older studies on village politics in 
Andhra Pradesh would lead one to believe. 
 
The relationships between levels of leaders are pragmatic and functional and have 
become increasingly important in the context of expansive and penetrative 
politicisation. The structured hierarchy serves as an opportunity for aspirants to enter 
the political stratum without challenging the existing leaders.  
 
It is important to note that this opportunity structure is based predominantly on 
political eventsin the village. While leaders may hold aspirations for political careers 
that extend outside the village, the difference between village and higher politics is 
evident. In one case, we found a retired ex-minister, ZPTC members, MLA aspirants and 
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district-level party leaders residing in one village, all of whom had disassociated 
themselves from direct involvement with ‘village politics’. At best, these ‘higher 
leaders’ would act as advisers or mediators in village affairs (category 2b in Table 15). 
Apex village leaders draw heavily on external connections with higher-party leaders 
and their power over village level secondary and tertiary leaders is based both on their 
custodial control of these relations and the benefits they accrue from dedicated village-
level party work. The pragmatic and functional reliance of followers on their apex 
leaders' resources and connections are 'modern' in the sense that the legitimacy of the 
leader's role and the potential to defect where leaders act illegitimately were found to 
be relatively high. 
 
In most villages, there were two or more parties present and, therefore, space for more 
than one apex leader and his group. The hierarchies of leadership described in Table 15 
are thus, hierarchies within village-level parties. In order to understand the shape of 
the political stratum in the case of competitive village factions or parties, one needs 
also to account not only for the relation between apex leaders but also between their 
groups.  A strong group will have an apex leader or leaders and the associated circles of 
secondary and tertiary cadres. Weak groups have significant gaps, either lacking apex 
leaders or secondary leaders. The power vested in these groups changes over time, 
determined by the control over resources and institutions within the village, electoral 
fortunes of the party and the support they can derive from higher-level leaders. The 
balance of power does change and pragmatic cadres are responsive to these changes. 
 
Not all political groups have a well-developed structure of apex, secondary and tertiary 
leadership. Villages vary in the extent to which well-organised networks have been 
formed. Often, this is dependent on the extent to which local factions pre-date party 
politicisation, and in some cases, the traditional system of negotiation through caste, 
heads or elders have controlled village governance and local conflicts until relatively 
recently. The village histories we collected, however, suggested that the process of 
transition to modern forms of party-based competition is pervasive. This synergistic 
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process has limited the potential for traditional or customary (Ananthapur 2002)forms 
of governance to continue to hold any relative significance at the village level. 
 
Establishing an ideal structure was an important means of understanding the strengths 
and weaknesses of these networks in the village. The distribution of leadership below 
the apex leadership varies significantly between one village and the next. Where sub-
leaders are clustered around the secondary level, the apex leadership is more prone to 
challenge and faction. Where followers are mostly from the tertiary cadre, the party is 
likely to be less dynamic. In this way, disaggregating leadership serves two analytical 
purposes. First, it highlights the importance of party-based networks as an opportunity 
structure for rural leadership. This is an important departure from the analysis that 
sees village-level political agents as a set of individuals competing for control of village 
resources. Second, it analyses the strength of the internal compulsions of the political 
stratum based on the personal and political ambitions of the leaders. 
 
6.3 Political Networks in Practice 
 
The establishment of an ideal structure of leadership is an important means to 
understand the nature of leadership in specific contexts. This section shows how this 
structure is played out in a specific context and on this basis, draws out some of the 
key themes that emerge in village politics. The discussion focuses on two contrasting 
examples of village political structures (Figure 10) and the specific narratives that these 
reveal. 
 
Three main themes emerge from this discussion. The first is the importance of political 
parties in cementing the divisions between groups or faction in the village, and in doing 
so, ensuring their relations with the higher level of the political system. The second is 
the ambiguity of positions vis a vis local development, social and political committees, 
and the extent to which the importance of these committees is conferred upon these 
positions rather than what is ordained by their formal role. The third key theme is the 
extent to which the creation of positions is important in mobilising local party cadres.  
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Figure 10: Mapping leaders, positions and parties – two contrasting cases 
DVV: Dominance and factionalism 
 
DVV – Dominance and Fracture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PM – Parallel channels and accommodation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key – bold demarcates Committee President, brackets demarcate ex-post holder (last 7 years) 
Panchayat positions - S – sarpanch,Up-S up (vice)-sarpanch, WM – ward member, MPTC – mandal panchayat, ZPTC – Zilla Parishad district 
panchayat; 
Party Positions – VP – village party committee, MdP – mandal level party committee, DP – district level party committee  
Other committees - TC – tank (water body) committee, TT – temple trust committee, MS – milk society, PAC – primary agricultural co-
operative, VDC – village development committee, WSC – watershed committee, WUA – water user association, WSG – women’s saving 
 
 
1aTC  
(MS, PAC, S) 
1bMPTC 
 
1bPAC  
(MkC, WUA) S) 
1a(S)  
 
2bMS 
3bVP, PAC, 
WSC 
3bVDC  
(SEC)  
3bUp-S 3bMS, SEC 
 
3cS 
 
3cWSC 
3cWSG 
TDP INC 
2b 
support HB 
R VR 
JRM 
TDP Rebels 
HB Faction 
HMR 
2bMkY  
(ZPTC, MdP, DP)  
3aMPTC  
SEC 
3c TT, VP 3bCL (S, 
TT, PAC) 
2b CL 
3b(MPTC)  
1cZPTC  
TDP 
Higherpolitics  
Villagepolitics  
2bWUA(
VP)  
2bMdP 
3a MdP, 
OS (WM) 
3aTT, MdP 
 2bcontractor 
3b VP, 
MdP 
WUA 
1aPAC 
(S,VP, MdP )  
1aS, (S)  
KV 
YR 
PR 
SR 
GR 
PY 
MLA 
MLA MLA 
INC 
Apex leaders  
Secondaryleaders  
Party workers  
160 
 
 
group, MkY – Market Yard Committee, SEC – school education committee, oil seed committee, CL – caste leader, MLA – member of 
legislative assembly.  
 
Dominance and Factionalism: DVV Village 
 
In the first case, in DVV village in Prakasham District, Kammas are the only high castes 
in the village and their population is roughly equal to that of the SCs (1,400 Kamma 
households, 700 SC Mala households, 400 SC Madiga households, 300 BC households). 
The TDP held the sarpanch post in the last two elections; previous to that, the apex 
leader of Congress (HMR) was the sarpanch. The present strength of the TDP is 
indicated by the fact that this was the only village where a building (formerly a school 
run by an NGO) had been designated to the party office, which was situated at the 
head of the main T-Junction in the heart of the Kamma colony. The apex leader of the 
TDP is HB who held the previous sarpanch post because his wife had been elected to 
the post ; he holds the present post by proxy control of the post of anSC woman. He 
currently holds no positions apart from the being head of the tank committee, for 
which he has been nominated by the MLA, previously he had been the agricultural co-
operative society chairman and the milk societypresident. He told us that it was a 
‘party policy’ that no one should hold two major positions in the village. He describes 
himself as a full-time politician and has only a small landholding (1.5 acres). He has 
moved to the village relatively recently and lives on rented property. 
 
The TDP currently holds all the key positions in the village, barring one watershed 
committee(the TDP controls one) and a private milk societythat was formed to counter 
the overt TDP dominance in the village. When asked about the party’s dominance over 
all the positions, he told me,“We are using and building our powerdemocratically.” HB 
currently controls virtually all the positions in the village through his close support of 
new political aspirants who constitute what is now a majority faction within the village 
party. The position of village president, up-sarpanch, sarpanch, milk societychairman, 
school education committee chairman, water-shed committee secretary and women’s 
self-help group (SHG)leaders are all held by his group. In addition, he has created a 
new post of village development committee (VDC)chairman, which has no power 
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effectively but has given political employment to the ex-SEC chairman from his cadre. 
In an interview, HB said that he had been offered a party position at the mandal level 
but he “decided to stick to the village”with which he was fully involved. 
 
A year before the fieldwork, a rebel faction emerged within the TDP, headed by the 
current co-operative chairman (VR) and the MPTC member. These men (especially VR), 
were factional apex leaders who had rebelled against the single-handed control and 
‘silent factionalism’ of HB. This conflict had built up over three years, but two events 
ensured that the disaffection resulted in a new faction. The first was during the 
selection of the co-operative vice president. After the election of the president, HB 
allegedly refused to abide by the president’s (VR) selection of the vice president and 
instituted a split amongst the directors even though he was not part of the committee. 
This caused the society to be suspended for six months. Officials came to try to resolve 
the issue and decided they would accept VR’s choice of candidate, as HB was not part 
of the committee. VR managed to retain his faction as his new followers realised that 
HB was restricting VR’s threat to his dominance. It had also become clear that the MLA 
by this point was not recognising other senior cadres in the village. The split intensified 
when one of VR’s supporters, R (or rather his wife), did not receive the party ticket 
from the MLA for the MPTC elections. HB proposed a relative of R’s for the party ticket 
in an attempt to divide R’s supporters. R managed to win the election with the support 
of the Congress leaders and a respected elder leader (JRM), who normally did not get 
involved with village factions. JRM felt R’s case was just and advised the MLA that 
factions would be intensified if HB was given the party ticket. Despite moving the 
polling booth in an attempt to increase the turnout of his supporters, HB lost the 
election. 
 
Stories of HB's ‘silent factionalism’ abound. His strategy has been to confer positions on 
weak tertiary cadres and in the majority of cases, he has taken up all the work in the 
village under their names. His strength as a leader is threatened by his unwillingness to 
bestow power on potential primary leaders. The present factionalism with the party 
has had little impact, as HB has the backing of the MLA. The TDP rebel group told me 
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that the faction exists only within the village and in the assembly election they would 
remain loyal to the MLA. They are, however, waiting to be formally approached by the 
MLA, as they feel that he has tacitly supported factionalism within the party, and is 
“playing with leaders who have earned their status through years of party work”. Other 
less powerful leaders are now cautious to develop real autonomy having seen the 
dangers of “being raised by HB and then dropped, like VR and R had been”. VR 
described the situation as,a uni-polar administration in the village, with absolutely no 
chance for a secondary leadership to arise. Factions within the party have led to 
dissatisfaction, as there is no way that this disaffection may be expressed.  
 
At best, they could appeal to the higher leaders within the party but VR felt this would 
only result in a “mutually destructive process of competition” and would damage the 
interests of the party as a whole. The best the senior leaders coulddo is to restrict the 
autocratic management of democracy by encouraging the wider electorate to ensure 
that provisions for elections are upheld. This happened in the case of the last sarpanch 
elections, held three months after the MPTC elections. HB and the senior Congress 
leader (HMR) decided to negotiate a unanimous election without consulting anyone 
outside their apex circle of leadership. TDP offered eight of the 12 ward members to 
Congress and the agreement was that the TDP would take the sarpanch seat. At the 
last minute, Congress, along with the rebel TDP faction, instigated their SCcandidate to 
call for an election. The TDP won eventually, but the agreement on the division of ward 
members was upheld with the eight posts being shared by Congress and the rebel TDP 
faction. The power of the ward members is negligible, as during the agreement 
between the apex leaders, there was apparently a signed agreement to say that the 
ward members would not be able to overturn decisions made by the sarpanch. 
 
Accommodation of Interests: PM Village 
In contrast to the domination and factionalism in DVV, the situation in PM village is one 
of successful accommodation of interests. The village lies in a constituency in which a 
relatively weak SC MLA from Congress defeated the TDP in 1999. The ex-MLA remains 
active, having been promoted since his defeat to district party president and Rajya 
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Sabha member. Both the mandal party president from Congress (PR) and a powerful 
TDP leader (KV) also reside in the village. These two leaders remain removed from 
direct involvement in village affairs but are still important enough to promote cadres 
and resolve disputes in the village. While the MLAs remain the main source of 
command in each party, the TDP leader (KV) directly nominated the victorious 
MPTC,and another tertiary leader to the temple trust committeepresidency and the 
position of village partypresident. Within Congress, the mandal president (PR) 
promoted the president of the VP and supported the ex-MPTC. One further channel of 
command has opened up recently within Congress, that of the victorious ZPTC (PY). He 
was directly nominated by the MLA and at 28 years of age, he is the youngest ZPTC in 
the district. He was chosen firstly on the basis of his caste (Yadava), and secondly, as 
his father was a classmate of the current MLA. As he is new to politics, he is yet to 
develop his own support base in the village but generally, his responsibilities are 
towards the mandal as a whole. 
 
The contest for the sarpanch election has alternated between the TDP and Congress 
for the last four terms and the contest is between the two Reddy leaders who have 
either held the position directly or by proxy. The present sarpanch is from Congress 
(SR). During this previous term, he was mostly staying in the nearby town and so was 
removed from village disputes to a large degree. The TDP ex-sarpanch (YR) is the 
largest landowner in the village, said to have assets amounting to more than Rs. 1 crore 
(about $200,000). He has personally contributed to many village development work 
projects and while the Congress sarpanch was absent from the village, he played an 
active role in village dispute resolutions. Two factors are said to have led him to lose 
the last elections. His involvement in dispute resolution made him unpopular. His 
cadres also complain that his self-importance as a mainstay of the village made him 
complacent, and that he was “inaccessible to cadres” during the campaigning. 
 
The major complaint against him was that he did not spend enough money during the 
last sarpanch election. As this was the first sarpanch seat to be allocated to the general 
category, the competition between the two high-caste Reddys was fierce. The cost of 
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the election spiralled. The victorious candidate feared YR’s capacity to bribe the voters. 
At the last minute he borrowed money, spending a total of Rs. 8 lakhs on his campaign. 
Some people believe that the rival TDP candidate (and ex-TDP village president - GR) 
had been paid by the Congress to contest. Despite the adverse effect on party 
relations, a few believe that GR's involvement was the main reason the TDP lost the 
election. The defeated TDP candidate (YR) became the president of the agricultural co-
operative, which, in addition to his good relations with the ex-MLA, meantthat he 
continued to be one of the most important figures of influence in the village.    
 
6.4 Interaction Between the Local and Higher Levels of the Polity 
 
These cases have served to show how the configuration of local political networks can 
vary between villages, both in terms of the degree to which power is distributed 
between party cadres and in the relationships between the competing networks that 
are played out. One common theme in both these cases is the importance of linkages 
between the local and the higher level of the polity and as a consequence, the implicit 
delineation between these two political worlds. This role of the higher level of politics 
has taken two main forms -one, the relations to higher level party leaders and two, the 
development of new political resources.  
 
Leaders outside the village 
 
Both the cases explored above demonstrate the importance of the linkages to the local 
MLA, or the MP, and the senior leaders in the village. A sharp distinction can be drawn 
between DVV and PM based on the fact that the former had only one senior politician, 
in the absence of an effective linkage to a Congress Party (CP) leader. The lack of this 
linkage undermined the capacity of the local CP to emerge as an effective force against 
the TDP.Further, disaffection in the secondary leadership in DVV resulted in the 
emergence of a factional force in the local TDP. In the case of PM, the existence of 
senior politicians from both major parties led to the creation of a broader and more 
balanced political space in the village.  
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One would expect there to be a reciprocal relationship between the local party cadre 
and the MLA, where the MLA would rely on the former to develop vote banks around 
election time. In such cases, one would expect the MLA to play a major role in selecting 
the apex leaders and workclosely with them to develop the party capacity. While this 
study did not explore the contrast between local and higher level electoral politics, the 
qualitative data suggests the relationship between these two tiers is more one-sided 
than that because thoughthe local leader is dependent on the MLA for patronage, the 
MLA himself tends to remain removed from village politics as much as possible. The 
cases above show how the MLA can play an important role in arbitrating in disputes 
and the extent to which these decisions can influence local politics, even to the 
detriment of the party, by promoting splits or even defections in cases where the MLA 
is unable to willing to accommodate the interest of competing senior village leaders 
effectively.  
 
The MLA plays an important role in giving importance to local leaders. Nearly half the 
respondents claimed personal connections to the present MLA in their area. It was also 
clear by interviewing leaders that contact with leaders below the assembly level was 
not considered worthy of mention. Interaction with village leaders is common to all 
villagers, but it is the (infrequent) rubbing of shoulders with the MLA that makes a 
leader. Hence,“moving with village leaders”, and “being introduced to the local party 
leaders and the MLA” is rare and something that is earned through loyalty to local 
leaders. As one youth leader told me, 
 
“I started as cadre, worked hard, forged relationshipswith higher people – and 
this is what made me a leader. You cannot become a leader just by being 
wealthy or by spending money on village development. Leaders need to be 
available to the public and they need to have high positions, a good image, 
political party affiliations,including relationshipswith leaders who have a higher 
position.” 
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6.5 Institutional Space and Ambiguity 
 
The second important interaction between the local and the higher level of the polity is 
the extent to which policies to promote the formation of user committees acted to 
open political space at the village level.This offered the lower level leaders the chance 
to gain recognition which providedthem with the incentive to work within parties. In 
addition, the development of local party organisations further added to this expanded 
institutional space. 
 
The importance of committees was highly mutable, dependent on local circumstances 
rather than formal power.One can illustrate this with a case relating to school 
education committees. These committees are elected by parents of schoolchildren at a 
meeting where votes are cast by the show of hands. In most villages there is more than 
one school and the formal powers of the committees are limited to the monitoring of 
the attendance and appointments of teachers. Where funds are allocated to the school 
(for the construction of buildings or compound walls) the power of the committee 
increases. However, in most cases, these contracts are informally allocated to leaders 
outside the committees. In the majority of cases, the committees, headed by politically 
neutral candidates,are ineffective. Significant exceptions were found to this rule, 
however, as we found in the following case. 
 
In PGP village, the election for the education committee was due to be held two 
months in advance of the sarpanch elections. The process that occurred can only be 
understood in terms of displaced caste-based factionalism that was transferred to the 
relatively innocuous space of the school committee elections by virtue of the 
impending gram panchayat elections. The school children’s parents were from both 
parties, but there were more from the TDP (dominated by the Telaga Naidu caste). In 
this village, theCP members were predominantly from the Reddy caste, and most of the 
Reddys sent their children outside the village to study in English-medium schools. 
Knowing that the TDP would win, the Congress apex leaders stopped the elections by 
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tearing up the papers that were being used to record the result. With the help of the 
local MLA, the TDP filed a case against the Congress leaders and when re-election was 
held, the police were called to the village after violent disputes broke out. The TDP 
leaders succeeded in ‘managing’ the second election with the complicity of local 
officials. Details of this were hard to establish with any degree of certainty. For obvious 
reasons, accounts were different according to which ‘group’ the informant was aligned 
to. However, there is some degree of certainty about the fact that the TDP leaders 
instructed the village to formally close the voting process two hours before the 
allocated time. The Congress claimed it had succeeded in mobilising the majority 
though the parents had been precluded from voting. 
 
This case represents a trend whereby, the interface between existing political networks 
and factions are articulated through relatively innocuous events in the village. The way 
in which political significance is transferred to these events requires that one to 
consider the matrix of positions at the village level as potential space for political 
leaders to express their power.It is also a method by which to make use of their power 
by well-developed networks of leadership. Analysing the diverse set of social, 
developmental and political associations as components of a matrix of power and 
influence at the village level has so far not been attempted.  To date, some work has 
been conducted on the interactions between the PRIs and natural resource 
managements committees that have extensive formal powers, often in excess of the 
PRIs (Chhotray 2004). The absence of the analysis of political influence in associations 
with less formal power (like education management and SHGs) is conspicuous. The 
assumption that the potential for political capture is dependent on the extent of formal 
powers is questionable where party and factional networks are well organised. To 
understand the process of interface one needs to distinguish between positions within 
the matrix not purely in terms of formal institutional provisions, but in terms of the 
value that leadership networks are capable of adding to these positions.   
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6.6 Drivers Within the Local Polity 
 
What compels village leaders to strengthen a local party group rather than operating 
through individual channels? Loyalty to factions can be explained as directly related to 
the political spoils that a faction has direct or potential control over. According to this 
logic, one could argue that followers of faction leaders base their loyalty on the ‘justice’ 
or even transparency in the distribution of patronage, as well as, their self-assessment 
of their own potential vis-à-vis the opportunities or rewards conferred on them by 
their leaders. Rational choice arguments, however, need to be tempered by the 
importance of kinship, caste, emotive and charismatic issues which also influence the 
guru-disciple relations between leaders and followers (Brass 1965:55). One cannot 
assume at present that local political leadership is a direct extension of higher-level 
politics within the state. As the following section shows, there are a number of 
incentives for leaders to join party groups, not all of which are financial. 
 
Conducting interviews on the motivation of leaders to become involved in politics is 
prone to biases, as the references to altruism do not only justify their own position as 
leaders with power and influence, but also protect the character of the party they 
represent. Despite this, it is wrong to be sceptical about suggestions of altruism. It is 
not uncommon that senior leaders who have a family history of village or community 
leadership, as well as, the benefit of political skills and connections, to be considered 
locally as performing a service to the villagers they represent. Similarly, caste leaders or 
public-minded members of communities within the village were considered favourably 
where they had enforced the redistribution of power within the village away from 
dominant or landed leadership groups. The dangers and biases of relying on the 
perspectives of politically skilled informants have led some researchers to base the 
analysis of more objective assessments of leaders’ backgrounds to uncover the nature 
of the political agency. 
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6.6.1 Social background 
 
Occupational differences do distinguish the leaders from the non-leaders52. Against a 
base line of around 50 percent illiteracy, only about 10 percent of the leaders had 
received no formal schooling and around three quarters were educated to the 
secondary level or above. The fact that nearly 20 percent of the leaders had 
undergraduate degrees or post-graduate qualificationswas very striking. In terms of 
occupation, the sample of leadersshows very clearly that their source of incomeis non-
agricultural. We found that 43 of the 181 leaders (23.7%) named politics, contracting 
for construction work or collective professional functions (leading labour gangs or 
private cooperative leaders53) as primary or secondary sources of income. 
 
There are other aspects of the relationship between occupational background and 
politics. Ration-shop dealers, as well as contractors, rely heavily on political 
connections. Corruption and the need to maintain amicable relations with higher 
politicians and local government officials are in many cases, central to the ‘effective’ 
implementation of contracts. In the state,allegations of corruption in ration-shops 
became stronger after the Food for Work Programme channelled the payments for rice 
through ration shops. We came across one case, which was not an exception, where 
the village ration-shop dealer had been charged three times with illegally selling off 
rice. The charges, made by the mandal revenue officer and the vigilance department 
were dropped and the dealership was retained, principally due to the support of a local 
TDP leader.  Decisions over the allocation of ration-shop dealership and contracts are 
highly politicised. They are an important form of patronage, often extending to the 
level of the MLA or the MP. Politics is not just a way of life. It is also a livelihood where 
politics is based around control and influence over government resource allocations. 
                                            
52
 A rough comparison can be drawn between data from the sample of leaders and data from the 
‘general sample’ of the electorate in the table in the annexure. 
53
 The evidence relating to master weavers or leaders of weaver working groups that was found in one of 
the coastal mandals can be seen as specific to that area. It, nonetheless, opens up the potential for 
suggesting that the regional variations in occupations and the style or working (i.e. reliance of 
professional leadership) does alter the nature of political leadership. 
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Indeed, it is reported that the Chief Minister himself said that political cadres within 
the TDP should have alternative sources of income,54 in an attempt to create a culture 
of party workers who do not survive purely on politics. Evidence of landownership, 
especially in the general sample, was not reliable enough to draw any firm conclusions 
on this. Hence, we adopt an agency-based analysis which focuses on the personal 
motivations of villagers to play a role in the party or factional networks. 
 
6.6.2 Risk factor which provides personal security 
 
One motivation for involvement in party politics that is frequently overlooked is the 
personal security that it provides. This is best illustrated by the following example. In 
KB village, a dispute broke out when water from one field overflowed onto the 
harvested crop in the field that lies below it. A violent conflict took place over three 
days resulting in the murder of the offending party. A number of people, all from the 
Reddy community, had been involved in the conflict, most of whom claimed to have 
intervened in an effort to stop the conflict. There was a youth called RR among this 
group. An inquiry was launched by the police resulting in a charge sheet being issued 
against nine villagers, including RR, All nine villagers were taken to the district jail for 
three months in an effort to ‘cool off’ the dispute in the village. Finally, five of the 
villagers were charged and sentenced to four years in prison. RR, however, was not 
sentenced though he denies that it was because of his political connections that he 
managed to go scot free. He feels that the experience taught him the importance of 
maintaining political connections. Since this episode,RR has become active in the TDP 
youth committee. His parents want him to stop his political involvement and give up 
his political aspirations, precisely due to the violence which they saw led to murder. For 
RR, however, it works the other way round. He feels that the protection he can get 
from political connections is much more valuable than the potential for conflict in 
political involvement. 
 
                                            
54
 Interview with Prof K Srinivasulu on 29 September 2003. 
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This is not an isolated case.It is clear that the involvement of the police in local disputes 
is increasing. Allegations of ‘false police cases’ are common, as are instances of leaders 
changing parties in order to avail of party political support to fight real or false police 
cases. Conflicts between village parties are often being taken outside the village and 
many leaders expressed the view that cases that were previously settled within the 
village are being referred to the police. Cases and counter-cases are a common means 
to re-articulate local conflict. We found a number of cases where the lack of party 
support, or the lack of capacity of parties to support cadres who have cases lodged 
against them, causes concerned cadresto defect. It is not uncommon to find that party 
members are proactive in managing these defections where leaders of the opposition 
represent a significant support base.  Where these shifting alignments carry significant 
implications in terms of relocating power and resources, it seems likely that the 
incentives to use legal and other means to discredit or remove competitors would 
increase. While there was a clear sense that there had been an increase in conflicts 
over the last decade or so, it was not possible to substantiate this through the data the 
researcher had collected.  
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Figure 11: Distribution of value of contracts undertaken by leaders over the last two 
years (value in Rs 100,000 (L)Source: Field data 
 
6.6.3 The profit motive 
 
Political involvement is also motivated by the potential for rewards in terms of wealth 
and status. While financial rewards are important, the reduction of leadership to a 
rational, micro-political economy perspective on leadership is a common 
oversimplification. Leadership is an important avenue to secure personal profit, both in 
controlling distribution of benefits within the village as well as forming direct contacts 
with higher political leaders and officials. The potential for financial gains has been 
intensified in AP due to the new contracting arrangements ushered in through the JB. 
The lack of accountability in these disbursements is both an opportunity for local 
leaders, as well as, a challenge to research. Due to the prevalence of 
benamitransactions, or transactions made under ghost names, on rural development 
works and the multiple channels of funding available to local political leaders, it is 
almost impossible to get any reliable information of the involvement of local leaders in 
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development activities. Reports from the leaders themselves provide the most reliable 
evidence on this. 
 
Roughly half the leaders interviewed had executed small scale civil 'work' themselves 
or in conjunction with other leaders. Among the leaders who had been involved in 
financial work, 60 percent had executed work of Rs. 2L or less over the last three years. 
This implies that out of the Rs. 300L worth of work, the total contingent of leaders had 
been responsible for, over half (i.e., Rs.162L) were carried out by only 28 leaders. The 
dominance of one or few contractors over the largest accounts, which would net in the 
largest amounts, as well as, the distribution of minor work across a number of cadres, 
is a pattern that is common across all villages studied (see Figure 11).  
 
Local observers suggest that the connection between status and contracts signals the 
change in political culture towards individualism and the consequent breakdown of 
order within village political networks. As one senior village leader reflected, 
 
“Leaders used to act in public interest, now those who are guiding politics have 
vested interests and a non-transparent form of politics is emerging. Society is 
developing a tendency towards earning money as fast as possible. Politics is being 
seen as a way of making money. The fault is not so much with the party, but with 
the grassroots cadres. From ward members upwards, leaders want to earn money 
and consequently now spend all their time meeting the MLA. In my time, politics 
was not a full time occupation as it is now.” 
 
The opportunities to engage in contracting work are not limited to the senior most 
leaders. Of the 24 apex leaders in the sample, only 10 had been directly engaged in 
contracting works. By contrast, 73 of the 106 party workers have been involved in some 
form of contracting work. These results might be misleading, to the extent that it is 
likely that the apex leaders often act as mediators or brokers for the award of contract 
to cadres and in the process, might be financially involved. However, it does show that 
engagement in financial dealing is open to lower level party leaders.  
 
The local configuration of power is vital to understand the way in which contracts are 
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distributed. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the lack of overt dissent or protest 
toward the Janmabhoomi by local leaders belonging to the opposition party can be 
explained by fear of undermining the developmental flow. The other reason was that 
the JB was not purely a partisan scheme, as is evident from the flow benefits. Overall, 
54 contracts with a value of Rs. 150.5 lakhs were awarded to the TDP leaders in the 
sample, and 41 contracts totalling Rs. 118.5 lakhs in value were given to Congress Party 
leaders. A further nine contracts were awarded to leaders representing other parties. 
While this indicated a slight bias towards the ruling party, these differences cannot be 
construed as representing partisan distribution.  
 
Interpreting these findings, it becomes clear that the allocation of contracts is 
dependent on local factors, namely the relative strength or capacity of local leadership 
networks, rather than decisions of higher-level leaders. It is likely that one of the main 
factors behind this was the creation of a new set of local contracting processes for the 
implementation of village works that neither affected nor attracted the interests of 
higher-level contractors. 
 
Political and Social Activities 
 
Similar reflections on the changing local political culture are common and not just 
within the older generation of village leaders. Not all political leaders are able or 
indeed expect to enter into contracts. Contracts are biased in favour of the rich and 
experienced. Furthermore, a minority of village leaders claimed that they did not get 
involved in contracts to insulate themselves from corrupt practices and consequent 
public scrutiny. The nexus between political leadership and financial control is 
nonetheless, an important aspect of the relations between the political stratum and 
the village as a whole. It is not, however, a sufficient frame of analysis to describe the 
internal dynamics of the stratum itself. The figures cited above are open to a different 
interpretation. The bulk of the political stratum comprises of sub-leaders who are not 
full-time politicians and are not principally involved in executing contracts.Yet they play 
an active role in strengthening the network itself. The accumulation of status and 
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power are more important – both as a means to enter into competition over contracts 
and as an end in itself.   
 
The functions of village-level political leaders are not restricted to campaigning for 
democratic control. Attending and organising party meetings, performing social 
services through conflict resolution and supporting government initiatives are a more 
important part of the diverse functions of village leaders (Table 16). Together, all these 
aspects contribute to what leaders call ‘party work’. Strengthening the party within the 
village is a means of increasing the collective power of the party or its factional 
networks. It is also a means of gaining personal prestige and a means of differentiating 
members of political networks from its non-members.  
 
The social aspects of leadership are also important, as leaders will be seen meeting 
together, either collectively, or in party-based or factionally defined spaces. The 
meetings are essentially closed-door meetings. Attending informal meetings of leaders 
and cadres is time-consuming, but to be called for them is a mark of respect. 
Leaders are called upon by the rest of the villagers to add status and importance to 
social gatherings. In one village, the sarpanch told us that he was invited to a social 
function in the village almost every day. We were also invited to some of these 
functions – one to celebrate the completion of a new house and one to mark the first 
death anniversary of one of the villagers. At these events, we invariably found that a 
significant portion of the leaders we had sampled were also present. 
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Table 16: Activities of village-level political leaders 
N=188 (unprompted responses) 
Party Activities n  Development Activities n 
Organising party 
meetings/mobilisation 59  
Attending JB and other 
development meetings 27 
Attending party meetings 58  
Development activities (monitoring 
or supporting activities in the 
village) 10 
Implementing party 
instructions 19  
Dissemination of information about 
government schemes 3 
Encouraging party 
membership 18  Contracts (supervising) 1 
Meeting MLA, leaders 16    
Finding problems of party 
cadres (representing issues) 14    
Following local leaders 4    
 
Election Activities n  Social activities n 
 
Campaigning 24  Conflict resolution and panchayats 38 
Contributing expenses for 
cadres/campaigns 24  
Assisting people to meet 
government officers 23 
Party decision, selecting 
candidates. 17  
Assisting people in dealing with the 
police 15 
Collecting money from 
cadres 2  Taking people to hospitals 2 
Source: Field data      
 
The division between social and political functions of leaders is somewhat blurred. 
Arbitration over disputes is also a key social function of leaders. It is also a means of 
developing political skills and earning respect in the village. Youth leaders are often 
seen either presiding directly over conflicts or supporting and learning from more 
experienced leaders. In Brass’ (1965) description of the circles of leadership, he lays 
stress on the importance of developing personal bonds between aspiring and 
established leaders. He describes this as a ‘guru-disciple’ bond. We found that many 
youth leaders had a clear idea of where they sit in the hierarchy of power in the village. 
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One such youth told us,“All parties are like families, where there are big leaders and 
small leaders. Now I am young (27 years of age), so I just listen.” The more dominant 
response, however, was that the new leaders no longer waitto develop themselves as 
cadres as theywould have done earlier. Thus, if they do not get recognition, they are 
likely to shift to a party where they will. The reason for this increasing pragmatism lies 
in the new opportunities for ‘political employment’ offered by the formation of new 
positions of power and stratum at the village level.    
Finally,there are some trends in the data to suggest that the activity of village leaders is 
indeed affected by the party they are affiliated to. Crude conclusions can be drawn 
from the evidence to show that differences exist in three major areas. The first is in 
‘taking part in membership campaigns’. Of the 15 leaders who mentioned this as part 
of their regular work, all but one was from the TDP. However, it should be noted that 
the result could clearly have been influenced by the fact that the party was conducting 
an enrolment drive during the time of fieldwork. Second, involvement in the ruling 
government’s development initiatives, namely Janmabhoomi, was mentioned as ‘party 
work’ only by TDP leaders (with the exception of two non-TDP leaders) which in itself, 
is not surprising, though the fact that this was seen as ‘party work’ is worthy of 
mention. The last activity where a clear party bias was evident was ‘organising people 
and mobilisation’, where the number mentioned by the TDP people was double the 
number of people from all other parties combined(32 against 15)55. 
These trends need to be treated with caution and examined through specifically 
designed survey instruments in order to be robust and reliable. However, in line with 
the broader argument developed here, the TDP has been remarkably successful in 
changing the playing field of local politics and most importantly, enlarging the 
resources and avenues for participation. In the following section, this process of 
mobilisation is examined in greater detail, and the importance of internal resource 
distribution within networks of leadersis highlighted.  
                                            
55
 Other party biases emerge from the data but the reliability is limited by the small sample. However, it 
is worth mentioning that TDP was more active than all other parties in the following areas: ‘providing 
expenses for cadre and campaigns’ (15 against 10), ‘implementing party instructions’ (11 versus 5). 
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6.7 Mobilising the Elite 
The PRIs offer limited opportunities for leaders in order to gain positions of power in 
the village. The creation of the new participatory spaces discussed in the last chapter 
has been important in expanding the space for leaders to find positions of power and 
influence. Due to the rapid and extensive nature of the formation of user groups and 
CBOs, information and the potential for capture has been biased in favour of the local 
political leadership. The impact extends beyond this, as the political potential of these 
committees has created a critical mass of people for the changing leadership culture in 
the state. They are, however, not the only parallel channels to the panchayat which are 
important in the wider scope of village governance and development. Primary 
agricultural cooperatives, milk producers’ societies, temple trust (or endowment 
committees), tank committees and other farmers associations have been in existence 
for many years. In addition, civil associations such as caste groups, religious groups and 
youth groups were active in varying degrees in the villages we visited. Finally, since the 
restructuring of the TDP, party committees have been established by the ruling regime 
in all villages in the state. Opposition parties also have committees, but they were less 
vibrant in the majority of cases. 
The number of committees, as well as, all positions of leadership within these 
committees far exceeds the capacities or the needs of the political stratum to co-opt 
them. The extent to which the matrix of associations is ‘captured’ by political leaders is 
vitally determined by the size and capacities of the stratum itself. On the whole, one 
can assume that leaders have better access to information and hence,are able to 
mobilise themselves more effectively to control the elections for CBOs directly or 
indirectly by installing members of their groups in positions that they can then control. 
It is common to find that apex leaders have found avenues for the expression of their 
dominance through water usersmanagement committees and WSCs, especially where 
they are precluded from contesting the sarpanch elections due to reservations. 
 
Despite the capacities of leaders to dominate these positions, we still found cases 
where even the apex leaders were not aware of the fact that the watershed 
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committees would become financially more powerful than the panchayats. One 
particular case was indicative of this. In DVV village, the TDP had become dominant in 
village politics, mainly due to the activities of their apex leader (from the Kamma caste, 
one who describes himself as a ‘full time politician’) called Harish Babu (HB). When the 
official from the district visited the village to announce the project, the apex leaders 
from both parties (TDP and Congress) were not aware that the watershed committees 
would be in control of Rs. 20 lakhs (approximately $40,000) of funds. HB was not 
involved at this stage. When the project was sanctioned, HB decided, in consultation 
with the Congress leaders and the MLAs, that as two committees were to be formed, 
one should be ‘given’ to the TDP and one to Congress. Both of these committees were 
chaired by politically inactive farmers who had succeeded in getting their names 
recorded by the officials during their initial visits to the village. When Rs 20 lakhs was 
sanctioned to these committees, the TDP nominee decided that he did not have the 
skills to undertake the construction work (where skills implied dealing with corruption 
and the local official), and that by assuming the post he would upset the balance of 
power within the village party. As he put it, ‘out of respect’ he transferred the de facto 
powers over the funds to HB. The check dams constructed by HB were washed away in 
the first rains. Despite complaints and a monitoring visit by the officials, no action was 
taken. Informants felt that there were two reasons for this. Firstly, HB had paid the 
‘correct’ bribes (10% to officers and 5% to political leaders, which was less than the 25 
percent that members of the Congress-supported committee admitted to paying). 
Secondly, due to the political compromise in the formation of the two committees, the 
pressure from the opposition party leaders was silenced. 
 
The understanding of the process of interface between political networks and the 
matrix of positions of potential power in the village is complicated by the fact that 
control over associations is not always direct. None of the works by the WSCs were 
officially recorded as being done by HB, which proved to be a challenge for this 
research. In this case, firstly, political control had been hastily passed on to HB due to 
the inexperience of the WSC committee chairman and secondly, because the formal 
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financial power that he found himself in control of, was far in excess of his local 
political status. 
 
6.8Political Order 
 
The rapid proliferation of CBOs in Andhra Pradesh serve to create a set of resources 
that effectively expanded the political stratum. Yet rather than resulting in 'radical 
polycentrism' (Houtzager 2003), what emerges is a comparatively ordered political 
society in which institutions are adapted to the needs of the leaders and not vice versa. 
 
It is often the leaders themselves who limit the potential for conflict and competition. 
In the case of the watershed committee in DVV village, the chairman had been ‘moving 
with’ the apex leader for two years and had also held the position of primary 
agricultural cooperative (PACS) secretary. Despite his experience, he reflected on the 
disjuncture between his chairmanship of the watershed committee and his relative 
status and skills as a leader with these words, 
 
“I am not educated and therefore, I think I should not continue further in 
politics.Moreover, I am a farmer and cannot spend the time that is required to 
become a political leader. For that, education, time and experience are all 
necessary. Without these one cannot have a direct link to the MLA and other 
leaders. Without these connections there can be no return (profits) for party work. 
Even in these positions (watershed committee and primary agricultural 
cooperative), we cannot get a profit and there are no salaries for position holders. 
Right now, only if I go to the higher leaders along with HB will I get recognition. 
Working as a cadre is a loss, you lose a day’s work going to senior leaders and only 
the senior leaders can earn money. We will support HB as our leader as he looks 
after the party cadre and spends money for the progress of the party. But speaking 
for myself. I am not interested in becoming one of the leaders within the partyfor 
all these reasons.” 
 
In this case, the chairman’s loyalty to HB had been assured because of the direct 
benefits HB had granted the chairman. The house, in which we conducted the 
interview, is a large concrete construction, paid for by two housing grants intended for 
SC beneficiaries with less than five acres of land. HB diverted these grants (of over Rs. 
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20,000, of which he had to give Rs 1,500 to the local officials) to the chairman and 
other cadres as reward for their ‘party work’ despite the fact that the chairman was 
high caste and had over ten acres of land. HB himself was eager to point out that he 
had no land and lived on rented premises in the village. 
 
Thus, the ‘virtuous circle’ of leadership development is cumulative and iterative. Apex 
leaders rely not only on their relationshipswith higher leaders but also with their 
supporters in the village. An important means of motivating cadres, even where the de 
facto control over these positions did not rest with the position holders, was to confer 
positionson them. As one leader told the researcher,“Without some position, we will 
not be recognised by the ‘big leaders’ and the MLA.” Positions offer a means of 
recognition and have been an important means to instil dynamism in village level 
political leadership. Cadres frequently ‘jump’ parties when they see that there is the 
potential for the immediate granting of status though position. One leader described 
the symbolic aspects of these rewards in these terms, 
 
“Chandrababu Naidu has been successful in increasing political employment in 
the state. In our village, the TDP committee will not be functioning and all other 
committees will be effectively headed by the same set of senior leaders.  They 
are not important positions, they are there only to encourage the party cadres 
that they are being given positions.” 
 
 
 
6.9 Conclusion 
 
The compilation of these cases serves to show the extent to which a new type of elite 
politics had emerged in Andhra Pradesh, one that combined elements of new leaders 
and factionalism. The development of the political stratum was significantly hastened 
by the creation of a plethora of new CBOs ,as well as, the availability of flexible funding 
for local development activities. These external changes were played out on the 
ground through a dynamic interface with the actions of the local leaders, who we have 
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seen in this thesis, became an important part of the broad process of stratification and 
dynamics of local politics.  
 
The discourse has presented a detailed account of the context specific nature of 
leadership and the contests between leaders and from this has sought to extract a 
model of analysis that helps further the understanding of local politics. The innovations 
in terms of ‘disaggregating the political stratum’, that is at the core of this analysis, 
resembles the type of models of factional politics described by Brass and others while 
analysing local politics in India over four decades ago. Against this backdrop of the 
evolution of local political leadership, I have sought to show how there are distinctly 
‘modern’ characteristics in the new local leadership that arose in Andhra Pradesh, 
especially in terms of the importance of parties in defining the vertical division in the 
village leadership network and in creation of the opportunity spaces in the context of 
which the leadership took place.The central theme of this thesis i.e., the complex 
picture of the interplay between local and state politics, is further clarified by the 
analysis of the external innovations made in local institutions as a result of which 
positions and resources at the local levelwere created. 
 
The analysis of local political leadership adds considerably to the prevailing notion of 
the ‘local elite’ and seeks to highlight the systemic process of the structuring of local 
politics and the distinction between local and higher level politics. The findings from 
this analysis further support the need to reconsider the polity approach and to assess 
the dynamic process of political development. The clarity of the political stratum in 
Andhra Pradesh is possibly exceptional but it is likely that similar patterns can be found 
in other states in India, albeit with varying degrees of party organisation. There are a 
number of implications that can be drawn from this analysis, namely, in terms of the 
male bias of political participation at the local level, and the distinction between civic 
and political participation which has received limited attention in the current 
developmental discourse on participatory local governance.  
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These findings have broader implications for the understanding of the process of 
democratic change and the role of development programmes in shaping leadership or 
‘elite cultures’ at the local level. While comparison with the long-term process of 
change is beyond the scope of this analysis, there are indications that new leaders have 
emerged in Andhra Pradesh and that this was partly in response to specific 
development initiatives.  The extent of penetration of politics and the influence of state 
level elites challenge the prevailing notions of political change in India - this has been 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 3. However, the interpretation of these changes forged 
along a clear distinction between local and higher level politics is critical and needs a 
more disaggregated account of politics and political change in developing polities and 
by implication, a re-examination of the construction of the polity in countries like India.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
184 
 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis has provided a detailed account of local politics in contemporary India 
through the lens of the new politics of localisation. At the time of planning and 
undertaking the fieldwork for this research, there was an emerging debate about the 
subtle change in the approach to participatory local democracy. As discussed in the 
introductory chapter, support from democratic decentralisation was gradually being 
outstripped by new initiatives that sought to promote direct participation in the design 
and management of local development projects. As an early observer of this trend, 
Manor termed this the ‘second wave of decentralisation’ (2005) and highlighted its 
potential damaging impact on the process of democratisation. Taking the case of 
Andhra Pradesh, this thesis sought to explore the politics behind this process.  
 
The case of Andhra Pradesh is arguably one of the most important examples of this 
new trajectory in participatory local development, on account of the high degree of 
political support that underpinned radical ‘informal’ reforms in local institutional 
structures. It was also a state that, around 2000, attracted a great deal of international 
attention on account of the neo-liberal policies of the new Chief Minister, at a time 
when Andhra Pradesh emerged as a forerunner in state level economic reforms due to 
changes in the nature of the Indian federal system. As my early visits to the state 
showed, there was a different story emerging - one where the new dynamic leader of 
the state was actively pursuing a domestic agenda by driving this political influence 
down to the local level through a new form of developmental politics.  
 
 While the context of state politics in Andhra Pradesh is important, this thesis focused 
on the broader issues of the nature of local politics in a vibrant and predominantly 
rural based democracy. The ‘new politics of localisation’ focused attention on the local 
arena as a driver of economic and political change. Theorists of this new trajectory        
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(Harriss et al 2004) have highlighted the extent to which this required a significant 
change in the understanding of political processes, one in which the locality has 
emerged as a primary area of development (Harriss et al 2004). At the time of writing 
this thesis, new perspectives on the framework of political analysis based on the 
pioneering work of Theda Skocpol in the 1990swere emerging. The ‘polity approach’ 
offers a means of focussing on the dynamic interaction between state and society in 
the policy making process, opening the scope for exploration of the effects of reform 
on the demands that emanate from society, and by implication, the construction of 
society in relation to the state.  
 
The framework proposed at the start of this thesis set out to further elaborate on the 
polity approach in relation to the specific features of a ‘developing polity’. The 
discussion drew on the much-neglected work on political development that had 
emerged during the 1960s and increasingly seen as less relevant following the ‘third 
wave’ of democratisation during the 1970s and beyond.  The proposed framework for 
the ‘development polity’ approach set out in Chapter 1 sought to highlight the 
relevance of the concepts of political development to thinking about state-society 
relations as a means of contextualising contemporary work that shed new light on the 
importance of informal institutions and local elites as being part of the political 
process. Two elements to this approach were discussed. The first is the need to assess 
whether the polity contains different types of politics, akin to the modern/traditional 
typologies set out by theorists of political development, which were central to the 
understanding of the ‘crisis of penetration’. The second was the need to disaggregate 
both state and society and explore the linkages between the higher and local levels.  
 
The concept of the local state drew from emerging thinking based largely in the Indian 
context that gave rise to the concept of the ‘everyday state’ (Fuller and Benei 2000). 
This body of work laid the important foundation for examining the unitary concept of 
the state in India and highlighted the importance of everyday practices in shaping 
citizens’ encounters with both the administration and politics (Ruud 2000). Drawing 
heavily on this work and the approach it offered, this thesis set out to further explore 
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the politics and the political implications of this, through an in-depth exploration of 
contemporary local politics at the village level. 
 
The key contribution of this thesis is the exploration of the nature of local politics and 
the process of political stratification of voters and leaders at the local level,in particular. 
These issues have been examined in a way that seeks to understand the relationship 
between higher level and local politics through three lenses: local elections, 
participatory development and leadership. The following section (7.2) reviews the main 
findings of this stream of analysis.  
 
Given the time taken to reach final submission of this work, it is important to recognise 
that thinking on these issues has further evolved. Discussion of the development in 
empirical and conceptual work is provided in section 7.3, which focuses on the extent 
to which political analysis has become increasing central to the donor discourse on 
development and specifically, on emerging discussions around the concept of political 
settlements. Against this backdrop, the broader implications of this research are 
discussed in section 7.4, which focuses on the relevance of the developing polity 
approach.  
 
7.2 Summary of Findings 
 
The methodological approaches discussed in depth in Chapter 2 set the challenge of 
striking a balance between in-depth qualitative case studies and an analysis that is 
representative. A mixed method approach was developed that was based on a limited 
set of cases but introduced methods that resulted in a large sample that enabled an 
exploration of the politically salient issues of caste, level of political participation, as 
well as, gender and age. The need to focus on the ‘locality’ reflected on the specific 
innovations in the state of Andhra Pradesh that conferred a new salience on the village 
as a political spacedespite the weak commitment to formal democratic 
decentralisation. The complexity of the ‘cases’ and the definition of ‘the local space’ 
served to circumscribe the findings of this research and the implications that can be 
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drawn from them on issues that are central to the analysis of local politics in particular 
and political change in general.  
 
Following an analysis of the political and policy context in Andhra Pradesh (Chapter 3), 
the empirical section of this thesis reflects three distinct research questions relating to 
elections, participation and leadership. Analysis of village elections (Chapter 4) 
highlights the distinctiveness of the village as a unit in the political system. Despite the 
powerlessness of locally elected bodies, elections for village governments were found 
to be fiercely contested events that were driven by the forces of party, identity and 
entrepreneurship.  While these contests resembled political contests at the higher 
levels of politics, the manifestation of these forces was highly contextual and deeply 
embedded in the specific histories of the villages. Despite this high degree of 
contextual specificity, analysis revealed an internal process of stratification that was 
common between villages and this was interpreted as evidence of the distinctiveness 
of village politics.  
 
Village elections were driven by the ambitions of leaders rather than formal powers of 
the local bodies and the positions within them. In seeking to explain this, it becomes 
clear that local elections cannot be understood in isolation from the broader political 
process and other policy innovations that penetrated to the local level. The presence of 
parties challenges the notion of political decay and the weakness of party structures in 
India and this analysis presents important evidence of the importance of party identity 
and the extent to which parties enjoy the support of general voters. Alignment to a 
party is an important means of ensuring access to benefits though local actors often 
intervene this access. This further enforces the view that villages are distinctive areas 
in the political system but it also highlights the extent to which the deepening of party 
politics is driven by factors that extend beyond local electoral politics.  
 
The arena of participatory politics in Andhra Pradesh was shaped directly by the state. 
The analysis (Chapter 5) focuses on three mechanisms that significantly impacted 
village politics: the village assembly, user groups and local contributions. The analysis 
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highlightsnot only the extent to which these changes circumvented formal democratic 
decentralisation by creating a more direct interface between the villagers and the state 
but also how the implementation process served to intensify village politics and 
political awareness. 
 
This analysis differs from other recent accounts of participatory development 
(Chhotray 2004, Veron et al 2003) that have focused on specific schemes or sectoral 
reforms. The proliferation of local institutions in Andhra Pradesh (many of which were 
indeed not new) had a number of aggregate effects and produced some important new 
dynamics that were widely acknowledged. These included the new culture of 
contracting, direct engagement of the higher-level state in participatory spaces and the 
mobilisation of new identities, all of which were the result of a combination of 
institutional innovations and strong state support. While there is a clear limitation in 
terms of drawing temporal comparisons based on a single study, there is some 
evidence to support the view that these changes were significant and rapid.  
 
The dynamism of the initiatives launched under the mantle of the Janmabhoomi 
programme reveals certain anomalies. On the one hand, the presence of the state 
created new identities which rose above local politics, for example, the dynamism of 
the women’s groups in creating space for participation outside the male dominated 
field of local politics On the other hand, the proliferation of institutions and resources 
at the local level was responsible for invigorating local politics, whose force ensured 
that non-political participation was restricted or contained. Elements of politics 
permeated political and civic spaces, as seen in the sharpening of other aspects of 
identity, namely of literacy and caste, based on interactions at the local level. 
 
A further aspect of the anomalies of participation related to corruption. The evidence 
highlighted the extent to which the Janmabhoomi programme institutionalised 
informal practices of corruption and how this became an accepted part of the local 
development process, largely due to a system that required community contribution. 
While it could be argued that the emergence of systemic corruption in programmes 
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that were strongly identified with the ruling party would be damaging, this was not 
found to be the case. The analysis suggests that villagers were able to distinguish 
between the image of the programme and the performance on the ground and by 
implication discern between practices of the local leaders and the higher levels of the 
political system.   
 
The importance of local leaders in defining village politics demanded closer attention 
and the second phase of fieldwork was designed to further develop the understanding 
of these local actors. This theme is explored in more depth in Chapter 6. Contrary to 
the dominant discourse on ‘elites’ and naya netas, the research showed that local 
leaders functioned as part of well-defined structures that served to stratify the leaders 
and govern their interactions. While these structures resembled systems of 
factionalism associated with 'traditional' politics in India, the drivers influencing the 
decisions and practices of the ‘elites’ were found to be very modern. The linkages to 
parties and local bureaucrats who were effectively brokers for development contracts 
defined the leaders and the internal distribution of development schemes and 
positions of importance played a major role in developing networks of leaders within 
the village. 
 
The creation of a typology of leaders is an important contribution, one which highlights 
the common patterns of local leadership, structured around hierarchy and groups. The 
specific configurations within these patterns varied between villages and served to 
define the politics of a specific village. The development of this second phase of 
fieldwork initiated a form of analysis that could be used to make comparisons between 
villages and therefore, to better understand the complex narrative of politics in a 
particular village.  
 
The analysis of leadership also explored the internal drivers of local politics and the 
complex interaction between political parties and local motivation of profit, security 
and social status. The alignment of these two aspects of the developing polity acted to 
ensure that elements of higher-level politics penetrated to the local level. The analysis 
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also showed the extent to which the (external) state was effective in stimulating the 
deepening of party politics through the creation of space and position and resources, 
and how essentially it was the local leaders who gave order and significance to these 
structures.  
 
While these three aspects of the new politics of localisation (elections, participation 
and leadership) served to structure this research, what emerges strongly is the fact that 
these cannot be treated as separate domains. The following section draws out the 
common trends that emerge across these three areas of local politics, before exploring 
the broader implications for understanding the political context in a developing polity.  
 
The first common strand relates to the importance of political stratification and the 
extent to which political behaviours are defined by encounters with local events, issues 
and actors. The detailed analysis of village politics reveals the complexity of caste and 
other key aspects that are assumed to have influenced political processes and the 
limited extent to which these dictate the nature of local politics. One reason for this is 
the heterogeneity of caste composition in the lower units of the polity, namely, the 
village. The discovery of esoteric coalitions between parties and divergent trends in 
caste-based alliances are evidence of this and they challenge the accounts of politics in 
contemporary India that are based on national or state level trends. While this study 
did not seek to compare political behaviours in local and national elections, there is 
sufficient evidence to question this relationship in greater detail.   
 
This analysis shows how the degree of political activity is an important defining feature 
of a villager, one that is not directly correlated to primordial characteristics of caste, 
age or education but rather is defined by relations or encounters in the local space. 
There are significant differences between the awareness and behaviours of leaders and 
the more passive villagers which is substantiated by their engagement in electoral and 
participatory politics. Further, there is evidence that the capacity of villagers to engage 
activity is determined, in part, by the internal dynamics of the village polity, or relations 
between villagers. Parties, positions and resources can serve to activate the village 
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polity but the strength of this internal ordering suggests that this process of 
stratification is an inherent feature of local politics.   
 
The second common pattern that emerges is the extent to which men dominate in 
local politics and by implication, the limited nature of empowerment through the 
participatory development processes. While we did encounter active and clearly 
exceptional women leaders, their capacity to influence the inner circles of the political 
stratum was limited. The analysis set out to show how the dynamism of local politics 
and participatory spaces has served to alter or sharpen identities, within the general 
category of gender.  
 
Arguably, the most important contribution of this research has been the deeper 
exploration of the nature of leadership in the contemporary rural context. Clearly, 
these findings cannot be generalised as there are certain aspects of the context that 
play an important role, including the regeneration of the Telugu Desam Party 
organisation under Chandrababu Naidu and the specific history of the rural fixer that 
differs in other states (Manor 2000). The positioning of this analysis in the broader 
context of Andhra Pradesh’s politics was not the objective of this analysis, through 
these it is possible that some important implications for the understanding of the 
existence of party organisation in contemporary India and the specific routes to party 
building that the case of Andhra Pradesh could contribute important insight into. My 
objective in this research was more limited, which was to focus on describing the type 
of politics at the local level.  
 
The type of leadership found at the village level in Andhra Pradesh has two important 
implications. The first is that party politics and local politics are not only compatible; 
they interact in ways that serves to deepen the penetration of parties in ways that 
challenge broader theories of mobilisation and decay (Manor 1983, Kohli 2000). It 
could be argued that the pragmatic alignment between party organisation and local 
politics was a deliberate strategy of Chandrababu Naidu in an attempt to develop a 
party organisation in a relatively short space of time. Subsequent political events in the 
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state, that saw the Telugu Desam Party defeated in the 2004 elections, also highlights 
the fragility of this strategy. The second important implication relates to the 
understanding of corruption at the local level. This is a theme that has been developed 
by this author in another work (Powis 2007) which argued that the apparently high 
level of rent seeking at the local level was largely channelled into a complex series of 
payments to local officials, as well as, to a higher level of party leaders. Most 
importantly, this payment was needed to support lower level village party workers to 
ensure the status of leaders to act as ‘brokers’ for the village. This evidence is 
important in shifting the focus away from the notion of self-serving ‘elites’ as 
propagators of corruption and highlights the importance of leaders in driving the 
process of development to the local level.      
 
The innovations in terms of developing methodologies for analysing networks of local 
leaders have a broader relevance which is beyond the Indian context.  Subsequent to 
this research, this framework has been developed and tested successfully in very 
different country contexts like Burma, Cambodia and recently, Nepal (in an unpublished 
work by this author) where it was further validated. This approach has important 
relevance in the light of a new work on political analysis that is reviewed briefly in the 
following section.   In the remainder of this chapter I set out to draw the broader 
implications of this research against the context of a more recent analysis of the need 
to understand the political context in developing countries.   
 
7.3 Updating the Conceptual and Empirical Context  
 
This thesis sought to develop a number of themes in the literature on politics and 
development that were emerging at the time this research was being formulated. 
There have been some developments and new areas in this literature in the interim 
period, which will be explored in this section before reflecting on the broader 
implications of this research.  
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The introductory chapter briefly analyses three strands in the literature related to the 
new politics of localisation. The first is the political approach to decentralisation that 
focuses on the politics strategy of state level ‘elites’, based on the understanding of 
centre-periphery relations. The second takes a bottom-up approach, focusing on the 
local space as an arena of potential change and emphasises the importance of local 
institutions and non-formal forms of political action as a driver of democracy and 
political change. Work on this latter intellectual trajectory has continued to attract 
interest and important work, much of which has been managed through the Institute 
of Development Studies research group on Participation, Power and Social Change. 
Some important aspects of this work include the analysis of ‘unruly politics’ (Hossain 
2010, Khanna 2012), new considerations of the broader nature of citizenship and 
spaces for participation (Cornwall et al 2011) and the implication for understanding the 
deepening of democracy (Gaventa 2005). These newer contributions to the debate on 
the nature of the new politics of localisation has furthered the understanding of the 
importance of forms of civic and political action at the margins of the state but, as 
discussed in the introduction, has downplayed the importance of the old style forms of 
politics that they challenge.  
The challenge of connecting local politics to the larger system remains in much of the 
more recent analysis of the everyday state and informal institutions. A recent paper by 
Williams et al. (2011) on a similar initiative to those undertaken in Andhra Pradesh, 
called the Kumbashree in Kerala, offers further evidence of the limited extent to which 
new ‘invited spaces’ are autonomous from the broader political process. Other recent 
analysis in Afghanistan (Brick 2008) and Africa (Kensall 2008) point toward the 
resilience of traditional politics and customary practices, how these differ between 
contexts, and questions of whether development interventions should aim to go with 
the ‘grain’ (ibid) of indigenous forms of governance or seek to change them.  
The more recent literature highlights the need to understand politics in order to 
promote effective development strategies, an issue that has increasinglybeen 
recognised as a part of donor thinking. As discussed in the first chapter of this thesis, 
the proposition that politics is central to the process of poverty reduction which was 
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set out by Whitehead and Molina (1999) has paved the way for a new commitment by 
donors to engage with issues relating to politics. Over the past few years, there has 
been a growing recognition of the importance of political economy and institutional 
analysis by the World Bank (2007, 2009) and other major development agencies (DFID 
2009). In the broadest sense, political economy analysis aims to look ‘beneath the 
formal structures’ with a view to revealing the ‘underlying interests, incentives and 
institutions that enable or frustrate change’ (DFID 2009). To date, the major focus of 
this emerging approach has been to assess political economy issues at the country, 
sector, and most recently, the project level (World Bank 2009). 
One of the most important departures in this regard has been the recognition of the 
need to engage directly in the political process in order to achieve the objective of pro-
poor development. The UK Department for International Development has been a 
leader in this field, with an approach that centred on the concept of ‘political 
settlements’ (see Parks and Cole 2010; Khan 2010). This framework sets out to chart 
the progress of ‘elite’ pacts as a means of understanding the political process of social 
inclusion and state stability. These developments are cited as examples of the growing 
interest in understanding the political context and the formal and informal process that 
shapes this (See Hickey 2006).   
While the recognition of the importance of political analysis marks a significant shift in 
the mainstream development discourse, this remains a field where more needs to be 
done. A recent review of the last five years of work on political settlements has 
highlighted the lack of clarity of concepts and the limitations of the approach being 
used currently. Laws (2012) identifies sixteen different definitions of political 
settlements in recent documents all of which focus on the pacts between ‘elites’ and 
highlight the confusion between peace settlements and political systems. The critique 
of the political settlement approach has drawn attention to the fact that any such 
negotiated basis for governance or power sharing is essentially dynamic and that often 
the objectives of inclusion and stability are contradictory. Most importantly, Laws 
emphasised the limitations of focusing on a national level political settlement based on 
a unitary concept of state and societies. As he states, “Both are always characterised by 
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internal differences and a variety of interests and forms and degrees of power, 
especially in developing societies and weak institutions’ (Laws 2012:1) 
One important development in this field of work lies in the paper by Parks and Cole 
(2010) who propose the notion of a secondary political settlement that lies at the sub-
national level, existing in relation to the central coalition of interests at the centre. 
While not developed in detail, there is a lot of potential in furthering this approach as a 
means of situating local politics in the context of the broader polity. The final section 
reflects on the model proposed in this thesis, of the developing polity and the extent to 
which this sheds light on the evidence from Andhra Pradesh.  
 
 
7.4 The Possibility of a Developing Polity Approach 
 
The broader objective of this thesis was to further the understanding of the relations 
between the state and the locality. The polity approach was proposed as one important 
framework to achieve this and the introductory chapter proposed an innovation in this 
approach that took into account the notion of distinctive ‘political cultures’ that co-
exist, as first suggested by Weiner (1965).  The ‘developing polity approach’ drew on 
elements of the political development school of thought to posit the existence of 
different type of politics in different spaces and thus, focused attention on the 
interaction between the national and the local. This approach enables analysis of some 
of the apparent anomalies that emerge from the evidence of political processes, actors 
and institutions that have been discussed earlier in this chapter.   
The developing polity approach introduced the distinction between the higher-level 
state and society and the local state and community. The methodology and research 
questions focused on the two extremes of this relationship and have been based on 
research at the village level. As such, the broader complexities of the multiple 
intermediary institutions, including district level government and political structures 
based around assembly and parliamentary constituencies, have been simplified as 
196 
 
 
parts of the higher level state and political system.  The model serves to show how 
distinctive arenas in the polity co-exist and interact. 
What is clear from this analysis is that the local space is not an autonomous domain, 
and that villagers are both influenced by events at the higher level of the polity, as well 
as, at the local level. The interplay between these ‘two worlds’ of politics is mediated 
by a range of institutions, including participatory development polices that directly 
shape the local space and parties and whose influence is driven by local forces within 
the enabling context of the larger political processes. Taking women as an example, 
politically mobilised villagers straddle these two worlds, with a strong awareness of the 
state level policy and policy processes though their direct encounters take place at the 
local level. Theorists of the everyday state and the broader critique on the unitary 
concept of state and society have underplayed the importance of this dualistic 
engagement with politics.  
The evidence suggests that the policy process around institution formation works in a 
complex way, based around the interplay of local and state level forces. While the 
‘political approach’ to decentralisation can help explain the policy choice to by-pass 
formal institutions of democratic decentralisation, it tells us less about the way in 
which informal reforms are played out. The creation of multiple institutions for 
participation and resource control can be understood as a political strategy for political 
penetration oriented expansion of the political stratum. However, the effectiveness of 
this process was determined by forces at the local level and the capacity of local 
leaders to appropriate new spaces to develop their local networks and power in the 
village. As such, the question of the institutional fit between state and society needs to 
be understood as a more complex process of the interplay between two distinct 
political arenas, which are beyond the direct control of the state level political elite.  
The need to bring politics back into the discussion of state-society relation has been a 
central theme of this discussion. The evidence presented in this thesis strongly 
suggests that political relations and political leaders are more important than 
administration in shaping interface with the state. Not only does this contrast with the 
more general accounts of political decay in India, it also strong suggests the need to 
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consider the role of politicians in deepening development and democracy more 
carefully and the importance of political parties in this process. Viewed from the 
perspective of the state, the extensive penetration of parties might be less evident. 
This research, however, serves to show how reality can be very different when seen 
though the lens of village politics.  
Whether or not the existence of parties implies a relationship to the state level 
electoral system remains a question that lies beyond the scope of this research. The 
developing polity model proposes a relationship between community and society 
based around the capacity for aggregation of political behaviours or the extent to 
which votes adopt political identities that translate into larger voting patterns or 
electoral forces. The apparent importance of the local polity as a distinctive space 
seems to challenge the clarity of this relationship and further research would be 
needed to test whether the formative role of parties implies that this linkage is 
established.  
The strength of the evidence of the distinctiveness of local politics in Andhra Pradesh 
supports the view that the developing polity approach can be further developed and 
applied to understand the political and development process and offer a slightly 
nuanced perspective on understanding the process of deepening democracy and the 
apparent anomalies that emerge. The capacity of the framework to encompass the 
dualistic behaviours of rural voters, which respond to both local and state or national 
level political issues and the extent to which it can account for the interplay of local and 
national patterns of politics, namely, aggregate caste and party political identity, 
alongside the importance of local events, issues and actors. It is hoped that this study 
will stimulate further research in this area,as well as, develop concepts that may be 
further explored by this author to enrich the understanding of the politics of 
development. 
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Annex 1: Electoral data 
 
Turnout for state and parliamentary elections 
 State Assembly elections Parliamentary elections 
Year Total Men Women Total Men Women 
1962 64 68.12 59.81 64.72 69.03 60.35 
1967 67.15 72.76 65.57 68.67 72.08 65.26 
1971    60.35 64.65 56.03 
1972 59.71 64.99 58.56    
1977    61.8 66.38 58.58 
1978 72.92 76.13 65.75    
1980    56.94 62.22 51.76 
1983 68.69 71.6 65.83    
1984    68.97 72.7 65.3 
1985 67.57 71.06 64.1    
1989 70.37 73.78 67.04 70.43 73.79 67.07 
1991    61.42 65.94 56.87 
1994 71.02 73.6 68.43    
1996    63.02 66.44 59.61 
1998    66 69.46 62.61 
1999 69.15 72.07 66.24    
Source : Election Commission for India reports, www.eci.gov.in  
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Andhra Pradesh Assembly Election Results 1962-2004: Seats won and percentage of votes secured 
bymajor political parties 
 
 
 Congress Telugu Desam Left parties Other major parties 
 Seats 
won 
Votes 
secured 
% 
Seats 
won 
Votes 
secured 
% 
Seats 
won 
Votes 
secured 
% 
 
1962 177 47.3 -  51 19.5 Swatantra 19 (10.4) 
1967 165 45.4 -  20 15.4 Swatantra 29 (9.8) 
1972 219 52.3 -  8 9.2 Swatantra 2 (2.0) 
1978 175 39.3 -  14 5.2 Janata 60 (28.8) Congress (R) 
30 (17) 
1983 60 33.6 198 46.3 9 4.8 BJP 3 (2.8) 
1985 50 33.6 202 46.2 22 5 BJP 8 (1.6) 
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1989 182 47.2 73 36.6 13 5.2 BJP 5 (1.8) 
1994 26 33.6 219 44.1 34 6.5 BJP 3 (3.9) 
1999 91 40.6 179 43.8 2 3.3 BJP 12 (3.7) 
2004 185 38.6 47 37.5 15 3.4 BJP 2 (2.6) TRS 26 (6.7) 
Data drawn from Suri 2002, 2004 and Government of India Election Commission Reports (www.eci.gov.in) 
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Andhra Pradesh Parliamentary election results 1957-2004 
 Seats won and percentage of votes secured by major political parties 
 Congress Telugu Desam Left Parties Other major parties 
 Seats 
won 
Votes 
secured 
% 
Seats 
won 
Votes 
secured 
% 
Seats 
won 
Votes 
secured 
% 
 
1957 35 51.5 -  2 15.6  
1962 34 47.9 -  7 21.1  
1967 35 46.8 -  1 19.4  
1971 28 55.7 -  2 9.0  
1977 41 57.4 -  0 7.4  
1980 41 56.2 -  0 7.1  
1984 6 41.8 30 44.7 2 3.6 BJP 1 (2.2) 
1989 39 51.0 2 34.5 0 4.3 BJP 0 (1.5) 
1991 25 45.6 13 32.8 2 4.4 BJP 1 (9.9) 
1996 22 39.7 16 32.6 3 5.3 BJP 0 (5.7) 
1998 22 38.5 12 32.0 2 5.5 BJP 4 (18.3) 
1999 5 42.8 29 39.9 0 2.7 BJP 7 (9.9) 
2004 29 41.6 5 33.1 2 2.4 BJP 8.4 (0), TRS 5 
(6.5) 
Data drawn from Suri 2002, 2004 and Government of India Election Commission Reports (www.eci.gov.in) 
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Local government election results 2001 (and 1995) 
 Total 
constituencies 
TDP Cong BJP CPI CPI(M) TRS Others 
& Ind. 
ZPTCs 
        
Coastal Andhra 422 232 178 1 2 -- -- 9 
Rayalaseema 231 123 103 1 1 -- -- 3 
Telengana 441 157 165 11 5 15 84 4 
Andhra Pradesh 1,094 512 446 13 8 15 84 16 
% votes         
1995 Panchayat elections, AP 
1,038 694 274 6 12 23 -- 29 
MPTCs         
Coastal Andhra 6,429 3,229 2,655 53 44 54 -- 394 
Rayalaseema 2,729 1,373 1,189 26 19 10 -- 112 
Telengana 5,422 1,749 1,807 200 141 216 1,043 266 
Andhra Pradesh 14,580 6,351 5,651 279 204 280 1,043 772 
1995 Panchayat elections, AP 
14,129 7,227 4,696 160 281 342 -- 1,423 
Mandalpresidents 
        
Coastal Andhra 420 233 163 2 3 2 -- 17 
Rayalaseema 229 113 110 1 1 -- -- 4 
Telengana 435 134 161 5 13 18 83 21 
Andhra Pradesh 1,084 480 434 8 17 20 83 42 
1995 Panchayat elections, AP 
1,036 653 283 6 18 26 -- 50 
Sources: Suri 2004, Andhra Pradesh State Election Commission Reports 2001. 
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Votes polled to parties in ZPTC elections 2001 (%of valid votes polled) 
Party 
Region 
TDP Cong BJP CPI CPI(M) TRS Others Ind. 
Coastal Andhra 49.46 45.97 1.04 0.74 0.61 -- 0.48 1.68 
Rayalaseema 49.50 45.33 1.63 0.57 0.68 -- 0.37 1.91 
Telengana 35.36 32.52 4.22 1.84 3.53 20.44 0.13 1.95 
Andhra Pradesh 44.09 40.72 2.36 1.13 1.74 7.80 0.33 1.82 
Nalgonda 36.3 34.82 1.03 3.76 8.07 15.09 0.51 0.09 
Prakasham 52.03 44.79 0.08 1.57   0.02 1.51 
Source:Andhra Pradesh State Election Commission Reports 2001. 
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Annex 2: User groups in Andhra Pradesh: coverage and year established* 
 
Name Date 
started 
Estimated 
number in 
state by 
2002 
Details 
Women’s 
SHGs 
(DWCRA) 
 on 
going 
since 
1982 
475,000 Up until 1994, only 10,000 groups were functioning; the 
expansion after this point has been unprecedented, yielding 
an estimated coverage of over 6 million women (averaging 12 
per group). 
In 2001, the corpus fund of groups was estimated at over 
1,000 crores (half of which was financial assistance) 
Other savings groups were started under the DPIP Scheme 
(Velugu) which started in 2000 in 180 economically backward 
mandals and was scaled up in 2002 to cover 861 mandals. 
Youth 
employment 
groups 
(CMEY) 
 1997 37,885 331,000 youth covered by end-2000 under the Chief 
Minister’s Employment for Youth scheme, CMEY (after which 
the programme was renamed Yuva Shakti). It is meant for 
groups of 15+ members or more, above the age of 18 years 
with family income less than Rs.11,000 per annum. One 
‘motivator’ is selected from each group. Groups are required 
to save Rs. 5,000 over six months to be eligible for a Rs.1L 
grant. Groups undergo training modules including 
health/AIDS awareness and entrepreneurial development. 
Other youth groups are formed under Prime Minister’s 
Employment for Youth (PMEY) scheme. 
WUAs 
 
 1997 10,292 
 
About two thirds of these are in small irrigation systems 
where the entire physical system is managed by a single 
WUA; while in the other third, several WUAs share 
management responsibility. 
4-10 members in committee, each farmer (water user) in the 
coverage area has a vote, regardless of size of landholding 
From January 1998 to March 1999, 22,887 works were 
undertaken, of which 70% were implemented directly by the 
WUAs. 
WDC  1997 5,499 The budget allocation of Rs.22.5 lakhs for a watershed area 
of 500 hectares. 
10% of the construction cost is to be borne by the landowner 
in whose lands the works are carried out. This may be borne 
by contributing cash or by physical labour 
Forest 
Committees 
 1997 6,616 15 members in each committee, half of whom should be 
women.   
 
SECs  1998 99,618 
 
All parents of the children in a school are members and from 
among them they elect a chairperson and 
three others, one of whom should be a woman and one 
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SC/ST. The committee meets every month and 
looks into various aspects of school education, like 
improvement of infrastructure, the standard of 
teaching etc., and also ensure 100% enrolment, monitoring 
of mid-day meals, motivating drop-outs to return to school 
and the recruitment of ‘vidya volunteers’. 
Only 15,009 were elected, through a show of hands. Most of 
these groups were nominated. 
Mothers’Com
mittees 
 1998 36,436 Each committee comprises of eight members. Two are 
mothers of children who are in the age group of 1-2 years, 
two are mothers of children of 3-6 years and two are 
mothers of adolescent girls. The other two are women in the 
age group of 18-45 years, preferably a pregnant woman and 
one with an infant. 8,816 committees received grants of 
Rs.1.25L to build day-care centres. Other responsibilities, to 
recruit child care centre workers, ensure child nutrition and 
motivate adolescent girls to enrol in skills development 
courses. 
This table draws from various sources including Sitaram 2002, GoAP 1997, WB 2000 
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Annex 3: Key development indications - state and sampled districts 
 Andhra Pradesh Prakasham Nalgonda 
Population density 275 173 227 
% Rural population 72.9 84.7 86.7 
% SCs* 15.9 20.0 17.7 
% STs* 6.3 3.6 9.7 
Rural sex ratio /1000 983 969 969 
Rural literacy rate 
  -male 
  -female 
   
66.1 67.4 67.0 
44.4 42.0 40.7 
SC literacy rate
#
 31.6 31.4 24.6 
% of male rural workers who are: 
   cultivators 
   agricultural labourers 
 
 
  
31.4 31.9 33.7 
37.9 36.9 30.3 
% of female rural workers who are: 
   cultivators 
   agricultural labourers 
 
 
  
21.9 21.5 20.7 
60.7 61.8 63.6 
HDI2001 **    
Education index  0.579 0.578 
Health index  0.839 0.795 
Standard of Living index  0.540 0.496 
HDI  0.373 0.496 
HDI district rank in Andhra Pradesh 
(out of a total of 22 districts) 
 
14 13 
 
#  
1991 figures 
HDI uses child mortality rate (0-4), literacy rate 
Data from  drawn from Census of India, 2001Statistical Abstract of Andhra Pradesh 2001 
** Subrahmanyam in Rao and Dev (2003) 
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Annex 4: General and leaders sample - social background 
Background  N % Remarks General 
sample% 
(N = 244) 
Gender Men 164 90.6   
Women 17 9.4   
Age <30 22 12.2   
 30<40 53 29.3   
 40<50 72 39.8   
 50<60 20 11.0   
 60+ 14 7.7   
Caste Category SC/ST 28 15.5 Tend to be selected/used  
BC 85 47.0 Mobile and fragmented  
OC 68 37.6   
Education No formal 
schooling 
19 10.5  51.6 
Primary 24 13.3  18.4 
Secondary 79 43.6  22.1 
Higher 59 32.6 28 graduate degrees, 7 post-graduation 
degrees 
7.8 
Occupation 
 
 
Multiple 
response: 68 
respondents 
mention two 
main 
occupations 
Agriculture 140 60.6   
Non-
Agriculture 
45 19.5 Private job/business (24), 
artisan/weaver (15), insurance agent 
(3), shopkeeper (1), auto-rickshaw 
driver (1), housewife (1) 
 
 
Skilled 
Professional 
3 1.3 Social worker (1), teacher (1), doctor 
(1) 
 
 
Other 43 18.6 Politics (14), contractor (13), master 
weaver (9), mistry** (9), ration shop 
dealer (2). 
 
Current party 
affiliation 
TDP 96 53.0 26.7% of leaders have changed their 
party since 1983 (i.e., since the 
inception of the TDP) 
42.5% of leaders come from ‘political 
families’ 
 
INC 71 39.2 
Other 14 7.7 
**mistries are local labour group leaders 
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Annex 5: Research tools:questionnaires used during field research 
Household Interview: Participation in Politics and Development 
(English translation) 
Individual Questionnaire:  
Respondents must be of voting age 
 
(Please read this at the start of every interview) 
 
My name is ___________ and I am conducting a survey regarding people’s 
participation in village level development. This work is being carried out as a 
research project for a university in the UK. This information is very important for 
understanding any problems in local development and how they can be best 
addressed. I would appreciate it if I could ask you a few questions on your 
experiences. This will only take a few minutes.  
 
All your answers will be confidential – your name and the name of the village will 
not be given to anyone outside of the research team.  
 
Would you be willing to take part in this survey:  Yes/No 
 
If no, then still try and record the basic information below. 
A1: Name:  
A2: Gender :  
A3: Religion: 
A4: Caste:  
A5: Village/hamlet/thanda: 
A6: Gram Panchayat: 
A7: Mandal: 
 
If it is inconvenient to conduct the interview now, could you specify a time that 
would be more convenient? 
 
If refusal – then record reason why 
 
Interview Log 
Date Time Comments 
   
   
   
   
 
In order to give you a chance to answer the questions, can I request that we 
conduct this interview in private?  
If not possible, record the names of the other people present and their 
relationship to the respondent below: 
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Introduction – please read 
From 1997, the government of AP has aimed to promote people’s participation, 
equality, and accountability in local development, through a combination of the 
Janmabhoomi programme, the panchayat and other local organisations. We are 
looking to try and find out your experiences regarding these initiatives to 
understand how they have contributed to the process of development in the 
village.  
 
(an extra page has been included at the back of this questionnaire for comments 
from respondents – please mark the question number to which the comments 
were raised) 
 
Elections 
B1  In talking to people about elections, it is found that they are sometimes not 
able to vote because they are not registered, they don’t have the time or they 
have difficultly getting to the polls. Think about panchayat elections since you 
were old enough to vote. Have you voted in all of them, in most of them, in some 
of them, rarely voted in them, or have you never voted at all in a panchayat 
election? 
 
Never voted in panchayat election  1 
Voted in some 2 
Voted in most 3 
Don’t know/not sure 8 
Refused to answer 9 
 
B2 In the last panchayat election, did you yourself try to talk to people and 
show them why they should vote for one of the parties or candidates? 
 
Yes  1 
No 2 
Don’t know 8 
Refused to answer 9 
 
B3 Did you attend any political meetings, rallies, speeches etc., in support of 
a particular candidate?  
 
Yes  1 
No 2 
Don’t know 8 
Refused to answer 9 
 
 
B4 What were the major factors influencing your decision to vote? 
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
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B5 Do you feel the elections to the grampanchayat were conducted fairly and 
allowed the most popular persons to be elected? 
  
Yes  1 
No 2 
Don’t know 8 
Refused to answer 9 
 
B6 i) Are you a member of a political party? If so which party? 
ii) Is anyone in your household a member of a political party? If so, which party? 
MARK DON’T KNOW AS 8 AND REFUSAL TO ANSWER AS ‘9’ 
a) Respondent 
 
Party 
b) Other – state who (relationship)  
  
  
  
  
 
Meetings  
C1 In the last year, have you initiated contact with any of the following 
persons regarding village development issues, and if so, what was the purpose? 
 READ OUT LIST 
Person Contacted Issue 
a) Sarpanch  
b) Up-sarpanch  
c) Ward panch  
d) Other panchayat 
member – MPTC/ZPTC 
 
e) Mandal Officer  
Who: 
 
 
f) Other district level 
officer 
Who: 
 
 
g) MLA/MP 
Who: 
 
h) I, myself, am a 
panchayat member 
Tick if true: 
i) Local NGO/social 
worker – give details 
 
 
 
j) Village Administrative 
Officer (VAO) or patwari 
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Who: 
 
 
C2 Of the 16 Janmabhoomi meetings held in your village over the last five  
years would you say you have attended all of them, most of them, some of them, 
few of them, none of them? 
  
All 1 
Most 2 
Some 3 
Few 4 
None 5 
Don’t know/not sure 8 
Refused to answer 9 
 
C3 (ask persons responding to other than All to question C2) 
What influences your decision to attend/or not to attend a Janmabhoomi 
GramSabha when it is held in your village? 
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
______________ 
 
C4  In your experience were these Janmabhoomi meetings - (circle for a,b,c) 
 
READ OUT Yes No D/K Ref 
a) A forum for lively discussion and debate by villagers? 1 2 8 9 
b) A good means to get information on government 
programmes? 
1 2 8 9 
c) A means by which villagers can keep a check on the 
activities of officers and the panchayat? 
1 2 8 9 
 
C4 i) Have you, or any member of your family contributed voluntary labour, 
finance or any other form of support to JB or development activities in the village 
– through shramadaman or by other means? – give details  
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
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C5 Now asking about meetings held by the gram panchayat or gram sabha 
conducted by the sarpanch, without officials present and open to the entire 
village.  
Thinking back over the last year, according to you, which of the following 
statements are true?  
 
No public meetings were organised in the last one 
year 
1 
Meetings were held, but I did not attend 2 
Meetings were held, and I attended some of them 3 
I have attended all public meetings called by the 
panchayat 
4 
Don’t know 8 
Refused to answer 9 
 
C6 Have you, over the last year –  
 
 Yes No Issue raised 
Raised an issue in the 
Janmabhoomi 
 
   
Raised an issue in the gram 
panchayat/gram sabha 
 
   
 
C7  Thinking back to the time before the Janmabhoomi programme started 
five years ago, do you feel that any of these statements are true? 
 
 TRUE FALSE D/K Refused 
a) There has been more development 
activity in the village by the government 
1 2 8 9 
b) The role of the sarpanch and 
panchayat has become bigger 
1 2 8 9 
c) The real needs and concerns of the 
villagers have been heard 
1 2 8 9 
d) The development programmes have 
reached those who really need them 
1 2 8 9 
e) On the whole, has your awareness/ 
knowledge of government development 
programmes increased? 
1 2 8 9 
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Exclusion from benefits 
D1 Thinking about the distribution of government and panchayat schemes 
and programmes in the village, which of the following do you think is true? 
   
Everyone gets a fair share 1 
People who are more powerful get a higher share 
of benefits 
2 
Benefits go to those who need them the most? 3 
Some programmes are distributed more fairly than 
others? 
4 
Selection of beneficiaries is made public 5 
Government officials select beneficiaries 6 
The panchayat plays a major role in selecting 
beneficiaries? 
7 
Don’t know/not sure 8 
Refused to answer 9 
 
Comments: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D2 Are there any development programmes or village activities that other 
members of the village have access to but you or members of your household do 
not? (mark spontaneous responses first and then read out the list, mark these 
two in a separate box below.) 
add comments and other schemes/programmes where necessary 
  
 Spon. Prompt Comments 
i) Education/schools    
ii) Health services/clinics    
iii) Government loans/credit    
iv) Housing assistance    
v) Water supply    
vi) Agricultural assistance    
vii) Employment  
     opportunities 
   
viii) Fair justice    
iv) Contact with higher  
     officials 
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D3  What qualities or attributes do you think a person needs to get greater 
access to development programmes and to obtain a greater share of benefits 
from them? (tick the first three mentioned – do not read out the list) 
 
High caste 1 
High education 2 
Large wealth 3 
Men can have more influence than women 4 
Political affiliation 5 
Religious belief 6 
Better information of rules and programmes 7 
Better contact with officials  10 
Other  
Don’t know/not sure 8 
Refused to answer 9 
 
 
Membership in other groups 
E1 Are you a member of any of the following groups or associations? 
 Are there any other groups you are a member of/or you participate in? 
  
Group Name  
Farmers’ group  1 
Cooperative Society  2 
Saving/credit group  3 
Religious group  4 
Caste   5 
Youth group  6 
Other   
   
   
   
 
Information Access 
F1 Which of the following sources do you consult regularly – i.e., at least one 
a month – for news and information (on current events and development issues) 
(if yes, try to get details of the newspaper’s name, the channel watched or the 
key persons mentioned) 
Household members 1  
Neighbours  2  
Village leaders, prominent persons, 
political party 
3  
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Radio 4  
TV 5  
Newspapers 6  
 
F2 What kinds of information do you seek from these sources?   
(give complete answers below) 
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________ 
 
 
F3  What is your level of education? (number of years of schooling);      
 
G Other. 
 
Please list the number of people in the household with their age and gender: 
Name Age Male/Female 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
G1 What is the main occupation for your household? (list up to three, underline 
the main one ) 
 
 
 
G2 How much agricultural land does your household have? (in bighas) 
  
Irrigated  
Unirrigated  
 
G3 Animals owned 
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G4 Does anyone in your family have a salaried job? (give details) 
 
 
 
 
G5 House type –  Kutcha   1                  Pucca         2      
 
 
G6 Does anyone in your household migrate for work during the year? (give 
details) 
 
 
 
 
 
G7 Do anyone in your family work on anyone else’s land on a regular basis or do 
you employ labour on a contract basis? (give details) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G8 Does your household rent land from anyone on a regular basis or rent land 
out to someone? (give details) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Would you be willing to take part in further discussions on these issues? 
          Yes/No  
 
Many thanks for your cooperation. Your involvement in this study is much 
appreciated.  
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Group discussion and key informants’ schedule: semi-structured interview- 
record name and caste of all the participants 
 
What is the purpose of the panchayat? 
Do most people vote in the panchayat elections? 
Was the election conducted fairly? 
What are the characteristics of the elected members – why were they elected? 
What were the major competing groups in the village election? 
Who are the most influential members in the present panchayat? 
What role does party politics play in the panchayat? 
Who else in the village influences the panchayat?  
What are the features of the influential people? 
Construct the timeline of your village/GP politics 
Have you attended a gram sabha held by the panchayat?  
How often are they held? 
What kinds of issues are discussed at these meetings? 
What kind of attendance is there normally? (men, women) 
Who participates mostly? 
Can one say what one wants in the gram sabha? 
Does the sarpanch make him/herself available the to village to discuss issues? 
Do programmes delivered by the panchayat go to the most deserving? 
 
What is the role of Janmabhoomi? 
What all the 16 rounds been conducted effectively? 
What was the attendance like, has it changed over time? 
It the JB a good forum to raise concerns in? 
Is there any political party involvement in the JB? 
What kinds of issues are discussed in the JB? 
Do issues get acted upon? 
Are benefits distributed fairly in the JB? 
 
What the differences between Janmabhoomi, gram sabha and ordinary 
gramsabha (in terms of attendance and issues discussed?    
What do you feel are the major changes in village level development since the 
start of JB? 
What other committees exist in the village - development and other (especially 
political)?  
What are their roles and relations between committees? 
Who are the leaders of these groups? 
What is the background of leaders?  
Who are the most influential persons in the village… why? 
Map the institutions and their relations 
Other events that have shaped village development and local politics 
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Leaders interview summary  
Semi-structured interview  
 
What positions do you currently hold? 
Which party do you support? 
How long have you been involved in politics (noting key positions held and party 
changes) 
What do you see as your role as a village leader? 
Who are the leaders outside the village you regularly contact and for what kind of 
issues? 
Have you personally been involved in local contracts? (if so, name and record source and 
size of contract) 
What are you views on the current government and in particular, the new initiatives like 
Janmabhoomi? 
 What are the key challenges you think face your village? 
What are your political ambitions? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<end> 
